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3 Hardware Trojans in Electronic Devices
(1) Generate a public key using the PineAP interface;
(2) Enter the Pineapple through ssh and follow to our ssh server using the password;
this action will add the server to known_hosts;
(3) Send authorized_keys to the server from the Pineapple via scp;
(4) Run autossh in PineAP through the web interface;
(5) Try to connect the < reverse port set on the Pineapple > to the localhost-p from
the server.
If everything is done properly, we will get permanent console access to our device.
(c) Logs
Modules can be installed both in the internal memory of the device and on an SD
card; however, some modules (e.g., SSLStrip) behave incorrectly when installed on
a card. The device has a very small memory space, and modules store the logs with
intercepted data in their folders. Therefore, you need to create a separate folder (e.g.,
logs) in the root of the SD card and link it to the folder containing module logs
in/pineapple/components/infusions/sslstrip/include/logs.
Now, we can draw some brief conclusions about the possibilities of this device.
WiFi Pineapple Mark V has shown itself as a useful tool for a penetration tester,
which helps find an entry point where it seems that the client’s infrastructure is
flawless, and the staff members are highly responsible and technically savvy. The
device has its flaws; its weak 400 MHz processor hardly copes with the assigned
tasks and often reboots when several modules at once are activated; on the other
hand, after exploring its limits, one can distribute the tasks in a manner that will help
use the PineAP without undesired breaks in operation.
Karma and PineAP technology of interception of wireless clients is not perfect:
no one can guarantee that your device will immediately connect to the PineAP after
entering its range; however, such possibility for devices using all popular operating
systems is very high. SSLStrip is gradually declining; it is especially useless in
intercepting traffic of mobile devices, since most applications employ the OAuth
2.0 authorization methods, and intercepted tokens are not as useful as passwords
themselves. However, popular messengers of social media still transfer data in the
form of open text, and access to services via browser is still provided on the basis
of combination of login and passwords, which makes the tool still effective for data
interception.
It is also necessary to remember about other capabilities of the Pineapple, such
as WPS hacking, DNS substitution, redirection of clients to fake pages, interception
of cookies, and much more. The device is definitely interesting and well worth its
money; for those who are afraid of intruders with such devices, I recommend deleting
open networks from the list of known wireless networks and avoiding suspicious
access points.
3 Hardware Trojans in Electronic Devices
(1) Generate a public key using the PineAP interface;
(2) Enter the Pineapple through ssh and follow to our ssh server using the password;
this action will add the server to known_hosts;
(3) Send authorized_keys to the server from the Pineapple via scp;
(4) Run autossh in PineAP through the web interface;
(5) Try to connect the < reverse port set on the Pineapple > to the localhost-p from
the server.
If everything is done properly, we will get permanent console access to our device.
(c) Logs
Modules can be installed both in the internal memory of the device and on an SD
card; however, some modules (e.g., SSLStrip) behave incorrectly when installed on
a card. The device has a very small memory space, and modules store the logs with
intercepted data in their folders. Therefore, you need to create a separate folder (e.g.,
logs) in the root of the SD card and link it to the folder containing module logs
in/pineapple/components/infusions/sslstrip/include/logs.
Now, we can draw some brief conclusions about the possibilities of this device.
WiFi Pineapple Mark V has shown itself as a useful tool for a penetration tester,
which helps find an entry point where it seems that the client’s infrastructure is
flawless, and the staff members are highly responsible and technically savvy. The
device has its flaws; its weak 400 MHz processor hardly copes with the assigned
tasks and often reboots when several modules at once are activated; on the other
hand, after exploring its limits, one can distribute the tasks in a manner that will help
use the PineAP without undesired breaks in operation.
Karma and PineAP technology of interception of wireless clients is not perfect:
no one can guarantee that your device will immediately connect to the PineAP after
entering its range; however, such possibility for devices using all popular operating
systems is very high. SSLStrip is gradually declining; it is especially useless in
intercepting traffic of mobile devices, since most applications employ the OAuth
2.0 authorization methods, and intercepted tokens are not as useful as passwords
themselves. However, popular messengers of social media still transfer data in the
form of open text, and access to services via browser is still provided on the basis
of combination of login and passwords, which makes the tool still effective for data
interception.
It is also necessary to remember about other capabilities of the Pineapple, such
as WPS hacking, DNS substitution, redirection of clients to fake pages, interception
of cookies, and much more. The device is definitely interesting and well worth its
money; for those who are afraid of intruders with such devices, I recommend deleting
open networks from the list of known wireless networks and avoiding suspicious
access points.