state or reveal a preference and declare some WTP or WTA. Such preference-based
approaches may disconnect us from a deeper sense of valuing nature—and sharing
such grounded values. Preference-based approaches are not wrong, but they obscure
the profoundness of axiological life.
The two functions of value systems (Sect. 2) are to be considered in their
fulfilment. While value systems such as TEV or ESS can be useful for establishing
evaluation standards, values play a second important role in evaluations—as we
have seen, value statements can be the result of reasoned evaluations. Axiological
grounding of goodness in nature is different from truth claims, moral claims, and
sincere expressions of sentiments. Grounding value judgements is an immersion into
the cultural lifeworld, not just making explicit a contingent mental state. Grounding
values means to adopt a commitment to care for something being shared as being
“good”. Can TEV and ESS be transformed toward such grounding? Yes, in principle, they can. As we argued at the end of Sect. 4, TEV and ESS can become catalytic
for environmental ethical discourse, as presented in Sect. 5.
The choice and design of value systems is not a matter of arbitrariness. One can
discuss and point out if certain value systems do not agree with other convictions. On
the basis of evaluations, we can make well-founded valuations. Values also flow into
economic valuations, since these are also the result of reflected evaluations. You
want to know the price before you decide for it. But normally you don’t just want to
know the price, you also want to know if something is good. Practical considerations
can speak for the choice of economic value systems, as these are operationalised, but
the suppression of ethical value systems should not be done per se, as ethical beliefs
are an integral part of our ways of life and judgements should be in a reflective
equilibrium with our other beliefs. In order for value systems to perform their
functions, they must help set the standards that we want to use—where we arrive
at evaluation results that are consistent with our intuitions and where we know that
we are valuing something for the best reasons. We raised doubts about the fit
between TEV and ESS and our moral intuitions and about an unreflected use of
these schemes. We should neither be cynics nor sentimentalists in the use of value
systems. To support an informed choice of a value system, we should design value
systems (schemes, concepts) being open for grounding evaluations.
References
Baurmann M et al (2010) Norms and values. The role of social norms as instruments of value
realisation. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden
Böhme G (2016) Naturphänomenologie. In: Ott K, Dierks J, Voget-Kleschin L (eds) Handbuch
Umweltethik. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, pp 100–105
Borgmann A (1984) Technology and the character of contemporary life. The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago
Chan K, Satterfield T, Goldstein J (2012) Rethinking ecosystem services to better address and
navigate cultural values. Ecol Econ 74:8–18
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
155
approaches may disconnect us from a deeper sense of valuing nature—and sharing
such grounded values. Preference-based approaches are not wrong, but they obscure
the profoundness of axiological life.
The two functions of value systems (Sect. 2) are to be considered in their
fulfilment. While value systems such as TEV or ESS can be useful for establishing
evaluation standards, values play a second important role in evaluations—as we
have seen, value statements can be the result of reasoned evaluations. Axiological
grounding of goodness in nature is different from truth claims, moral claims, and
sincere expressions of sentiments. Grounding value judgements is an immersion into
the cultural lifeworld, not just making explicit a contingent mental state. Grounding
values means to adopt a commitment to care for something being shared as being
“good”. Can TEV and ESS be transformed toward such grounding? Yes, in principle, they can. As we argued at the end of Sect. 4, TEV and ESS can become catalytic
for environmental ethical discourse, as presented in Sect. 5.
The choice and design of value systems is not a matter of arbitrariness. One can
discuss and point out if certain value systems do not agree with other convictions. On
the basis of evaluations, we can make well-founded valuations. Values also flow into
economic valuations, since these are also the result of reflected evaluations. You
want to know the price before you decide for it. But normally you don’t just want to
know the price, you also want to know if something is good. Practical considerations
can speak for the choice of economic value systems, as these are operationalised, but
the suppression of ethical value systems should not be done per se, as ethical beliefs
are an integral part of our ways of life and judgements should be in a reflective
equilibrium with our other beliefs. In order for value systems to perform their
functions, they must help set the standards that we want to use—where we arrive
at evaluation results that are consistent with our intuitions and where we know that
we are valuing something for the best reasons. We raised doubts about the fit
between TEV and ESS and our moral intuitions and about an unreflected use of
these schemes. We should neither be cynics nor sentimentalists in the use of value
systems. To support an informed choice of a value system, we should design value
systems (schemes, concepts) being open for grounding evaluations.
References
Baurmann M et al (2010) Norms and values. The role of social norms as instruments of value
realisation. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden
Böhme G (2016) Naturphänomenologie. In: Ott K, Dierks J, Voget-Kleschin L (eds) Handbuch
Umweltethik. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, pp 100–105
Borgmann A (1984) Technology and the character of contemporary life. The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago
Chan K, Satterfield T, Goldstein J (2012) Rethinking ecosystem services to better address and
navigate cultural values. Ecol Econ 74:8–18
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
155