5.1 Brief Review of Basic Techniques for Detection …
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physical values, such as power supply current or IC trigger time. It was followed by
a long line of publications dedicated to side channels.
Special prominence back then was given to side-channel analysis [7, 10, 11, 24,
31, 38, 47]; however, other methods in the field of logic testing were suggested as
well: in particular, certain approaches to increases in the frequency of activation of
hardware Trojans were suggested to increase the rate of successful detection [22, 40].
5.1.3 Malicious Computer Systems
King et al. [27] were the first to publish information about the capabilities and
methods of a comprehensive combined attack (prototype of cyberattacks) on software
and hardware of computer systems. In this attack, a hardware Trojan serves as the
process basis for an extensive attack, allowing an attacker to enter the operating
system with root privileges by means of bypassing the standard security system of
the hardware.
New York University held the first contest with the purpose of researching various
methods of introducing hardware Trojans. The criterion of success in this contest was
the most unobtrusive introduction of a malicious introduction into the original microcircuit; the possibility of imperceptible information extraction was also assessed. The
works presented in the contest can be found in [12, 16]; we have already examined
separate works of the winners of the contest in chapter 4.
5.1.4 Methods of Increasing Probability of Trojan Detection
To enhance the detection of activation of Trojans, several approaches have been
proposed that should have increased the probability of detection in the course of
functional testing. Thus, the method of minimizing the triggering circuit is used to
reduce the overall power activity of the microcircuit under study and to provide in
this context the possibility of measuring the activity of a Trojan in its presence [9].
Banga and Hsiao [6] present an approach, primarily allowing to determine
signals that are easily activated during a functional test. These signals are subsequently ignored during tests for Trojans that are difficult to detect. With the help
of the remaining signals, a formal check is performed. All identified Trojans are
subsequently isolated by means of development of corresponding software.
A change in the supply voltage level on logical circuits inside the microcircuit
design leads to corresponding changes in the logical states of these circuits. This
measure, according to the authors, reverses the possibility of detection: the Trojan
that was difficult to find becomes visible [8].
The formation of optimal testing plans (test patterns) should also increase the
probability of detection when conducting logical tests. Chakrabori et al. [14] represent an approach to the multiple initiations of the so-called rare logical positions in
457
physical values, such as power supply current or IC trigger time. It was followed by
a long line of publications dedicated to side channels.
Special prominence back then was given to side-channel analysis [7, 10, 11, 24,
31, 38, 47]; however, other methods in the field of logic testing were suggested as
well: in particular, certain approaches to increases in the frequency of activation of
hardware Trojans were suggested to increase the rate of successful detection [22, 40].
5.1.3 Malicious Computer Systems
King et al. [27] were the first to publish information about the capabilities and
methods of a comprehensive combined attack (prototype of cyberattacks) on software
and hardware of computer systems. In this attack, a hardware Trojan serves as the
process basis for an extensive attack, allowing an attacker to enter the operating
system with root privileges by means of bypassing the standard security system of
the hardware.
New York University held the first contest with the purpose of researching various
methods of introducing hardware Trojans. The criterion of success in this contest was
the most unobtrusive introduction of a malicious introduction into the original microcircuit; the possibility of imperceptible information extraction was also assessed. The
works presented in the contest can be found in [12, 16]; we have already examined
separate works of the winners of the contest in chapter 4.
5.1.4 Methods of Increasing Probability of Trojan Detection
To enhance the detection of activation of Trojans, several approaches have been
proposed that should have increased the probability of detection in the course of
functional testing. Thus, the method of minimizing the triggering circuit is used to
reduce the overall power activity of the microcircuit under study and to provide in
this context the possibility of measuring the activity of a Trojan in its presence [9].
Banga and Hsiao [6] present an approach, primarily allowing to determine
signals that are easily activated during a functional test. These signals are subsequently ignored during tests for Trojans that are difficult to detect. With the help
of the remaining signals, a formal check is performed. All identified Trojans are
subsequently isolated by means of development of corresponding software.
A change in the supply voltage level on logical circuits inside the microcircuit
design leads to corresponding changes in the logical states of these circuits. This
measure, according to the authors, reverses the possibility of detection: the Trojan
that was difficult to find becomes visible [8].
The formation of optimal testing plans (test patterns) should also increase the
probability of detection when conducting logical tests. Chakrabori et al. [14] represent an approach to the multiple initiations of the so-called rare logical positions in