3.6 Exotic Spy Equipment
265
“0”, while 1600 RPM is “1”. According to the researchers, transmission of three bits
of information in this mode takes a minute. Using 2000 and 2500 RPM, one can
transmit 15 bits per minute.
For situations where it is impossible to carry a mobile phone or some other special
device into a closed premise containing the protected vehicle, the special GSMem
program has been developed that transfers data from an infected PC to any phone,
including even the ancient models with buttons, using GSM frequencies.
In this case, a regular smartphone can be used as a receiver. This is based on the
fact that a smartphone’s microphone is capable of picking up the noise produced
by the cooler at a distance of 1–4 meters from the computer. These sound waves
will be used for data transmission. According to the researchers, they managed to
successfully transfer information from a computer without any sound equipment to
a smartphone located at a distance of up to eight meters. The transfer rate amounted
to 900 bits per hours.
The extremely low data transfer rate in this case is not very critical, since it
is absolutely sufficient for stealing passwords or encryption keys. A more serious
disadvantage of this method is the fact that the protected computer first needs to
be infected with Fansmitter; it is not easy to simply insert a USB flash drive into an
isolated PC. These machines are often not simply isolated from any networks, but also
have no audio equipment, cameras, and other “excessive” devices; any potentially
hazardous ports can be blocked physically.
3.6.2 Image Interception from the Laptop Screen
Security specialists have known that interception of screen radiation from VDT
makes it possible to reproduce the screen image remotely. Methods and equipment
for such interception are mentioned in the second section of our book.
LED screens were previously believed to be protected from such hazard. However,
Dr. Markus Kuhn from the Cambridge University has demonstrated that it is absolutely possible. Using equipment worth about 1000 lb, he intercepted images from a
LED screen through two rooms and three walls [22].
Design features, such as metal hinges of the cover or cable laying method, can
make the laptop even more vulnerable to monitoring.
There are quite a lot of ways of acquiring information stored on a computer,
from infecting the system with malicious software and intercepting network receive–
transmit to stealing the system unit or hard drive; however, the most important thing
for an intruder is to remain unnoticed.
Below we examine the method of data acquisition using the so-called TEMPEST
method (Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard).
The term TEMPEST first appeared in 1918. Back then, the military department
of the USA offered Herbert Yardley, a famous expert and cryptographer, to research
the methods of detection, interception, and analysis of the useful signal from radio
stations and phones. As a result of these works, it was revealed that such equipment
265
“0”, while 1600 RPM is “1”. According to the researchers, transmission of three bits
of information in this mode takes a minute. Using 2000 and 2500 RPM, one can
transmit 15 bits per minute.
For situations where it is impossible to carry a mobile phone or some other special
device into a closed premise containing the protected vehicle, the special GSMem
program has been developed that transfers data from an infected PC to any phone,
including even the ancient models with buttons, using GSM frequencies.
In this case, a regular smartphone can be used as a receiver. This is based on the
fact that a smartphone’s microphone is capable of picking up the noise produced
by the cooler at a distance of 1–4 meters from the computer. These sound waves
will be used for data transmission. According to the researchers, they managed to
successfully transfer information from a computer without any sound equipment to
a smartphone located at a distance of up to eight meters. The transfer rate amounted
to 900 bits per hours.
The extremely low data transfer rate in this case is not very critical, since it
is absolutely sufficient for stealing passwords or encryption keys. A more serious
disadvantage of this method is the fact that the protected computer first needs to
be infected with Fansmitter; it is not easy to simply insert a USB flash drive into an
isolated PC. These machines are often not simply isolated from any networks, but also
have no audio equipment, cameras, and other “excessive” devices; any potentially
hazardous ports can be blocked physically.
3.6.2 Image Interception from the Laptop Screen
Security specialists have known that interception of screen radiation from VDT
makes it possible to reproduce the screen image remotely. Methods and equipment
for such interception are mentioned in the second section of our book.
LED screens were previously believed to be protected from such hazard. However,
Dr. Markus Kuhn from the Cambridge University has demonstrated that it is absolutely possible. Using equipment worth about 1000 lb, he intercepted images from a
LED screen through two rooms and three walls [22].
Design features, such as metal hinges of the cover or cable laying method, can
make the laptop even more vulnerable to monitoring.
There are quite a lot of ways of acquiring information stored on a computer,
from infecting the system with malicious software and intercepting network receive–
transmit to stealing the system unit or hard drive; however, the most important thing
for an intruder is to remain unnoticed.
Below we examine the method of data acquisition using the so-called TEMPEST
method (Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard).
The term TEMPEST first appeared in 1918. Back then, the military department
of the USA offered Herbert Yardley, a famous expert and cryptographer, to research
the methods of detection, interception, and analysis of the useful signal from radio
stations and phones. As a result of these works, it was revealed that such equipment