distribution and transmission) as a result of energy and power sector reform
programmes promoted by the World Bank in particular (Tellam, 2000; Cho and
Dubash, 2005). The role of ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’,
5 practised by key inter -
national institutions and multilateral development banks, in constraining the policy
autonomy and developmental space of poorer countries over whom they exercise
control through their lending practices (Gill, 1995; Gallagher, 2005), raises key
questions about what instruments states have available to address the challenges of
decarbonizing their economies when many have ceded direct control over their
energy sectors. At the same time, as host to a suite of Climate Investment Funds
and serving as the trustee of the Green Climate Fund, the World Bank and other
donors are in a position to use their structural power in ways that promote lower
carbon energy pathways, even if the record to date is mixed at best amid continued
large-scale lending for fossil fuels (WRI, 2008). Either way, these examples pose
a challenge to assumptions in debates about transitions management about how
much autonomy and power most states have in reality to pursue their preferred
transition pathways, or to manage transitions on their own terms.
Given the unequal and uneven global economy in which green transformations
will have to occur, the uncritical pursuit of the ‘green economy’ also runs the risk
of reproducing injustices of the fossil fuel economy unless attention is paid to
inequities and injustices in the production or supply of energy technologies.
Examples include the use of toxic chemicals by immigrant and female labour in
the production of solar photovoltaics (PV) cells (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013);
green grabs for biofuels (Fairhead et al., 2012); displacement for carbon-financed
wind-farm projects (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009) or the lithium rush in Bolivia for
batteries for electric cars. This is about addressing the creation or exacerbation of
poverty in the production of energy technologies and reducing scope to displace
and allocate burdens in unequal and uneven ways within the global political
economy between and within states.
Financialization
It may also be the case, however, that shifts in power as a result of the global
reorganization of capitalism might create opportunities to destabilize incumbent
regimes. I am referring to the interest that powerful actors in this current phase of
neoliberalism – global finance – have shown in decarbonization. The centrality of
finance in the making of global capitalism has already been emphasized in general
terms. Its role in the era of post-Fordism has also led to claims of a finance-led
regime of accumulation being the dominant growth model in the contemporary
global economy from the late 1970s and early 1980s (Aglietta, 2000). This section
seeks to reflect on the historic role of finance in literally fuelling the industries and
underwriting carbon-intensive infrastructures, and what this suggests about the role
it may play in supporting and benefiting from a shift away from a structure of
production based largely on the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels. Although
current debates about transitions and transformation place technology centrally in
Green transformations in capitalism 77
programmes promoted by the World Bank in particular (Tellam, 2000; Cho and
Dubash, 2005). The role of ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’,
5 practised by key inter -
national institutions and multilateral development banks, in constraining the policy
autonomy and developmental space of poorer countries over whom they exercise
control through their lending practices (Gill, 1995; Gallagher, 2005), raises key
questions about what instruments states have available to address the challenges of
decarbonizing their economies when many have ceded direct control over their
energy sectors. At the same time, as host to a suite of Climate Investment Funds
and serving as the trustee of the Green Climate Fund, the World Bank and other
donors are in a position to use their structural power in ways that promote lower
carbon energy pathways, even if the record to date is mixed at best amid continued
large-scale lending for fossil fuels (WRI, 2008). Either way, these examples pose
a challenge to assumptions in debates about transitions management about how
much autonomy and power most states have in reality to pursue their preferred
transition pathways, or to manage transitions on their own terms.
Given the unequal and uneven global economy in which green transformations
will have to occur, the uncritical pursuit of the ‘green economy’ also runs the risk
of reproducing injustices of the fossil fuel economy unless attention is paid to
inequities and injustices in the production or supply of energy technologies.
Examples include the use of toxic chemicals by immigrant and female labour in
the production of solar photovoltaics (PV) cells (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013);
green grabs for biofuels (Fairhead et al., 2012); displacement for carbon-financed
wind-farm projects (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009) or the lithium rush in Bolivia for
batteries for electric cars. This is about addressing the creation or exacerbation of
poverty in the production of energy technologies and reducing scope to displace
and allocate burdens in unequal and uneven ways within the global political
economy between and within states.
Financialization
It may also be the case, however, that shifts in power as a result of the global
reorganization of capitalism might create opportunities to destabilize incumbent
regimes. I am referring to the interest that powerful actors in this current phase of
neoliberalism – global finance – have shown in decarbonization. The centrality of
finance in the making of global capitalism has already been emphasized in general
terms. Its role in the era of post-Fordism has also led to claims of a finance-led
regime of accumulation being the dominant growth model in the contemporary
global economy from the late 1970s and early 1980s (Aglietta, 2000). This section
seeks to reflect on the historic role of finance in literally fuelling the industries and
underwriting carbon-intensive infrastructures, and what this suggests about the role
it may play in supporting and benefiting from a shift away from a structure of
production based largely on the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels. Although
current debates about transitions and transformation place technology centrally in
Green transformations in capitalism 77