290
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
Security Specialists: In addition to the professionals, who ensure security of operated systems in their line of duty, this category includes criminal groups that have
their own highly professional (and well paid for silence) specialists and the corresponding algorithms and software, as well as single users attacking systems just for
fun, who are also capable of single experimental attacks (lab attacks).
Trusted Developers: Engineers, scientists, and managers working in reliable and
verified organizations, who can be recruited (bribed) to introduce a hardware Trojan
in the structure of a microcircuit and/or description (specification) of a project.
Device Distributor/Fab Owner: In separate specific cases, owner of a factory
can be personally interested in becoming an organizer (initiator) of an attack or
forced to become one. In the first case, the owner may be interested in acquiring
technical and technological secrets or know-how of a bespoke product in order to
obtain competitive advantage in this class of microelectronic devices. In the second
case, the owner can be following mandatory requirements of governmental agencies
or special services. Factory owner is usually incompetent in technical aspects of
organization of such attacks and thus delegates this work to the technical specialists
who are capable of designing the necessary plan or attack method and introduce a
provided or designed hardware Trojan in the specific microcircuit.
Secret Departments of Special Services and Military Establishments: A typical
example of such activity is the special joint operation of the NSA and Israel’s special
services “Olympic Games” aimed at deactivation of Iranian centrifuges for uranium
enrichment mentioned in Chap. 2. In order to achieve the ultimate goal of this operation, hardware Trojan was introduced into the serial industrial microcontroller by
Siemens (most likely, without knowledge of the company), which allowed Stuxnet
to carry out its destructive work.
4.1.4 Author’s Attempt to Systematize the Existing
Knowledge About the Methods of Ensuring the Security
of Microcircuit Supply Channels
Figure 4.14 shows the classification of the methods of ensuring so-called hardware
security of microcircuits, which are used for protection from specific attack methods.
The left column of this generalizing figure shows the possible targets of an intrusion,
while the right column shows the position of the intruder at the time of the attack
in the IC supply channel, where the intruder can be located in terms of the standard
microcircuit design and manufacturing flow.
Figure 4.15, borrowed by the authors of the book from [1], shows the results
of generalization of the known information on methods of ensuring security of
microcircuits, where an attempt was made to visually demonstrate the correlation
between three factors—possible types of attacks, necessary countermeasures, and
special methods of assessing the level of these threats and possible methods of protection against them. On the left, the column dedicated to the intruder generalizes the
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
Security Specialists: In addition to the professionals, who ensure security of operated systems in their line of duty, this category includes criminal groups that have
their own highly professional (and well paid for silence) specialists and the corresponding algorithms and software, as well as single users attacking systems just for
fun, who are also capable of single experimental attacks (lab attacks).
Trusted Developers: Engineers, scientists, and managers working in reliable and
verified organizations, who can be recruited (bribed) to introduce a hardware Trojan
in the structure of a microcircuit and/or description (specification) of a project.
Device Distributor/Fab Owner: In separate specific cases, owner of a factory
can be personally interested in becoming an organizer (initiator) of an attack or
forced to become one. In the first case, the owner may be interested in acquiring
technical and technological secrets or know-how of a bespoke product in order to
obtain competitive advantage in this class of microelectronic devices. In the second
case, the owner can be following mandatory requirements of governmental agencies
or special services. Factory owner is usually incompetent in technical aspects of
organization of such attacks and thus delegates this work to the technical specialists
who are capable of designing the necessary plan or attack method and introduce a
provided or designed hardware Trojan in the specific microcircuit.
Secret Departments of Special Services and Military Establishments: A typical
example of such activity is the special joint operation of the NSA and Israel’s special
services “Olympic Games” aimed at deactivation of Iranian centrifuges for uranium
enrichment mentioned in Chap. 2. In order to achieve the ultimate goal of this operation, hardware Trojan was introduced into the serial industrial microcontroller by
Siemens (most likely, without knowledge of the company), which allowed Stuxnet
to carry out its destructive work.
4.1.4 Author’s Attempt to Systematize the Existing
Knowledge About the Methods of Ensuring the Security
of Microcircuit Supply Channels
Figure 4.14 shows the classification of the methods of ensuring so-called hardware
security of microcircuits, which are used for protection from specific attack methods.
The left column of this generalizing figure shows the possible targets of an intrusion,
while the right column shows the position of the intruder at the time of the attack
in the IC supply channel, where the intruder can be located in terms of the standard
microcircuit design and manufacturing flow.
Figure 4.15, borrowed by the authors of the book from [1], shows the results
of generalization of the known information on methods of ensuring security of
microcircuits, where an attempt was made to visually demonstrate the correlation
between three factors—possible types of attacks, necessary countermeasures, and
special methods of assessing the level of these threats and possible methods of protection against them. On the left, the column dedicated to the intruder generalizes the