be democratising “trickle down” effects of ESS. We leave the dialectics of exclusion
(property rights) and access (liberty rights) to the rule of democratic governance
schemes.
Cultural values overlap strongly with the so-called eudemonic values in environmental ethics (Sect. 5). From an economic perspective, the economic value of such
cultural services must be measured through travel cost analysis, combined tourism
analysis or contingent valuation, with WTP and WTA receiving virtual price tags.
Cautious economists acknowledge the limitations of such economic instruments.
Despite these limitations, they can provide useful information to stakeholders and
policy makers. If a contingent valuation study shows that most tourists do not like
noise on the beach, a destination becomes financially more valuable if noisy vehicles
are banned by local authorities. An opinion poll can be conducted on whether
projects affect cultural services. Do offshore windmills affect the beauty of the
ocean horizon as perceived by tourists? Such an opinion poll provides quantified
results. This method is a (snapshot) axiological opinion poll.
Such methods, however, remain at the surface of cultural values. In relation to
deeper layers of cultural services, other approaches such as cultural history, landscape painting, conservation history, cultural anthropology, religious studies, etc.
can contribute to a deeper understanding of cultural services being grounded
eudemonic values.
The spiritual values of sacred sites as such remain obscure and opaque to
scientific and economic methods. Perhaps only phenomenological expressions,
such as atmospheres, auras and sacred sites, can be perceived by sensitive embodied
spirits and how they form specific moods that come close to such spiritual encounters with nature. It is fair to say that cultural services must go beyond the epistemic
idea of monetary operationalization. If the appreciation of nature as such goes
beyond interest, it is simply misleading to ask for WTP. When people become
radically open to special places (“genius loci”), it becomes pointless to ask for
opportunity costs to replace them with shopping centres. However, for methodological reasons, ESS should be warned against undervaluing cultural services that
cannot be monetised or physically measured (“How many tons of beauty?”). Many
scientists fill the gaps of the ESS approach with ideas of participation, stakeholder
involvement and conscious decision making.
The search for quantification is based on the ideal of operationalization and on the
desire to homogenize the multitude of heterogeneous environmental values. Numbers simplify, but both ESS and TEV have intrinsic reasons to withstand simplification. If ESS and TEV are seen as derived instruments, close contact should be
maintained with environmental ethics, enabling mutual learning. However, when
TEV and ESS are overstipulated, they become victims of simplifications, are biased
by their own abstractions and can serve economic interests in the acquisition of
natural resources. In order to make convincing judgments, ethical reflection should
take precedence over schematic tools. As we have argued in Sect. 2, evaluations can
be argued with respect both to attribution and grounding. Grounding evaluations of
natural entities is at the core of environmental axiology (Sect. 5). TEV and ESS are
not well-suited for grounding as far as they are preference-based. It is sufficient to
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