fundamental conflicts and trade-offs, centring again on questions about what is to
be sustained and what we mean by green.
Glib policy statements of win–win green economies often obscure the many
hard trade-offs implied by attempts to square environmental aims with social justice,
or to pursue a just transition (Agyeman et al., 2003; Swilling and Annecke, 2012;
Newell and Mulvaney, 2013). While some focus only on green limits and planetary
boundaries, others argue that attending to distributional issues first is essential –
creating a ‘safe and just operating space for humanity’, with a basic floor of welfare,
human rights and dignity (Raworth, 2012; Leach et al., 2012, 2013). These per -
spectives are reflected in attempts to protect ‘development rights in a carbon
con strained world’ (Baer et al., 2008) or to specify ‘contraction’ on the part of
richer countries and ‘convergence’ on the part of poorer ones towards agreed per
capita entitlements to what remains of available carbon budgets (GCI, 2014).
Rather than divide up the existing cake (albeit an ever smaller one) in more
equitable ways, one alternative invokes what some term ‘green sufficiency’. Thus
the claim that continuous exponential economic growth can ever be compatible
with long-run environmental sustainability is contested (Trainer, 1996). Prosperity,
not growth, is seen as the appropriate goal for green economies and societies, to
be built through emphases on well-being, social sustainability, services and care
(Jackson, 2011). Such perspectives are promoted by Green political parties in some
countries, with a focus on public provision of sustainable energy and water, and
support for community-based economies (Douthwaite, 1996; Levidow, 2014).
A related set of alternatives emphasize green well-being and justice. Some argue
that mainstream versions of the ‘green economy’ and ‘green growth’ function
primarily as a means to maintain existing patterns of capitalist development and
the inequalities associated with them, just now under a green veneer (Lyon and
Maxwell, 2011). While some reject the concept of the green economy entirely
(Wanner, 2014), others seek to elaborate it to incorporate questions of justice,
promoting ideas of a ‘green and fair economy’ (Green Economy Coalition, 2014).
Understanding the politics of green transformations
All transformations are replete with governance challenges, and this book asks: whose
rules rule, which institutions define visions of change and the terms of change,
and which relations of power shape different pathways?
Given the variety of perspectives on green transformations, it is not surprising
to find a diversity of literatures that offer interpretations and frameworks for
understanding them. One important area is the growing literature on sociotechnical
transitions. This has generated many important insights into how, when and why
sociotechnical change is possible: how niche technologies emerge and displace
incumbent regimes and how a series of landscape factors can frustrate or enable
this change (Geels, 2005a; Scarse and Smith, 2009; Geels and Schot, 2007;
Loorbach, 2007; Grin et al., 2010).
6 Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and Melissa Leach
be sustained and what we mean by green.
Glib policy statements of win–win green economies often obscure the many
hard trade-offs implied by attempts to square environmental aims with social justice,
or to pursue a just transition (Agyeman et al., 2003; Swilling and Annecke, 2012;
Newell and Mulvaney, 2013). While some focus only on green limits and planetary
boundaries, others argue that attending to distributional issues first is essential –
creating a ‘safe and just operating space for humanity’, with a basic floor of welfare,
human rights and dignity (Raworth, 2012; Leach et al., 2012, 2013). These per -
spectives are reflected in attempts to protect ‘development rights in a carbon
con strained world’ (Baer et al., 2008) or to specify ‘contraction’ on the part of
richer countries and ‘convergence’ on the part of poorer ones towards agreed per
capita entitlements to what remains of available carbon budgets (GCI, 2014).
Rather than divide up the existing cake (albeit an ever smaller one) in more
equitable ways, one alternative invokes what some term ‘green sufficiency’. Thus
the claim that continuous exponential economic growth can ever be compatible
with long-run environmental sustainability is contested (Trainer, 1996). Prosperity,
not growth, is seen as the appropriate goal for green economies and societies, to
be built through emphases on well-being, social sustainability, services and care
(Jackson, 2011). Such perspectives are promoted by Green political parties in some
countries, with a focus on public provision of sustainable energy and water, and
support for community-based economies (Douthwaite, 1996; Levidow, 2014).
A related set of alternatives emphasize green well-being and justice. Some argue
that mainstream versions of the ‘green economy’ and ‘green growth’ function
primarily as a means to maintain existing patterns of capitalist development and
the inequalities associated with them, just now under a green veneer (Lyon and
Maxwell, 2011). While some reject the concept of the green economy entirely
(Wanner, 2014), others seek to elaborate it to incorporate questions of justice,
promoting ideas of a ‘green and fair economy’ (Green Economy Coalition, 2014).
Understanding the politics of green transformations
All transformations are replete with governance challenges, and this book asks: whose
rules rule, which institutions define visions of change and the terms of change,
and which relations of power shape different pathways?
Given the variety of perspectives on green transformations, it is not surprising
to find a diversity of literatures that offer interpretations and frameworks for
understanding them. One important area is the growing literature on sociotechnical
transitions. This has generated many important insights into how, when and why
sociotechnical change is possible: how niche technologies emerge and displace
incumbent regimes and how a series of landscape factors can frustrate or enable
this change (Geels, 2005a; Scarse and Smith, 2009; Geels and Schot, 2007;
Loorbach, 2007; Grin et al., 2010).
6 Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and Melissa Leach