environmental evaluation, axiological grounding differs from transcendental justification (Sect. 5).
In axiological grounding, reasoning may refer to substantial cultural traditions
(as nature conservation), eudemonic experiences, phenomenological descriptions,
psychoanalysis, narratives, history, and even literature and poetry. Axiological
grounding does not necessarily have to refer to morals. It can be “deep” without
touching morals. Phenomenology of nature (Böhme 2016) is helpful in grounding
evaluations with respect to nature. Quite often, a reflective articulation presents
sufficient grounding. If I say: “I strongly dislike this smell since it reminds me of
vomiting in childhood”, no further grounding is required (ceteris paribus). The bad
memory counts as sufficient reason. We will return to the problem of axiological
grounding throughout the following sections. To sum up the point we wish to make:
From an axiological perspective, valuation schemes should be conceived as to fulfil
the requirement of allowing for both articulation and grounding.
2.2 Economic Evaluation
Economics assumes that individuals make rational choices according to their preferences. Economic approaches being grounded in a concept of preference are
paradigmatic to liberal individualism. A preference is a binary value-judgement
(“To me, x is (ceteris paribus) better/worse than y”). An individual agent prefers a
state X over Y according to her mental states. Reaching X gives utility (welfare) to
the agent. The degree of preference is intensity. Behaviour reveals actual values
people hold. Many, but not all values materialize in commodities (cars, mansions,
books, carpets, jewellery, gardens etc.) which are relatively scarce and have an
exchange value signalled by prices. One realizes values via consumption. Economic
axiology is liberal, individualistic, flexible etc. Economists show respect for the
many ways in which persons may value commodities, cultural events, and social
affairs. Preferences are to count. Economics, however, is disinterested in grounding.
It takes preferences as face values. Economists assume that people themselves know
their real preference best, since they have privileged access to them. Ontogenetic
origins, manipulation, advertisement, self-deceit, and indoctrination are abstracted
away from economic models. Economics assume authenticity of all or most preferences and they ground their models on such heroic assumptions. To ethics, authenticity of values is an ideal, not a given. On a second-order layer, we all should wish
that our important values are actually “ours” (Frankfurt 1971). Frankfurt defines this
wish of having authentic preferences as “second-order preference”. Disregarding
such shortcomings, economists apply this axiological approach to nature, resulting
in environmental economics and the TEV-scheme (Sect. 3) and even the
ESS-scheme (Sect. 4).
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
133
In axiological grounding, reasoning may refer to substantial cultural traditions
(as nature conservation), eudemonic experiences, phenomenological descriptions,
psychoanalysis, narratives, history, and even literature and poetry. Axiological
grounding does not necessarily have to refer to morals. It can be “deep” without
touching morals. Phenomenology of nature (Böhme 2016) is helpful in grounding
evaluations with respect to nature. Quite often, a reflective articulation presents
sufficient grounding. If I say: “I strongly dislike this smell since it reminds me of
vomiting in childhood”, no further grounding is required (ceteris paribus). The bad
memory counts as sufficient reason. We will return to the problem of axiological
grounding throughout the following sections. To sum up the point we wish to make:
From an axiological perspective, valuation schemes should be conceived as to fulfil
the requirement of allowing for both articulation and grounding.
2.2 Economic Evaluation
Economics assumes that individuals make rational choices according to their preferences. Economic approaches being grounded in a concept of preference are
paradigmatic to liberal individualism. A preference is a binary value-judgement
(“To me, x is (ceteris paribus) better/worse than y”). An individual agent prefers a
state X over Y according to her mental states. Reaching X gives utility (welfare) to
the agent. The degree of preference is intensity. Behaviour reveals actual values
people hold. Many, but not all values materialize in commodities (cars, mansions,
books, carpets, jewellery, gardens etc.) which are relatively scarce and have an
exchange value signalled by prices. One realizes values via consumption. Economic
axiology is liberal, individualistic, flexible etc. Economists show respect for the
many ways in which persons may value commodities, cultural events, and social
affairs. Preferences are to count. Economics, however, is disinterested in grounding.
It takes preferences as face values. Economists assume that people themselves know
their real preference best, since they have privileged access to them. Ontogenetic
origins, manipulation, advertisement, self-deceit, and indoctrination are abstracted
away from economic models. Economics assume authenticity of all or most preferences and they ground their models on such heroic assumptions. To ethics, authenticity of values is an ideal, not a given. On a second-order layer, we all should wish
that our important values are actually “ours” (Frankfurt 1971). Frankfurt defines this
wish of having authentic preferences as “second-order preference”. Disregarding
such shortcomings, economists apply this axiological approach to nature, resulting
in environmental economics and the TEV-scheme (Sect. 3) and even the
ESS-scheme (Sect. 4).
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
133