Framing risks and uncertainties 11
Risk and uncertainty are often used synonymously, as if they were one
concept; this is particularly the case in the climate change research and policymaking community, and in the context of mitigation policy. For instance, in
the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report, working group III introduces risk management as a key pillar of the
assessment report (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b), and the IPCC overall provides
detailed guidance on how to address uncertainty in its work (Mastrandrea et al.,
2011). However, even in this co- ordinated assessment, we find several different
interpretations of risks and uncertainties. This is potentially a spill- over from
economics, which is among the most influential disciplines in this research area
of climate–economy interactions and modelling, but where no one standardised
understanding of either concept is provided.
At least for analytical clarity, but also for clarity in communicating across
scientific boundaries, it is worth acknowledging and explaining how we avoid
using these two concepts as synonyms in this book. Most often academic work,
including pieces of the ‘grey literature’, when talking about ‘risks and uncertainties’ actually only address one of the two concepts. While this is not wrong, this
interchanging use of the two terms may hinder effective academic work in
support of climate policy. It may also cause confusion to both policymakers and
those new to the study of risk and/or uncertainty.
We understand uncertainty as a general lack of knowledge of possible outcomes and states of the world. Uncertainty is a broader concept than risk, which
refers to a calculated or perceived potential for negative impacts when the
outcome is uncertain. Thus, uncertainty always retains an element of risk and,
conversely, risk is always a form/subcategory of uncertainty. Risk is a reduced
form of uncertainty, and one that we can better manage than most other forms.
When we present disciplinary approaches to uncertainty, we only consider those
that go beyond risk.
Perspectives on uncertainty
Since Socrates and then well into the seventeenth century, awareness of uncertainty and ignorance had been recognised as the key to wisdom. However, Descartes heralded three centuries of ‘ignorance of ignorance’, that is complete
confidence in rationalism to provide certainty/truth, which became the normal
state of the educated classes of Europe, particularly those in science (Ravetz,
2009, pp. xv–xvi). It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that a
renewed awareness of uncertainty and ignorance returned. Thus, Ravetz argues,
modern dealings with uncertainty have come to the fore with probabilistic risk
assessment in the 1950s related to nuclear technology. Indeed, most concrete
disciplinary work has been done in the context of risk as one specific form of
uncertainty, as discussed in the following section. Broader ideas of uncertainty
are rare and lack a disciplinary home. Some useful categorisations may help
better distinguish and understand such uncertainties based on the extent of
uncertainty, the sources of uncertainty, and the ability to measure uncertainty.
Risk and uncertainty are often used synonymously, as if they were one
concept; this is particularly the case in the climate change research and policymaking community, and in the context of mitigation policy. For instance, in
the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report, working group III introduces risk management as a key pillar of the
assessment report (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b), and the IPCC overall provides
detailed guidance on how to address uncertainty in its work (Mastrandrea et al.,
2011). However, even in this co- ordinated assessment, we find several different
interpretations of risks and uncertainties. This is potentially a spill- over from
economics, which is among the most influential disciplines in this research area
of climate–economy interactions and modelling, but where no one standardised
understanding of either concept is provided.
At least for analytical clarity, but also for clarity in communicating across
scientific boundaries, it is worth acknowledging and explaining how we avoid
using these two concepts as synonyms in this book. Most often academic work,
including pieces of the ‘grey literature’, when talking about ‘risks and uncertainties’ actually only address one of the two concepts. While this is not wrong, this
interchanging use of the two terms may hinder effective academic work in
support of climate policy. It may also cause confusion to both policymakers and
those new to the study of risk and/or uncertainty.
We understand uncertainty as a general lack of knowledge of possible outcomes and states of the world. Uncertainty is a broader concept than risk, which
refers to a calculated or perceived potential for negative impacts when the
outcome is uncertain. Thus, uncertainty always retains an element of risk and,
conversely, risk is always a form/subcategory of uncertainty. Risk is a reduced
form of uncertainty, and one that we can better manage than most other forms.
When we present disciplinary approaches to uncertainty, we only consider those
that go beyond risk.
Perspectives on uncertainty
Since Socrates and then well into the seventeenth century, awareness of uncertainty and ignorance had been recognised as the key to wisdom. However, Descartes heralded three centuries of ‘ignorance of ignorance’, that is complete
confidence in rationalism to provide certainty/truth, which became the normal
state of the educated classes of Europe, particularly those in science (Ravetz,
2009, pp. xv–xvi). It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that a
renewed awareness of uncertainty and ignorance returned. Thus, Ravetz argues,
modern dealings with uncertainty have come to the fore with probabilistic risk
assessment in the 1950s related to nuclear technology. Indeed, most concrete
disciplinary work has been done in the context of risk as one specific form of
uncertainty, as discussed in the following section. Broader ideas of uncertainty
are rare and lack a disciplinary home. Some useful categorisations may help
better distinguish and understand such uncertainties based on the extent of
uncertainty, the sources of uncertainty, and the ability to measure uncertainty.