the form of proactive efforts to claim control over processes, priorities and resources,
as in the case of the movements for food, water and energy justice/sovereignty.
These illustrate the potential of place-based struggles to resonate and ‘globalize’
through transnational advocacy networks (Leach and Scoones, 2007; Sikor and
Newell, 2014), while also inviting questions about the scalability and replicability
of experiments and successful campaigns, given the contingent and context-specific
nature of transformation politics.
Across these four strategies for transformation, there is a diverse, always messy
(and often murky) politics at play. This highlights a profound mismatch between
how transformations are currently and historically practised – always complex, over -
lapping and contested – and how they are talked about and imagined in policy –
often as a plan, specified in terms of goals and targets, implying hubristic illusions
of control through management (Stirling, this book). Although with hindsight the
temptation is to ascribe unidirectionality, linearity and clearly defined purpose to
transformations in previous historical periods, when living through such periods
of change, they appear open-ended, where goals and pathways to change are often
unclear and contested (Newell, this book). Moreover, despite the best intentions
and aspirations of planners and entrepreneurs, muddling through, constant adaptation and coping are the norm, and act to subvert and resist any plans that seek
to predict and manage change (Folke et al., 2002). Added to the importance of
political–economic contexts, this should strike a note of caution about ‘blue prints’,
‘models’ and ‘transfers’ from ‘success’ stories such as Germany or China (see Schmitz,
Lockwood, this book).
Across the book, the different contributions incline towards a stance of politically
informed, yet pragmatic realism, drawing on combinations of the different strategies
outlined above to map out ways forward. A scepticism towards simplistic win–win
technocratic or market solutions comes across clearly. However, there is also an
acknowledgement that the likelihood of radical change in the short term is small,
while maintaining a commitment to longer term, more radical shifts, and to ensuring
that decisions now do not constrain the possibility of such longer term changes.
Collectively, there is a shared appreciation that current economic and political
structures around markets, technology, finance and existing allocations of power
are not delivering green transformations that are either just or sustainable. So a
searching analysis of wider political economy and the structures of power is
necessary. Yet the sense in which a radical and revolutionary overhaul is unlikely
soon, even if ultimately desirable, suggests the inevitability of the messy politics of
deal-brokering, compromise and alliance-building for green transformations.
Conclusion
So what does this all mean for the politics of green transformations? First, the chapters
strike a note of caution about the idea that there will be one great, guided
(normally assumed from above or through the market) green transformation.
Neither a global Green New Deal, a World Environment Organisation or global
The politics of green transformations 23
as in the case of the movements for food, water and energy justice/sovereignty.
These illustrate the potential of place-based struggles to resonate and ‘globalize’
through transnational advocacy networks (Leach and Scoones, 2007; Sikor and
Newell, 2014), while also inviting questions about the scalability and replicability
of experiments and successful campaigns, given the contingent and context-specific
nature of transformation politics.
Across these four strategies for transformation, there is a diverse, always messy
(and often murky) politics at play. This highlights a profound mismatch between
how transformations are currently and historically practised – always complex, over -
lapping and contested – and how they are talked about and imagined in policy –
often as a plan, specified in terms of goals and targets, implying hubristic illusions
of control through management (Stirling, this book). Although with hindsight the
temptation is to ascribe unidirectionality, linearity and clearly defined purpose to
transformations in previous historical periods, when living through such periods
of change, they appear open-ended, where goals and pathways to change are often
unclear and contested (Newell, this book). Moreover, despite the best intentions
and aspirations of planners and entrepreneurs, muddling through, constant adaptation and coping are the norm, and act to subvert and resist any plans that seek
to predict and manage change (Folke et al., 2002). Added to the importance of
political–economic contexts, this should strike a note of caution about ‘blue prints’,
‘models’ and ‘transfers’ from ‘success’ stories such as Germany or China (see Schmitz,
Lockwood, this book).
Across the book, the different contributions incline towards a stance of politically
informed, yet pragmatic realism, drawing on combinations of the different strategies
outlined above to map out ways forward. A scepticism towards simplistic win–win
technocratic or market solutions comes across clearly. However, there is also an
acknowledgement that the likelihood of radical change in the short term is small,
while maintaining a commitment to longer term, more radical shifts, and to ensuring
that decisions now do not constrain the possibility of such longer term changes.
Collectively, there is a shared appreciation that current economic and political
structures around markets, technology, finance and existing allocations of power
are not delivering green transformations that are either just or sustainable. So a
searching analysis of wider political economy and the structures of power is
necessary. Yet the sense in which a radical and revolutionary overhaul is unlikely
soon, even if ultimately desirable, suggests the inevitability of the messy politics of
deal-brokering, compromise and alliance-building for green transformations.
Conclusion
So what does this all mean for the politics of green transformations? First, the chapters
strike a note of caution about the idea that there will be one great, guided
(normally assumed from above or through the market) green transformation.
Neither a global Green New Deal, a World Environment Organisation or global
The politics of green transformations 23