this book). Similarly, others have highlighted the dangers of ‘post-political’
discourses (Swyngedouw, 2010) around environmental threats such as climate change
that restrict the contours of legitimate political debate precisely on grounds of the
need to suspend social conflict. Instead, clear urgencies and imperatives may call
for a ‘slow race’ – making haste slowly – in a way that is respectful of inclusion,
deliberation, democracy and justice (Leach and Scoones, 2006).
What is to be transformed and how?
There is widespread acknowledgement of the multiple environmental stresses the
world faces – from climate change, air and water pollution, and biodiversity loss
to land use change, for example. There is growing consensus that these will prove
deeply damaging to human well-being and futures unless they are addressed. There
is a robust debate, but a lesser consensus, about the drivers that exacerbate them
– including overconsumption, urban expansion, population pressures, unequal
economic relations and globalization. But how these are to be tackled remains much
disputed, and a clear vision of what green transformations are required, for what
and for whom remains elusive.
This is, of course, due to political contention. There is intense competition
around framings of how to read and react to the observed trends: what diagnoses
they allegedly provide of the origins of the crisis and the sources of the remedies.
There is much at stake in the construction of what drives unsustainability (who is
to blame for what) and of what forces can be aligned to rebalance socionatures.
Whether wholesale transformations, as opposed to more discrete sociotechnical tran -
si tions, are required, and what it is that is to be transformed, has major implications
for actors and interests – which are supported and which challenged. Whether
transformations should be technology-led, marketized, state-led or citizen-led has
huge implications for the processes, institutions and instruments deployed. Should
the entry point be individual behaviour change, pricing of environmental external -
ities and ecosystem services, state restructuring and support for ‘green’ industrial
sectors, or green technological innovation? All have different implications for who
should be involved on what terms and who wins and who loses. Such choices
about ‘green’ directions therefore inevitably have implications for social justice and
social inequality.
In recent years, debates about economic growth have taken centre stage – both
its desirability as an end in itself (Jackson, 2011; Dale, 2012), and the extent to
which it improves broad well-being in highly unequal, richer societies (Wilkinson
and Pickett, 2010). Measures of growth, and appropriate metrics and accounting
systems, have also been widely debated, with calls for ‘green accounting’, ‘ecological
footprint’ assessments and ‘circular economy’ measures (Vincent, 2000; Mathews
and Tan, 2011; Wackernagel and Rees, 2013). Debates about growth have also
prompted deeper reflections about the scope for the greening of capitalism, or
whether the idea of green(er) capitalism constitutes an oxymoron (O’Connor, 1994;
Foster, 2002; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Newell, 2012). All of these debates identify
The politics of green transformations 5
discourses (Swyngedouw, 2010) around environmental threats such as climate change
that restrict the contours of legitimate political debate precisely on grounds of the
need to suspend social conflict. Instead, clear urgencies and imperatives may call
for a ‘slow race’ – making haste slowly – in a way that is respectful of inclusion,
deliberation, democracy and justice (Leach and Scoones, 2006).
What is to be transformed and how?
There is widespread acknowledgement of the multiple environmental stresses the
world faces – from climate change, air and water pollution, and biodiversity loss
to land use change, for example. There is growing consensus that these will prove
deeply damaging to human well-being and futures unless they are addressed. There
is a robust debate, but a lesser consensus, about the drivers that exacerbate them
– including overconsumption, urban expansion, population pressures, unequal
economic relations and globalization. But how these are to be tackled remains much
disputed, and a clear vision of what green transformations are required, for what
and for whom remains elusive.
This is, of course, due to political contention. There is intense competition
around framings of how to read and react to the observed trends: what diagnoses
they allegedly provide of the origins of the crisis and the sources of the remedies.
There is much at stake in the construction of what drives unsustainability (who is
to blame for what) and of what forces can be aligned to rebalance socionatures.
Whether wholesale transformations, as opposed to more discrete sociotechnical tran -
si tions, are required, and what it is that is to be transformed, has major implications
for actors and interests – which are supported and which challenged. Whether
transformations should be technology-led, marketized, state-led or citizen-led has
huge implications for the processes, institutions and instruments deployed. Should
the entry point be individual behaviour change, pricing of environmental external -
ities and ecosystem services, state restructuring and support for ‘green’ industrial
sectors, or green technological innovation? All have different implications for who
should be involved on what terms and who wins and who loses. Such choices
about ‘green’ directions therefore inevitably have implications for social justice and
social inequality.
In recent years, debates about economic growth have taken centre stage – both
its desirability as an end in itself (Jackson, 2011; Dale, 2012), and the extent to
which it improves broad well-being in highly unequal, richer societies (Wilkinson
and Pickett, 2010). Measures of growth, and appropriate metrics and accounting
systems, have also been widely debated, with calls for ‘green accounting’, ‘ecological
footprint’ assessments and ‘circular economy’ measures (Vincent, 2000; Mathews
and Tan, 2011; Wackernagel and Rees, 2013). Debates about growth have also
prompted deeper reflections about the scope for the greening of capitalism, or
whether the idea of green(er) capitalism constitutes an oxymoron (O’Connor, 1994;
Foster, 2002; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Newell, 2012). All of these debates identify
The politics of green transformations 5