676
7 Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans
The module for detection of hardware Trojans can reliably detect the influence
of even one XOR gate on a long logic path with delay with a precision of over
95%. Implementation of IIPS in both ASICs and FPGAs demonstrates extremely
low hardware costs. Due to the flexible interface, the IIPS module can be interfaced
with SoC equipped with various configurations of the IEEE 1500 infrastructure and
can be used in higher configuration when testing their effectiveness and security.
Along with standard configuration advantages, IIPS module can be expanded to
ensure improved functions of SoC protection from other types of attacks or from a
certain attack implemented by various means.
7.4 Using Classic Methods of Reliable Programming
to Design Safe Microcircuits
7.4.1 Introduction to the Problem
As shown in Chap. 2, malware for a long time has been a regular threat to computer
systems, and multiple efforts are still aimed at developing adequate countermeasures.
However, all computer systems include both software and hardware. High functional
capabilities can be implemented by both hardware and software means. Similarly,
malicious functions can be parts of a program or a circuit.
In this section, we will consider the suggested [72] new approach to the organization of safe development lifecycle, which generalizes the methods previously used in
development of reliable software and not in microcircuit designing. To achieve this
goal, it is necessary to ensure complete traceability from specification to implementation and down to each gate. In the work [72], such detection cycle with feedback
is used, where each separate stage of the design process is subject to special control.
Here, each phase of microcircuit development is performed using known methods
of hardware detection from the corresponding knowledge database.
Wang et al. [73] have previously defined hardware Trojans as modifications of
the circuit that lead to malicious changes in the functions of the corresponding
device. As noted above many times, taking into account the distribution of ICs in
the modern world, including household appliances (washing machines), transport
means (motor cars and planes), equipment of medical clinics allowing for precise
diagnostics, military appliances (such as the ones improving precision and effectiveness of weapons), such Trojan can actually influence our everyday life and even
create life-threatening situations. Unlike other regular errors and incorrect operation
(circuit defects), Trojans are inserted selectively. The transfer of production stages to
foreign third parties due to economic reasons drastically increases the possibility of
such attacks. Contractors, their staff and intruders can potentially modify the design
of the microcircuit without notifying the developer and the customer. Until recently,
7 Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans
The module for detection of hardware Trojans can reliably detect the influence
of even one XOR gate on a long logic path with delay with a precision of over
95%. Implementation of IIPS in both ASICs and FPGAs demonstrates extremely
low hardware costs. Due to the flexible interface, the IIPS module can be interfaced
with SoC equipped with various configurations of the IEEE 1500 infrastructure and
can be used in higher configuration when testing their effectiveness and security.
Along with standard configuration advantages, IIPS module can be expanded to
ensure improved functions of SoC protection from other types of attacks or from a
certain attack implemented by various means.
7.4 Using Classic Methods of Reliable Programming
to Design Safe Microcircuits
7.4.1 Introduction to the Problem
As shown in Chap. 2, malware for a long time has been a regular threat to computer
systems, and multiple efforts are still aimed at developing adequate countermeasures.
However, all computer systems include both software and hardware. High functional
capabilities can be implemented by both hardware and software means. Similarly,
malicious functions can be parts of a program or a circuit.
In this section, we will consider the suggested [72] new approach to the organization of safe development lifecycle, which generalizes the methods previously used in
development of reliable software and not in microcircuit designing. To achieve this
goal, it is necessary to ensure complete traceability from specification to implementation and down to each gate. In the work [72], such detection cycle with feedback
is used, where each separate stage of the design process is subject to special control.
Here, each phase of microcircuit development is performed using known methods
of hardware detection from the corresponding knowledge database.
Wang et al. [73] have previously defined hardware Trojans as modifications of
the circuit that lead to malicious changes in the functions of the corresponding
device. As noted above many times, taking into account the distribution of ICs in
the modern world, including household appliances (washing machines), transport
means (motor cars and planes), equipment of medical clinics allowing for precise
diagnostics, military appliances (such as the ones improving precision and effectiveness of weapons), such Trojan can actually influence our everyday life and even
create life-threatening situations. Unlike other regular errors and incorrect operation
(circuit defects), Trojans are inserted selectively. The transfer of production stages to
foreign third parties due to economic reasons drastically increases the possibility of
such attacks. Contractors, their staff and intruders can potentially modify the design
of the microcircuit without notifying the developer and the customer. Until recently,
