4.4 Methods of Implementation of Hardware Trojans …
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keys in a wireless transmission channel just by changing the amplitude of signals or
frequencies, which naturally arise due to variations in IC manufacturing technologies,
is suggested in [142]. In [143], it was specifically shown how, using the spread
spectrum transmission method, information about the encryption key was easily
extracted as a result of a special program for analyzing the nature of changes in the
self-noise level of the CMOS IC.
It should be noted that the system modification at the lowest level provides a
wide range of possibilities for implementing a denial-of-service (DoS) error, which
varies from partial error manifestation to complete and final shutdown of the system
by introducing the so-called kill switch [144]. In [137], hardware Trojans are also
referred to this class, which affect the customer service of a computing system through
the use of a number of limited resources such as performance, frequency operating
range, and power supply parameters. Developers of space-related application microcircuits and onboard electronic control systems of spacecraft should know that the
physical effects causing this so-called error, a change in system configuration or its
unauthorized shutdown can be temporary or permanent. And another important thing:
hardware Trojans of this class can generally consume all the power source (battery)
energy, preventing the onboard electronic system from going into sleep mode [144]
established by the regulation, or by introducing redundant buffers into IC interconnections [145] to significantly reduce the device operation time between scheduled
recharges. A hardware Trojan can also be developed to influence the operation of the
write enable signal in memory, overwriting an existing value with a random variable.
This leads to unclassifiable operators of service failures or partial (and even complete)
shutdown of the electronic control system of a spacecraft. “Denial-of-service” errors
caused by hardware Trojans can also be associated with premature failure of the
device. In [137], an equivalent circuit is given that generates a small local excess
power, which ultimately can accelerate the IC aging process, reducing its lifespan
on board of a spacecraft without disturbing the functionality. In order to increase
the intensity of electric migration processes, it is possible to change the percentage
of chemical components in metallized wiring of a microcircuit, and the final effect
of this may be quite similar to the effect of increasing the power supply voltage or
increasing the system clock frequency, which leads to a significant decrease in time
between failures of the onboard device IC.
Unauthorized malicious modifications of an IC (let’s call them that) can be a
major problem not only for electronic spacecraft systems, but also for ensuring the
cybersecurity of electronic systems around the world, especially strategic information
and communication systems involved in military and national security systems.
Currently, the military departments of the USA, Russia, China, and other information and communications technology leaders do not hide concerns about the
expanding outsourcing in the field of the development and production of integrated
electronic components for special-purpose systems and the dependence of the latest
developments on commercial off-the-shelf electronic components.
Hardware Trojans threaten the integrity of data and functions performed by any
computing and control electronic system that contains integrated electronic components. The essence of these real threats lies in unauthorized functional and technical
329
keys in a wireless transmission channel just by changing the amplitude of signals or
frequencies, which naturally arise due to variations in IC manufacturing technologies,
is suggested in [142]. In [143], it was specifically shown how, using the spread
spectrum transmission method, information about the encryption key was easily
extracted as a result of a special program for analyzing the nature of changes in the
self-noise level of the CMOS IC.
It should be noted that the system modification at the lowest level provides a
wide range of possibilities for implementing a denial-of-service (DoS) error, which
varies from partial error manifestation to complete and final shutdown of the system
by introducing the so-called kill switch [144]. In [137], hardware Trojans are also
referred to this class, which affect the customer service of a computing system through
the use of a number of limited resources such as performance, frequency operating
range, and power supply parameters. Developers of space-related application microcircuits and onboard electronic control systems of spacecraft should know that the
physical effects causing this so-called error, a change in system configuration or its
unauthorized shutdown can be temporary or permanent. And another important thing:
hardware Trojans of this class can generally consume all the power source (battery)
energy, preventing the onboard electronic system from going into sleep mode [144]
established by the regulation, or by introducing redundant buffers into IC interconnections [145] to significantly reduce the device operation time between scheduled
recharges. A hardware Trojan can also be developed to influence the operation of the
write enable signal in memory, overwriting an existing value with a random variable.
This leads to unclassifiable operators of service failures or partial (and even complete)
shutdown of the electronic control system of a spacecraft. “Denial-of-service” errors
caused by hardware Trojans can also be associated with premature failure of the
device. In [137], an equivalent circuit is given that generates a small local excess
power, which ultimately can accelerate the IC aging process, reducing its lifespan
on board of a spacecraft without disturbing the functionality. In order to increase
the intensity of electric migration processes, it is possible to change the percentage
of chemical components in metallized wiring of a microcircuit, and the final effect
of this may be quite similar to the effect of increasing the power supply voltage or
increasing the system clock frequency, which leads to a significant decrease in time
between failures of the onboard device IC.
Unauthorized malicious modifications of an IC (let’s call them that) can be a
major problem not only for electronic spacecraft systems, but also for ensuring the
cybersecurity of electronic systems around the world, especially strategic information
and communication systems involved in military and national security systems.
Currently, the military departments of the USA, Russia, China, and other information and communications technology leaders do not hide concerns about the
expanding outsourcing in the field of the development and production of integrated
electronic components for special-purpose systems and the dependence of the latest
developments on commercial off-the-shelf electronic components.
Hardware Trojans threaten the integrity of data and functions performed by any
computing and control electronic system that contains integrated electronic components. The essence of these real threats lies in unauthorized functional and technical
