moral values, ideals, obligations, and principles is highly contested even among
ethicists.
After clarifying what is to be understood by the complex term “evaluation”, the
role of values in relation to evaluations can now be analysed. Values play a dual role
in evaluations. First of all, they are central to all evaluations, as they guide the
selection of criteria and standards and thus also the design and formulation of
criteria. In order to fulfil the function of criteria design, one must be clear about
one’s own values and their strength (or intensity). If nature conservation is important
to you and you attach a high value to biodiversity, then you will use appropriate
criteria to evaluate interventions in nature. In view of the evaluation functions, in
particular enabling decision making, formulating evaluation results is often
attempted not only in evaluative terms, but to use “objective” numerical values for
the supply of decision bases. Since various aspects of situations can be evaluated in
different ways using different criteria, but clear decisions have to be made (e.g. laws
have to be given), this way attempts to minimize complexity and to abstract away
difficult questions. Many scholars wish to operationalize evaluations. The evaluation
that X is of value to P remains vague if it is not specified to the question how much
value does X have to P in relation to many other valuable entities and events. Such
specification must homogenize and in economics there is no better homogenizer than
money, as specified by willingness to pay (WTP). If a person P values X positively,
her WTP should be greater than zero. The epistemic idea to operationalize values
numerically in monetary terms deserves reflective scrutiny: May such
operationalization open our eyes or may $-numbers blind us against the actual
substances of values? How is numerical economic operationalization related to
attributing and grounding? What axiological lessons can be drawn from contingent
value studies of virtual WTP for nature conservation?
The second function of values is precisely to formulate evaluation results. Since
we are talking about reflected evaluations here, one can assume that value statements
are the result of well-founded evaluations. One can demand and give reasons for
certain valuations and value systems. One can point to missing transparency of
evaluations and doubtful consequences. Arguing about values and evaluations is
possible. Values and valuations are related to philosophical underpinnings and
frameworks. Valuations are associated with varieties of values and major philosophical questions. A philosophically informed analysis can help answer the question,
which value systems can fulfil the purposes and deliver appropriate evaluations. As
stated above, axiological discourse should give credit to the plurality of value
encounters with respect to both attribution and grounding.
The result of this section implies, that all value-schemes should be aware about
the deep axiological background within they operate. Environmental value schemes
should be able to integrate axiological reflections on the ontology and epistemology
of values, such as Weberian clashes of values, second-order preferences, the
contested zone of moral values, the many axiological correlations, the role of prescriptions and the distinction between grounding and attribution. Such topics kept in
mind, we turn to the evaluation of nature.
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
137
ethicists.
After clarifying what is to be understood by the complex term “evaluation”, the
role of values in relation to evaluations can now be analysed. Values play a dual role
in evaluations. First of all, they are central to all evaluations, as they guide the
selection of criteria and standards and thus also the design and formulation of
criteria. In order to fulfil the function of criteria design, one must be clear about
one’s own values and their strength (or intensity). If nature conservation is important
to you and you attach a high value to biodiversity, then you will use appropriate
criteria to evaluate interventions in nature. In view of the evaluation functions, in
particular enabling decision making, formulating evaluation results is often
attempted not only in evaluative terms, but to use “objective” numerical values for
the supply of decision bases. Since various aspects of situations can be evaluated in
different ways using different criteria, but clear decisions have to be made (e.g. laws
have to be given), this way attempts to minimize complexity and to abstract away
difficult questions. Many scholars wish to operationalize evaluations. The evaluation
that X is of value to P remains vague if it is not specified to the question how much
value does X have to P in relation to many other valuable entities and events. Such
specification must homogenize and in economics there is no better homogenizer than
money, as specified by willingness to pay (WTP). If a person P values X positively,
her WTP should be greater than zero. The epistemic idea to operationalize values
numerically in monetary terms deserves reflective scrutiny: May such
operationalization open our eyes or may $-numbers blind us against the actual
substances of values? How is numerical economic operationalization related to
attributing and grounding? What axiological lessons can be drawn from contingent
value studies of virtual WTP for nature conservation?
The second function of values is precisely to formulate evaluation results. Since
we are talking about reflected evaluations here, one can assume that value statements
are the result of well-founded evaluations. One can demand and give reasons for
certain valuations and value systems. One can point to missing transparency of
evaluations and doubtful consequences. Arguing about values and evaluations is
possible. Values and valuations are related to philosophical underpinnings and
frameworks. Valuations are associated with varieties of values and major philosophical questions. A philosophically informed analysis can help answer the question,
which value systems can fulfil the purposes and deliver appropriate evaluations. As
stated above, axiological discourse should give credit to the plurality of value
encounters with respect to both attribution and grounding.
The result of this section implies, that all value-schemes should be aware about
the deep axiological background within they operate. Environmental value schemes
should be able to integrate axiological reflections on the ontology and epistemology
of values, such as Weberian clashes of values, second-order preferences, the
contested zone of moral values, the many axiological correlations, the role of prescriptions and the distinction between grounding and attribution. Such topics kept in
mind, we turn to the evaluation of nature.
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
137