axiological evaluations as extensively as possible. Evaluations relative to values can
be bundled by setting norms.
Besides that, there are statements about the quality of rules (“This is a just/good
rule system”) or the justification of rule uses (“It is good to set these rules”; “It is
right to accept this rule system”, “there should be a legal regulation”), or decisions to
set rules in the light of values (“Let us do something about it!”, “we must endeavour
to ensure that there are rules for this”). Such statements and decisions mediate
between evaluations and rules or norms (If X is good for us, we should act as to
protect X). One could call them prescriptions or generic resolutions. From a speech
act perspective, prescriptions are close to suggestions, recommendations, and ways
of counselling. A prescription could state that there should be a legal regulation on
the matter X (as oil spills, bycatch in fisheries, trophy hunting), but may remain silent
on the specific deontic content of such environmental regulation. Grounded and
shared values can constitute agreements that regulation is mandatory. Via such
reasoning, the realms of axiology and deontology can be bridged discursively. So,
prescriptions (in the sense of rule-setting decisions in consideration of axiological
evaluations) build another important bridge. This bridge is between evaluations and
actual implementation of the evaluative insights (“In view of our values, we should
set the-and-the norms” or “In view of our values, something should be done
urgently”). Evaluations are often based on our shared values or attitudes to our
values. Evaluations can often motivate action. Prescriptions claim a need for regulation, but are not yet rules. They are assertions that X, having been so and evaluated,
should also be regulated in some way (“We have to institutionalize a conservation
law!”, “We need protected area categories for marine nature conservation!”). Prescriptions, rules and specific deontological norms would then be specifications, until
finally a specific doer P knows what to do in a certain situation. The difficulty,
however, often lies in translating various evaluations into clear rules for action. The
bridge between evaluations and the decision to change something is more on the
motivational side. The bridge between values and clear instructions for action is
more about the quality of norms.
Communities endorse shared values as they specify them to rules, rights, and
commitments. Peace, liberty, health, safety, wealth, democracy, and decent environments are instances of “our” commonly shared moral values. Moral values require a
generic betterness-relationship between two oppositional concepts: To all reasonable
agents (prima facie and ceteris paribus) there is peace better than war, arguing better
than violence, health better than maladies, wealth better than poverty etc. A
non-polluted environment is better than a highly toxic one. In environmental valuation, however, such betterness-relations are full of vague qualifiers as “spoiled”,
“decent”, “degraded”, “rich and diverse”, “impoverished”, “original” etc. These
qualifiers indicate that a broad and unspecific betterness-relation in favour of decent
environmental conditions might be of moral value, while specifications remain
culturally bounded (Sect. 6).
In any case, axiology operates within a range having a contested border zone to
deontology/normativity (rightness). This borderline region between evaluations,
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K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth
be bundled by setting norms.
Besides that, there are statements about the quality of rules (“This is a just/good
rule system”) or the justification of rule uses (“It is good to set these rules”; “It is
right to accept this rule system”, “there should be a legal regulation”), or decisions to
set rules in the light of values (“Let us do something about it!”, “we must endeavour
to ensure that there are rules for this”). Such statements and decisions mediate
between evaluations and rules or norms (If X is good for us, we should act as to
protect X). One could call them prescriptions or generic resolutions. From a speech
act perspective, prescriptions are close to suggestions, recommendations, and ways
of counselling. A prescription could state that there should be a legal regulation on
the matter X (as oil spills, bycatch in fisheries, trophy hunting), but may remain silent
on the specific deontic content of such environmental regulation. Grounded and
shared values can constitute agreements that regulation is mandatory. Via such
reasoning, the realms of axiology and deontology can be bridged discursively. So,
prescriptions (in the sense of rule-setting decisions in consideration of axiological
evaluations) build another important bridge. This bridge is between evaluations and
actual implementation of the evaluative insights (“In view of our values, we should
set the-and-the norms” or “In view of our values, something should be done
urgently”). Evaluations are often based on our shared values or attitudes to our
values. Evaluations can often motivate action. Prescriptions claim a need for regulation, but are not yet rules. They are assertions that X, having been so and evaluated,
should also be regulated in some way (“We have to institutionalize a conservation
law!”, “We need protected area categories for marine nature conservation!”). Prescriptions, rules and specific deontological norms would then be specifications, until
finally a specific doer P knows what to do in a certain situation. The difficulty,
however, often lies in translating various evaluations into clear rules for action. The
bridge between evaluations and the decision to change something is more on the
motivational side. The bridge between values and clear instructions for action is
more about the quality of norms.
Communities endorse shared values as they specify them to rules, rights, and
commitments. Peace, liberty, health, safety, wealth, democracy, and decent environments are instances of “our” commonly shared moral values. Moral values require a
generic betterness-relationship between two oppositional concepts: To all reasonable
agents (prima facie and ceteris paribus) there is peace better than war, arguing better
than violence, health better than maladies, wealth better than poverty etc. A
non-polluted environment is better than a highly toxic one. In environmental valuation, however, such betterness-relations are full of vague qualifiers as “spoiled”,
“decent”, “degraded”, “rich and diverse”, “impoverished”, “original” etc. These
qualifiers indicate that a broad and unspecific betterness-relation in favour of decent
environmental conditions might be of moral value, while specifications remain
culturally bounded (Sect. 6).
In any case, axiology operates within a range having a contested border zone to
deontology/normativity (rightness). This borderline region between evaluations,
136
K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth