2.1 Philosophical Axiology
Most contemporary philosophers see individual humans as the grounding “locus” of
values. Human agency is intrinsically value-oriented. If an agent wishes to reach a
goal, she puts a value upon it. To agents, it seems impossible not to value. We will
focus on self-conscious agents making value judgements on a daily base. If so,
valuing is nothing special, but it belongs, as a mundane practice, to everyday life.
Humans enjoy values and they dislike disvalues. Values are perceived, experienced,
and expressed from the first-person perspective and such first-person-expressions are
articulated within cultures via language. Therefore, any ordinary language must
include phrases and attributes expressing (dis)values. Such expressions are used in
value-judgements. Value-judgements can refer to commodities, artefacts, works of
art, aesthetic performances, dishes, hobbies, parties and so on. Axiology becomes
analysis of value-judgements and asks how cultural debates about value-judgements
are to be performed and substantiated (¼ justified).
In Habermasian discourse ethics (Habermas 1981), the problem of how to
substantiate values remained unresolved. To Habermas, emotional and expressive
value-judgements refer to the validity claim of sincerity (“Aufrichtigkeit”). Some
value-judgements, however, implicitly claim rightness, since supreme values as
liberty, peace, health, democracy etc. are addressed. Validity claims for rightness
have a different status than the articulation of preferences. While values remain
within the particularities of cultures to Habermas, only general rules can be recognized within discourse as being valid. Speech about values, however critical, does
not reach the mode of discourse. To Habermas, (particular) values and (universal)
morals ultimately fall apart. Contrary to Habermas, we wish to bring values closer to
discourse and, by doing so, shed some light onto the intermediate zones between
axiology and deontology.
Values span a broad range, starting by simple desires, wishes, and preferences
and ending up with moral values as honesty, peace, democracy, and justice. By
moralizing values (“This was a dirty trick!”), we take a turn from the expression of
values to deontological validity claims. In his seminal “Philosophie und Sprache”
(1937), philosopher Richard Hönigswald argued that such shift can be justified by
means of discursive axiological language (see Ott and Surau-Ott 2017). The
Neokantian background of Hönigswald allows him to make tighter connections
between (supreme) values and morality than Habermas does. Following
Hönigswald, a discourse ethical axiology must distinguish between attribution and
grounding. Attribution means that agents attribute positive and negative values to
entities and events. Grounding means that agents present and exchange axiological
reasons why they attribute values as they do. This implies the distinction between
expressive lingual articulation (attribution) and well-considered reflective valuejudgements (grounding). Articulation is sincere, while grounding is considered.
Grounding stipulates profoundness. To Neokantianism, grounding values was a
transcendental enterprise (“Wertgeltung”). As we shall see with respect to
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K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth
Most contemporary philosophers see individual humans as the grounding “locus” of
values. Human agency is intrinsically value-oriented. If an agent wishes to reach a
goal, she puts a value upon it. To agents, it seems impossible not to value. We will
focus on self-conscious agents making value judgements on a daily base. If so,
valuing is nothing special, but it belongs, as a mundane practice, to everyday life.
Humans enjoy values and they dislike disvalues. Values are perceived, experienced,
and expressed from the first-person perspective and such first-person-expressions are
articulated within cultures via language. Therefore, any ordinary language must
include phrases and attributes expressing (dis)values. Such expressions are used in
value-judgements. Value-judgements can refer to commodities, artefacts, works of
art, aesthetic performances, dishes, hobbies, parties and so on. Axiology becomes
analysis of value-judgements and asks how cultural debates about value-judgements
are to be performed and substantiated (¼ justified).
In Habermasian discourse ethics (Habermas 1981), the problem of how to
substantiate values remained unresolved. To Habermas, emotional and expressive
value-judgements refer to the validity claim of sincerity (“Aufrichtigkeit”). Some
value-judgements, however, implicitly claim rightness, since supreme values as
liberty, peace, health, democracy etc. are addressed. Validity claims for rightness
have a different status than the articulation of preferences. While values remain
within the particularities of cultures to Habermas, only general rules can be recognized within discourse as being valid. Speech about values, however critical, does
not reach the mode of discourse. To Habermas, (particular) values and (universal)
morals ultimately fall apart. Contrary to Habermas, we wish to bring values closer to
discourse and, by doing so, shed some light onto the intermediate zones between
axiology and deontology.
Values span a broad range, starting by simple desires, wishes, and preferences
and ending up with moral values as honesty, peace, democracy, and justice. By
moralizing values (“This was a dirty trick!”), we take a turn from the expression of
values to deontological validity claims. In his seminal “Philosophie und Sprache”
(1937), philosopher Richard Hönigswald argued that such shift can be justified by
means of discursive axiological language (see Ott and Surau-Ott 2017). The
Neokantian background of Hönigswald allows him to make tighter connections
between (supreme) values and morality than Habermas does. Following
Hönigswald, a discourse ethical axiology must distinguish between attribution and
grounding. Attribution means that agents attribute positive and negative values to
entities and events. Grounding means that agents present and exchange axiological
reasons why they attribute values as they do. This implies the distinction between
expressive lingual articulation (attribution) and well-considered reflective valuejudgements (grounding). Articulation is sincere, while grounding is considered.
Grounding stipulates profoundness. To Neokantianism, grounding values was a
transcendental enterprise (“Wertgeltung”). As we shall see with respect to
132
K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth