United Kingdom 77
magnitude of their possible effects on the UK nuclear power as extremely high.
Similar accidents can in fact become key triggers in radically increasing activism and social disruption, posing significant threats to the entire UK nuclear
sector, especially in any case of geographically close and high- impact accidents
(Wheatley, Sovacool et al. 2016).
Radioactive waste legacy and intergenerational injustice
There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the back- end of the nuclear fuel
cycle (decommissioning and waste management), especially the failure to date
to establish a UK geological repository for high- level wastes. Considering the
ethical issues, poor waste management governance, and the scale and longevity
of radioactive waste, there is a widespread stakeholder view that the risk has not
been fully taken into account in UK nuclear expansion decisions (Second stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2017). A specific issue is the peripheralisation/
marginalisation of communities surrounding nuclear facilities and waste sites.
These communities may be prone to manipulation of public opinion by the
nuclear industry to develop an apparent social acceptance (Sovacool, 2011,
p. 211). The risk of continued failure to develop adequate and democratic waste
governance is considered a risk whose magnitude and effects are hard to define
precisely. No timely mitigation strategy was advanced by stakeholders.
Lack of technology and specialised skills
Stakeholders have considered this among the most likely and potentially
harmful risks to the success of new nuclear power in the UK. While this may
seem surprising given the UK’s long experience in nuclear technology, the UK
is contemplating the commercialisation of at least four overseas nuclear technologies as part of its expansion plan (the EPR, AP1000, ABWR, and Hualong)
and possibly more (e.g. SMRs). The greater part of the relevant knowledge
about these technologies resides outside the UK, so this significant expansion of
novel nuclear technologies and related systems requires development of many
new skills for the implementation of such an ambitious and diverse nuclear
pathway. The needs for significant technology transfer processes and agreements
can be seen as limits for a domestic implementation of the sector. In addition,
Brexit, which may lead to a slowdown in technological relationships with traditional UK nuclear partners such as France, may further increase both the likelihood and magnitude of such risk. Finally, the lack of people with specialised
skills in nuclear regulation is considered as a particular risk for the sector by the
stakeholders. Lack of capacity among regulators could lead to a significant misalignment between the ambitions for the UK nuclear sector and the means to
fulfil them (First stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2016).
magnitude of their possible effects on the UK nuclear power as extremely high.
Similar accidents can in fact become key triggers in radically increasing activism and social disruption, posing significant threats to the entire UK nuclear
sector, especially in any case of geographically close and high- impact accidents
(Wheatley, Sovacool et al. 2016).
Radioactive waste legacy and intergenerational injustice
There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the back- end of the nuclear fuel
cycle (decommissioning and waste management), especially the failure to date
to establish a UK geological repository for high- level wastes. Considering the
ethical issues, poor waste management governance, and the scale and longevity
of radioactive waste, there is a widespread stakeholder view that the risk has not
been fully taken into account in UK nuclear expansion decisions (Second stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2017). A specific issue is the peripheralisation/
marginalisation of communities surrounding nuclear facilities and waste sites.
These communities may be prone to manipulation of public opinion by the
nuclear industry to develop an apparent social acceptance (Sovacool, 2011,
p. 211). The risk of continued failure to develop adequate and democratic waste
governance is considered a risk whose magnitude and effects are hard to define
precisely. No timely mitigation strategy was advanced by stakeholders.
Lack of technology and specialised skills
Stakeholders have considered this among the most likely and potentially
harmful risks to the success of new nuclear power in the UK. While this may
seem surprising given the UK’s long experience in nuclear technology, the UK
is contemplating the commercialisation of at least four overseas nuclear technologies as part of its expansion plan (the EPR, AP1000, ABWR, and Hualong)
and possibly more (e.g. SMRs). The greater part of the relevant knowledge
about these technologies resides outside the UK, so this significant expansion of
novel nuclear technologies and related systems requires development of many
new skills for the implementation of such an ambitious and diverse nuclear
pathway. The needs for significant technology transfer processes and agreements
can be seen as limits for a domestic implementation of the sector. In addition,
Brexit, which may lead to a slowdown in technological relationships with traditional UK nuclear partners such as France, may further increase both the likelihood and magnitude of such risk. Finally, the lack of people with specialised
skills in nuclear regulation is considered as a particular risk for the sector by the
stakeholders. Lack of capacity among regulators could lead to a significant misalignment between the ambitions for the UK nuclear sector and the means to
fulfil them (First stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2016).