500
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
25. Y. Jin, Y. Makris, Hardware Trojan detection using path delay ftngerprint, in IEEE International
Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008. HOST 2008 (2008), pp. 51–57,
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2008.4559049
26. C.H. Kim, J.-J. Quisquater, Faults, injection methods and fault attacks. IEEE Des. Test Comput.
24(6), 544–545 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1109/MDT.2007.186
27. L.-W Kim, J.D. Villasenor, C.K. Koc, A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture, in
Military Communications Conference, 2009. MILCOM 2009 IEEE (2009), pp. 1–6, https://
doi.org/10.1109/milcom.2009.5379966
28. S.T. King, J. Tucek, A. Cozzie, C. Grier, W. Jiang, Y, Zhou, Designing and implementing
malicious hardware, in LEET’08: Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale
Exploits and Emergent Threats (Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008), pp. 1–8. USENIX Association,
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1387709.1387714
29. F. Koushanfar, A. Mirhoseini, A unified framework for multimodal submodular integrated
circuits Trojan detection. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 6(1), 162–174 (2011), https://doi.
org/10.1109/tifs.2010.2096811
30. F. Koushanfar, A. Mirhoseini, Y.A. Alkabani, A unifted submodular framework for multimodal
IC Trojan detection, in Information Hiding, ed. by R. Boohme, P. Fong, R. Safavi-Naini. Volume
6387 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2010), pp. 17–32,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16435-42
31. C. Lamech, R. Rad, M. Tehrani, J. Plusquellic, An experimental analysis of power and delay
signal-to-noise requirements for detecting Trojans and methods for achieving the required
detection sensitivities. Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. (99) (2011), https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.
2011.2136339. Early Access
32. J. Li, J. Lach, At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan horse detection,
in IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008. HOST 2008
(2008), pp. 8–14, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2008.4559038
33. L. Lin, W. Burleson, C. Paar, MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels, in
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design—Digest of Technical Papers,
2009. ICCAD 2009 (2009), pp. 117–122. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_alljsp?arnumber=
5361303
34. L. Lin, M. Kasper, T.G. Neysu, C. Paar, W Burleson, Trojan side-channels: lightweight hardware trojans through side-channel engineering, in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
System—CHES 2009, ed. by C. Clavier, K. Gaj. Volume 5747 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009), pp. 382–395, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3642-04138-9_27
35. D. Mclntyre, F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, S. Bhunia, D. Weyer, Dynamic evaluation of hardware
trust, in IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2009. HOST
’09 (2009), pp. 108–111, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2009.5224990
36. S. Narasimhan, D. Du, R.S. Chakraborty, S. Paul, F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, K. Roy, S. Bhunia,
Multiple-parameter side-channel analysis: a non-invasive hardware Trojan detection approach,
in 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
(2010), pp. 13–18, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2010.5513122
37. M. Nelson, A. Nahapetian, F. Koushanfar, M. Potkonjak, SVD-based ghost circuitry detection,
in Information Hiding, ed. by S. Katzenbeisser, A.-R. Sadeghi. Volume 5806 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009), pp. 221–234, http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/978-3-642-04431-1_16
38. M. Potkonjak, A. Nahapetian, M. Nelson, T. Massey, Hardware Trojan horse detection using
gate-level characterization, in DAC ’09: Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation
Conference, New York, NY, USA, 2009 (ACM, 2009), pp. 688–693. ISBN 978-160558-497-3.
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1629911.1630091
39. R. Rad, J. Plusquellic, M. Tehranipoor, Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power
supply transient signals, in IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and
Trust, 2008. HOST 2008 (2008), pp. 3–7, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2008.4559037
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
25. Y. Jin, Y. Makris, Hardware Trojan detection using path delay ftngerprint, in IEEE International
Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008. HOST 2008 (2008), pp. 51–57,
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2008.4559049
26. C.H. Kim, J.-J. Quisquater, Faults, injection methods and fault attacks. IEEE Des. Test Comput.
24(6), 544–545 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1109/MDT.2007.186
27. L.-W Kim, J.D. Villasenor, C.K. Koc, A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture, in
Military Communications Conference, 2009. MILCOM 2009 IEEE (2009), pp. 1–6, https://
doi.org/10.1109/milcom.2009.5379966
28. S.T. King, J. Tucek, A. Cozzie, C. Grier, W. Jiang, Y, Zhou, Designing and implementing
malicious hardware, in LEET’08: Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale
Exploits and Emergent Threats (Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008), pp. 1–8. USENIX Association,
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1387709.1387714
29. F. Koushanfar, A. Mirhoseini, A unified framework for multimodal submodular integrated
circuits Trojan detection. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 6(1), 162–174 (2011), https://doi.
org/10.1109/tifs.2010.2096811
30. F. Koushanfar, A. Mirhoseini, Y.A. Alkabani, A unifted submodular framework for multimodal
IC Trojan detection, in Information Hiding, ed. by R. Boohme, P. Fong, R. Safavi-Naini. Volume
6387 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2010), pp. 17–32,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16435-42
31. C. Lamech, R. Rad, M. Tehrani, J. Plusquellic, An experimental analysis of power and delay
signal-to-noise requirements for detecting Trojans and methods for achieving the required
detection sensitivities. Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. (99) (2011), https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.
2011.2136339. Early Access
32. J. Li, J. Lach, At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan horse detection,
in IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008. HOST 2008
(2008), pp. 8–14, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2008.4559038
33. L. Lin, W. Burleson, C. Paar, MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels, in
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design—Digest of Technical Papers,
2009. ICCAD 2009 (2009), pp. 117–122. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_alljsp?arnumber=
5361303
34. L. Lin, M. Kasper, T.G. Neysu, C. Paar, W Burleson, Trojan side-channels: lightweight hardware trojans through side-channel engineering, in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
System—CHES 2009, ed. by C. Clavier, K. Gaj. Volume 5747 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009), pp. 382–395, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3642-04138-9_27
35. D. Mclntyre, F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, S. Bhunia, D. Weyer, Dynamic evaluation of hardware
trust, in IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2009. HOST
’09 (2009), pp. 108–111, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2009.5224990
36. S. Narasimhan, D. Du, R.S. Chakraborty, S. Paul, F. Wolff, C. Papachristou, K. Roy, S. Bhunia,
Multiple-parameter side-channel analysis: a non-invasive hardware Trojan detection approach,
in 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
(2010), pp. 13–18, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2010.5513122
37. M. Nelson, A. Nahapetian, F. Koushanfar, M. Potkonjak, SVD-based ghost circuitry detection,
in Information Hiding, ed. by S. Katzenbeisser, A.-R. Sadeghi. Volume 5806 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009), pp. 221–234, http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/978-3-642-04431-1_16
38. M. Potkonjak, A. Nahapetian, M. Nelson, T. Massey, Hardware Trojan horse detection using
gate-level characterization, in DAC ’09: Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation
Conference, New York, NY, USA, 2009 (ACM, 2009), pp. 688–693. ISBN 978-160558-497-3.
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1629911.1630091
39. R. Rad, J. Plusquellic, M. Tehranipoor, Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power
supply transient signals, in IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and
Trust, 2008. HOST 2008 (2008), pp. 3–7, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2008.4559037