5.3 Features of Identifying Sequential Hardware Trojans Using the TeSR Method
485
(b) component that is non-correlated to the rest of the circuit and defined only by
switching transistors of the activated hardware Trojan in the microcircuit.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note the following. As defined for many times
already, hardware Trojans are deliberate modifications of the initial circuit implemented by intruders in order to use standard hardware to access data or software
installed on these chips without authorization. Detection of such hardware Trojans
is a brand new field of research; however, this direction has attracted attention from
academic circles over the last few years. In particular, the authors of this book have
been referring to the results of studies of two authoritative specialists, who dedicated
over 10 years to the problem of hardware Trojans. They are Mohammad Tehranipoor
from the University of Connecticut and Farinaz Koushanfor from Rice University.
We also need to mention Mark M. Tehranipoor, who published dozens of work dedicated to the issue of Trojans over the years of his work in the University of Florida.
What’s even more interesting, though, is the fact that there are 4271 references to his
publications in other scientific papers, according to the information from the Internet
community. This serves as yet another proof of relevance of the subject of hardware
Trojans in microciruits. It even feels uncomfortable to speak about the only, even if
fundamental, publication in the native scientific periodic print (Saurov–Kuznetsov).
Modern trends in the field of design and organization of semiconductor device
production in the direction of globalization and horizontal integration of this field
are undoubtedly a source of threat and vulnerability. Table 7.2 contains only several
main methods of Trojan detection considered in this specific article in generalized
form. The second column, Test Modality, only applies to the features of metering
processes used (often as a side channel) to identify the fact of presence of a Trojan.
Trojan Model (third column) indicates the classification type of the introduced Trojan
used in test samples of the microcircuit, i.e., number of elements of the Trojan and
their specifications.
Perfect Model (fourth column) describes the environment used for presentation of
the results. Except for the pioneer work by Agrawal et al. [14], where the authors first
accessed the test chips and personally performed non-invasive metering, all methods
were based on non-invasive modeling. Detection method (fifth column) characterizes
the essence of the detection method used in the cited work. Contents of the Process
Changes column (sixth column) determine such an important aspects as taking into
account detection of Trojans and protocols of inevitable process variations of the IC
production process by the algorithms. Finally, the last column characterizes the main
used assessment criteria.
In conclusion of this section, we should note that simulation of hardware Trojans
in microcircuits and their analysis is a subject that is currently gaining popularity
in terms of studies and has already attracted a lot of attention in the last five to
seven years. The basic work in this field, which is examined in this section, has
paved the way for development and study of other more complete models, preventive
strategies, analysis strategies, and new means of detecting hardware Trojans in critical
microcircuits.
485
(b) component that is non-correlated to the rest of the circuit and defined only by
switching transistors of the activated hardware Trojan in the microcircuit.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note the following. As defined for many times
already, hardware Trojans are deliberate modifications of the initial circuit implemented by intruders in order to use standard hardware to access data or software
installed on these chips without authorization. Detection of such hardware Trojans
is a brand new field of research; however, this direction has attracted attention from
academic circles over the last few years. In particular, the authors of this book have
been referring to the results of studies of two authoritative specialists, who dedicated
over 10 years to the problem of hardware Trojans. They are Mohammad Tehranipoor
from the University of Connecticut and Farinaz Koushanfor from Rice University.
We also need to mention Mark M. Tehranipoor, who published dozens of work dedicated to the issue of Trojans over the years of his work in the University of Florida.
What’s even more interesting, though, is the fact that there are 4271 references to his
publications in other scientific papers, according to the information from the Internet
community. This serves as yet another proof of relevance of the subject of hardware
Trojans in microciruits. It even feels uncomfortable to speak about the only, even if
fundamental, publication in the native scientific periodic print (Saurov–Kuznetsov).
Modern trends in the field of design and organization of semiconductor device
production in the direction of globalization and horizontal integration of this field
are undoubtedly a source of threat and vulnerability. Table 7.2 contains only several
main methods of Trojan detection considered in this specific article in generalized
form. The second column, Test Modality, only applies to the features of metering
processes used (often as a side channel) to identify the fact of presence of a Trojan.
Trojan Model (third column) indicates the classification type of the introduced Trojan
used in test samples of the microcircuit, i.e., number of elements of the Trojan and
their specifications.
Perfect Model (fourth column) describes the environment used for presentation of
the results. Except for the pioneer work by Agrawal et al. [14], where the authors first
accessed the test chips and personally performed non-invasive metering, all methods
were based on non-invasive modeling. Detection method (fifth column) characterizes
the essence of the detection method used in the cited work. Contents of the Process
Changes column (sixth column) determine such an important aspects as taking into
account detection of Trojans and protocols of inevitable process variations of the IC
production process by the algorithms. Finally, the last column characterizes the main
used assessment criteria.
In conclusion of this section, we should note that simulation of hardware Trojans
in microcircuits and their analysis is a subject that is currently gaining popularity
in terms of studies and has already attracted a lot of attention in the last five to
seven years. The basic work in this field, which is examined in this section, has
paved the way for development and study of other more complete models, preventive
strategies, analysis strategies, and new means of detecting hardware Trojans in critical
microcircuits.