498
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
The main goal to be pursued by technologists applying the station in the technological process is identification of new problems, elimination of which will allow
them to improve the technological process.
Main parameters
• Minimum size of the detected defects, μm: 0.25
• Testing performance at the threshold of 0.25 μm, mm
2 /s: 10
• Diameter of tested wafers, mm: 100; 150
• Minimum programmable movement on the coordinate table, nm: 5
This station allows the user to remove and memorize a photometric picture of
a given wafer section with a resolution of 250 nm in the setup mode. The next
stage of image processing needs to be developed. There are software developments
for implementing these algorithms for the search of differences between the actual
topology and those stored in the project, but a complete processing program must be
created and debugged on samples of wafers containing this technology. As a result
of implementation of such work, topology control is possible for the purpose of
finding additional elements for the technology with design standards of 250 nm. For
a potential station, it is possible to aim at implementing the control of structures for
the technology with design rules of 90 nm.
Thus, by means of minimum software modifications, all these virtually serial
process stations can be successfully used the task of identification of hardware
Trojans both on a mask and on a wafer produced at a foreign factory.
References
1. C. Krieg, E. Weippl, Malware in Hardware Infrastructure Components. SBA Research,
Favoritenstrasse 16, 1040, Vienna {ckrieg, eweippl}@sba- research.org
2. S. Adee, The hunt for the kill switch. Spectrum IEEE 45(5), 34–39 (2008). ISSN 0018-9235,
https://doi.org/10.1109/mspec.2008.4505310
3. D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P Rohatgi, B. Sunar, Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting, in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2007. SP ’07 (2007), pp. 296–310,
https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2007.36
4. S.S. Ali, R.S. Chakraborty, D. Mukhopadhyay, S. Bhunia, Multi-level attacks: an emerging
security concern for cryptographic hardware, in Proceedings of Design, Automation & Test
in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE) (2011), pp. 1–4, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5763307
5. M.S. Anderson, C.J.G. North, K.K. Yiu, Towards Countering the Rise of the Silicon Trojan.
Technical Report 12 (2008). 20PR.pdf
6. R.J. Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems,
1st edn. (Wiley, New York, NY, USA, 2001). ISBN 0471389226. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/
~rja14/Papers/SE-14.pdf
7. M. Banga, M.S. Hsiao, Trusted RTL: trojan detection methodology in pre-silicon designs,
in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
(HOST) (2010), pp. 56–59, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2010.5513114
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
The main goal to be pursued by technologists applying the station in the technological process is identification of new problems, elimination of which will allow
them to improve the technological process.
Main parameters
• Minimum size of the detected defects, μm: 0.25
• Testing performance at the threshold of 0.25 μm, mm
2 /s: 10
• Diameter of tested wafers, mm: 100; 150
• Minimum programmable movement on the coordinate table, nm: 5
This station allows the user to remove and memorize a photometric picture of
a given wafer section with a resolution of 250 nm in the setup mode. The next
stage of image processing needs to be developed. There are software developments
for implementing these algorithms for the search of differences between the actual
topology and those stored in the project, but a complete processing program must be
created and debugged on samples of wafers containing this technology. As a result
of implementation of such work, topology control is possible for the purpose of
finding additional elements for the technology with design standards of 250 nm. For
a potential station, it is possible to aim at implementing the control of structures for
the technology with design rules of 90 nm.
Thus, by means of minimum software modifications, all these virtually serial
process stations can be successfully used the task of identification of hardware
Trojans both on a mask and on a wafer produced at a foreign factory.
References
1. C. Krieg, E. Weippl, Malware in Hardware Infrastructure Components. SBA Research,
Favoritenstrasse 16, 1040, Vienna {ckrieg, eweippl}@sba- research.org
2. S. Adee, The hunt for the kill switch. Spectrum IEEE 45(5), 34–39 (2008). ISSN 0018-9235,
https://doi.org/10.1109/mspec.2008.4505310
3. D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P Rohatgi, B. Sunar, Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting, in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2007. SP ’07 (2007), pp. 296–310,
https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2007.36
4. S.S. Ali, R.S. Chakraborty, D. Mukhopadhyay, S. Bhunia, Multi-level attacks: an emerging
security concern for cryptographic hardware, in Proceedings of Design, Automation & Test
in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE) (2011), pp. 1–4, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5763307
5. M.S. Anderson, C.J.G. North, K.K. Yiu, Towards Countering the Rise of the Silicon Trojan.
Technical Report 12 (2008). 20PR.pdf
6. R.J. Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems,
1st edn. (Wiley, New York, NY, USA, 2001). ISBN 0471389226. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/
~rja14/Papers/SE-14.pdf
7. M. Banga, M.S. Hsiao, Trusted RTL: trojan detection methodology in pre-silicon designs,
in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
(HOST) (2010), pp. 56–59, https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2010.5513114