we want to use for the evaluation of policies. In a more technical vocabulary, one
could say that I argued against restricted ways for thinking about the evaluation of
policies, like that of a consequentialist economist who uses only the criterion of
effectiveness and designs the rule user as a homo economicus. But we shouldn’t
exclude empirical considerations. So, we shouldn’t just use the deducibility criterion
for justifying the use of rules. We shouldn’t be strict deontologists and disregard
evidence or empirical propositions about actual rule uses in our evaluation of rules.
Because our evaluative and normative propositions supervene on evidence, it
plays a significant role: different evidence binds us to accept different evaluative or
normative propositions. But this role is restricted by the standards we use, so we
could change our standards. Or, to put it otherwise: We (sometimes) disagree about
criteria—and accordingly deem different evidence to be relevant for knowing
whether we could justifiably implement the policy. And because the choice of a
policy is a choice within rules we accordingly need good rules for the use of
evidence in policy-making related arguments.
The application of the deducibility criterion raises questions concerning the
reconstruction of moral theories and the adequate formulation of rules. Furthermore,
it must be clarified how rules are applied and how they generate further rules in
interaction. The insight formulated in the social sciences applies to the criteria of
effectiveness and harmlessness: It is very difficult to carry out rule impact evaluations. We face problems of assessing rule compliance and enforcement. In addition
to unclear cause-effect relations and the difficulty of making counterfactual considerations, the analysis of the achievement of objectives is also complicated by the
overlapping of different sets of rules. For example, various factors can have an
influence on the actions of farmers, like cross compliance, economic factors
(demand, fertiliser price) and market incentives (subsidies—positive sanctions),
measures concerning other rule systems like water protection measures or action
programmes of the Nitrates Directive, preferences of farmers or negative sanctions.
These considerations illustrate how difficult it is to involve all those concerned in
corresponding discourses on evaluations of normative solutions to environmental
problems. However, this approach enables us to perform a comprehensible evaluation and to discuss the quality of the arguments in a precise way. Without a detailed
discussion it is not clear which rules are to be changed and which alternative means
could or should be used.
References
Alchourrón CE, Bulygin E (1971) Normative systems. Springer, Wien
Anderson E (2000) Beyond Homo economicus: new developments in theories of social norms.
Philos Public Aff 29:170–200
Barry B (1990) Political argument: a reissue with new introduction. University of California Press,
Berkely/Los Angeles
Baurmann M, Brennan G, Goodin RE, Southwood N (2010) Norms and values. The role of social
norms as instruments of value realisation. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden
126
K. C. Reinmuth
could say that I argued against restricted ways for thinking about the evaluation of
policies, like that of a consequentialist economist who uses only the criterion of
effectiveness and designs the rule user as a homo economicus. But we shouldn’t
exclude empirical considerations. So, we shouldn’t just use the deducibility criterion
for justifying the use of rules. We shouldn’t be strict deontologists and disregard
evidence or empirical propositions about actual rule uses in our evaluation of rules.
Because our evaluative and normative propositions supervene on evidence, it
plays a significant role: different evidence binds us to accept different evaluative or
normative propositions. But this role is restricted by the standards we use, so we
could change our standards. Or, to put it otherwise: We (sometimes) disagree about
criteria—and accordingly deem different evidence to be relevant for knowing
whether we could justifiably implement the policy. And because the choice of a
policy is a choice within rules we accordingly need good rules for the use of
evidence in policy-making related arguments.
The application of the deducibility criterion raises questions concerning the
reconstruction of moral theories and the adequate formulation of rules. Furthermore,
it must be clarified how rules are applied and how they generate further rules in
interaction. The insight formulated in the social sciences applies to the criteria of
effectiveness and harmlessness: It is very difficult to carry out rule impact evaluations. We face problems of assessing rule compliance and enforcement. In addition
to unclear cause-effect relations and the difficulty of making counterfactual considerations, the analysis of the achievement of objectives is also complicated by the
overlapping of different sets of rules. For example, various factors can have an
influence on the actions of farmers, like cross compliance, economic factors
(demand, fertiliser price) and market incentives (subsidies—positive sanctions),
measures concerning other rule systems like water protection measures or action
programmes of the Nitrates Directive, preferences of farmers or negative sanctions.
These considerations illustrate how difficult it is to involve all those concerned in
corresponding discourses on evaluations of normative solutions to environmental
problems. However, this approach enables us to perform a comprehensible evaluation and to discuss the quality of the arguments in a precise way. Without a detailed
discussion it is not clear which rules are to be changed and which alternative means
could or should be used.
References
Alchourrón CE, Bulygin E (1971) Normative systems. Springer, Wien
Anderson E (2000) Beyond Homo economicus: new developments in theories of social norms.
Philos Public Aff 29:170–200
Barry B (1990) Political argument: a reissue with new introduction. University of California Press,
Berkely/Los Angeles
Baurmann M, Brennan G, Goodin RE, Southwood N (2010) Norms and values. The role of social
norms as instruments of value realisation. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden
126
K. C. Reinmuth