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5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
In fact, starting from that moment, the Department of Defence of the USA has
deployed a complex of studies and implemented over a hundred projects aimed at
researching this threat and finding measures and methods to counteract it. It has to
be said that they managed to solve most set tasks to a significant degree, but only due
to recruitment of academical and industrial institutes and even student collectives.
In order to preserve the logical connection, the authors of [1] divided all known
approaches into separate subgroups.
So, in 2005, the US Department of Defense published one of the first reports on
the security of supply chains for high-performance integrated circuits [19], in which
the concept of security was formulated as follows:
“Reliability (credibility) includes the belief that secret or critical information for
the final mission will not be disclosed, reliability will not be reduced, and undesirable
structural elements will not be introduced into microcircuits as a result of development or manufacture in conditions of potential vulnerability to hostile agents. The
confidence in the safe condition of integrated circuits after production cannot
be ensured; electrical tests and even their reproduction (re-engineering) cannot
guarantee the detection of undesirable changes in military integrated circuits.”
Since the contemporary semiconductor production was moved to the territory of
“potential adversaries,” the US Department of Defense considered that in the event
of any conflict or war it would be impossible to ensure the supply of necessary
microcircuits to the military.
In this regard, in 2007, the defense advanced research projects agency (DARPA)
launched the first research project on the ways to ensure reliability of integrated
circuits (TIC) [17]. The task of TIC was to develop such innovative technologies
that could ensure the reliability of microcircuits in the absence of a trusted (certified)
manufacturer. The TIC project dealt exclusively with technical activities related to
the production of application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC) by enterprises not
considered reliable, as well as software application of custom hardware, such as field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
This report served as an impulse for an entire stream of publications.
From the analysis of literature data, it can be definitely said that 2008 was the
year when this topic heightened interest of the academic community. The Australian
Ministry of Defense was one of the first to consider this issue and published a report
on methods to combat hardware Trojans, assessing the effectiveness of such a combat
[4].
Below we are giving a very brief overview of hardware Trojan identification
methods [1].
5.1.2 Analysis Using Third-Party Channels
In May 2007, Agraval et al. [3] published the first work on the method of detecting
functions that were secretly introduced in an IC through a so-called bypass analysis.
The device under consideration (microcircuit) is examined in terms of using various
5 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
In fact, starting from that moment, the Department of Defence of the USA has
deployed a complex of studies and implemented over a hundred projects aimed at
researching this threat and finding measures and methods to counteract it. It has to
be said that they managed to solve most set tasks to a significant degree, but only due
to recruitment of academical and industrial institutes and even student collectives.
In order to preserve the logical connection, the authors of [1] divided all known
approaches into separate subgroups.
So, in 2005, the US Department of Defense published one of the first reports on
the security of supply chains for high-performance integrated circuits [19], in which
the concept of security was formulated as follows:
“Reliability (credibility) includes the belief that secret or critical information for
the final mission will not be disclosed, reliability will not be reduced, and undesirable
structural elements will not be introduced into microcircuits as a result of development or manufacture in conditions of potential vulnerability to hostile agents. The
confidence in the safe condition of integrated circuits after production cannot
be ensured; electrical tests and even their reproduction (re-engineering) cannot
guarantee the detection of undesirable changes in military integrated circuits.”
Since the contemporary semiconductor production was moved to the territory of
“potential adversaries,” the US Department of Defense considered that in the event
of any conflict or war it would be impossible to ensure the supply of necessary
microcircuits to the military.
In this regard, in 2007, the defense advanced research projects agency (DARPA)
launched the first research project on the ways to ensure reliability of integrated
circuits (TIC) [17]. The task of TIC was to develop such innovative technologies
that could ensure the reliability of microcircuits in the absence of a trusted (certified)
manufacturer. The TIC project dealt exclusively with technical activities related to
the production of application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC) by enterprises not
considered reliable, as well as software application of custom hardware, such as field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
This report served as an impulse for an entire stream of publications.
From the analysis of literature data, it can be definitely said that 2008 was the
year when this topic heightened interest of the academic community. The Australian
Ministry of Defense was one of the first to consider this issue and published a report
on methods to combat hardware Trojans, assessing the effectiveness of such a combat
[4].
Below we are giving a very brief overview of hardware Trojan identification
methods [1].
5.1.2 Analysis Using Third-Party Channels
In May 2007, Agraval et al. [3] published the first work on the method of detecting
functions that were secretly introduced in an IC through a so-called bypass analysis.
The device under consideration (microcircuit) is examined in terms of using various