solutions, and how we come to define, know and frame futures. Closing down
debates and the capture of terms and styles of discussion are common features.
We must ask whose knowledge counts in the development and articulation of
authoritative and legitimate knowledge about transformations. Many of the book’s
contributions argue for the need to ‘open up’ discussions, allowing for discursive
reframing, and deliberation and dialogue as part of a process of knowledge pro -
duction for and within transformations. These structures of knowledge production
have concrete, material and distributional implications, as the contributions from
Leach, Stirling and Millstone make clear. This raises important challenges about
the robustness of institutions to deal with the plurality and diversity of knowledge,
as Millstone suggests. Previous experience of global assessments (Scoones, 2009),
or attempts to manage public engagement though global institutions charged with
governing technology (Newell, 2010) offer important lessons (Beck et al., 2014).
Realigning institutions and incentives
Several chapters point to the potentially key role of strong (entrepreneurial or
developmental) states in pushing (rather than just nudging) change (Mazzucato,
this book), and the importance of different institutional configurations to the
prospects of green transformations (Lockwood, this book). They also raise questions
about the capacity of states to fulfil what is imagined or expected of them. The
potential for state capture is also highlighted when so much is at stake and powerful
actors feel threatened by the direction of change and seek to control the pace and
direction of it.
This is not just about differences between states in the global North and
South, since while resources are critical, corporate capture of states is a worldwide
phenomenon. This is just one aspect of the changing global context, including the
rise of the BRICS, which is rendering old North–South distinctions obsolete, and
highlighting both global commonalities and new axes of political–economic power
and privilege. There are issues everywhere, then, of whether states can or should
‘pick winners’, and their willingness and ability to challenge incumbent power –
to discontinue sunk investments and avoid technological and infrastructural lockin, for example. The nimbleness of the state to reflect, challenge and change direction
is often questionable (Lockwood, this book), although there are also positive
examples (Mazzucato, Schmitz, this book).
Mobilizing and networking
Civic action to disrupt, discontinue and challenge incumbent power has always
been a central part of historical transformations and will continue to be part of
future ones. Smith and Ely (this book) emphasize the potential of bottom-up
innovation and grassroots practice. Movements play a key role in challenging the
legitimacy of dominant framings, resource distributions, technological priorities and
distributional consequences (Leach and Scoones, this book). This occasionally takes
22 Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and Melissa Leach
debates and the capture of terms and styles of discussion are common features.
We must ask whose knowledge counts in the development and articulation of
authoritative and legitimate knowledge about transformations. Many of the book’s
contributions argue for the need to ‘open up’ discussions, allowing for discursive
reframing, and deliberation and dialogue as part of a process of knowledge pro -
duction for and within transformations. These structures of knowledge production
have concrete, material and distributional implications, as the contributions from
Leach, Stirling and Millstone make clear. This raises important challenges about
the robustness of institutions to deal with the plurality and diversity of knowledge,
as Millstone suggests. Previous experience of global assessments (Scoones, 2009),
or attempts to manage public engagement though global institutions charged with
governing technology (Newell, 2010) offer important lessons (Beck et al., 2014).
Realigning institutions and incentives
Several chapters point to the potentially key role of strong (entrepreneurial or
developmental) states in pushing (rather than just nudging) change (Mazzucato,
this book), and the importance of different institutional configurations to the
prospects of green transformations (Lockwood, this book). They also raise questions
about the capacity of states to fulfil what is imagined or expected of them. The
potential for state capture is also highlighted when so much is at stake and powerful
actors feel threatened by the direction of change and seek to control the pace and
direction of it.
This is not just about differences between states in the global North and
South, since while resources are critical, corporate capture of states is a worldwide
phenomenon. This is just one aspect of the changing global context, including the
rise of the BRICS, which is rendering old North–South distinctions obsolete, and
highlighting both global commonalities and new axes of political–economic power
and privilege. There are issues everywhere, then, of whether states can or should
‘pick winners’, and their willingness and ability to challenge incumbent power –
to discontinue sunk investments and avoid technological and infrastructural lockin, for example. The nimbleness of the state to reflect, challenge and change direction
is often questionable (Lockwood, this book), although there are also positive
examples (Mazzucato, Schmitz, this book).
Mobilizing and networking
Civic action to disrupt, discontinue and challenge incumbent power has always
been a central part of historical transformations and will continue to be part of
future ones. Smith and Ely (this book) emphasize the potential of bottom-up
innovation and grassroots practice. Movements play a key role in challenging the
legitimacy of dominant framings, resource distributions, technological priorities and
distributional consequences (Leach and Scoones, this book). This occasionally takes
22 Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and Melissa Leach