fulfilled, and the harmlessness criterion is not fulfilled at all. Thus, the moral quality
of the Fertiliser Ordinance is not high.
Fertiliser rules could be designed to reduce undesirable impacts and be compatible with sustainability rules. For example, fertilisation could be based more on the
actual nutrient potential of the soil and not on possible yields, which would not be
achieved due to prolonged rainfall, for example, and thus nutrients would not
decrease. Crop rotations and nitrogen-binding plants are good alternatives. Retaining
samples could also be requested so that the determination of nutrient requirements
can be verified. It would also make sense to oblige biogas plants to prove who has
purchased their fermentation residues – a kind of double-entry bookkeeping for
nutrients.
6 Summary and Outlook: Problems and Potentials
of the Evaluation Approach
In this article, components of evaluations were first emphasized. In order to illustrate
the difficulties and complexities of evaluations, the argumentative evaluation components were then analysed in more detail. It has been shown that we should
distinguish between different arguments in the context of rule evaluation: On the
one hand, we have arguments for a rule proposition and arguments for the proposition that this rule is an effective and harmless means for some purposes. On the other
hand, there are arguments for evaluative propositions which state that this rule is a
right, good or even the best one and arguments for justificatory propositions that we
should use (design, implement, follow. . .) certain rules. Finally, some of the problems and potentials of the presented evaluation approach will be addressed. As we
have seen, it is quite possible to use a moral theory to design a yardstick that provides
plausible evaluation criteria. However, it is sometimes not clear which further
background considerations may be assumed. The example of the evaluation of the
fertiliser ordinance with the aid of a sustainability theory illustrates the high cognitive effort of a systematic and transparent moral evaluation of a relatively straightforward legal rule system. Considerable efforts are involved in the evaluation of
rules and regulations. In order to be able to obtain reasoned evaluation statements,
the results of social, natural and legal research must be taken into account when
determining the degree to which the criteria have been fulfilled. The hurdles that
arise when answering the questions relating to the criteria or checking their fulfilment are enormous. If we take seriously the idea that policy-making is above all a
choice of rules within rules, we have to consider also the rules which guide our
evaluations, arguments and uses of evidence. When we talk about evidence in the
context of policy-making we have to achieve a better understanding of rules and rule
uses—for example to predict the possible side effects of certain policies. And
because the use of evidence is imbedded in the use of evaluations and arguments
we have to consider theories of evaluation. And we should argue about the criteria
A Framework for Evaluation of Normative Solutions to Environmental Problems
125
of the Fertiliser Ordinance is not high.
Fertiliser rules could be designed to reduce undesirable impacts and be compatible with sustainability rules. For example, fertilisation could be based more on the
actual nutrient potential of the soil and not on possible yields, which would not be
achieved due to prolonged rainfall, for example, and thus nutrients would not
decrease. Crop rotations and nitrogen-binding plants are good alternatives. Retaining
samples could also be requested so that the determination of nutrient requirements
can be verified. It would also make sense to oblige biogas plants to prove who has
purchased their fermentation residues – a kind of double-entry bookkeeping for
nutrients.
6 Summary and Outlook: Problems and Potentials
of the Evaluation Approach
In this article, components of evaluations were first emphasized. In order to illustrate
the difficulties and complexities of evaluations, the argumentative evaluation components were then analysed in more detail. It has been shown that we should
distinguish between different arguments in the context of rule evaluation: On the
one hand, we have arguments for a rule proposition and arguments for the proposition that this rule is an effective and harmless means for some purposes. On the other
hand, there are arguments for evaluative propositions which state that this rule is a
right, good or even the best one and arguments for justificatory propositions that we
should use (design, implement, follow. . .) certain rules. Finally, some of the problems and potentials of the presented evaluation approach will be addressed. As we
have seen, it is quite possible to use a moral theory to design a yardstick that provides
plausible evaluation criteria. However, it is sometimes not clear which further
background considerations may be assumed. The example of the evaluation of the
fertiliser ordinance with the aid of a sustainability theory illustrates the high cognitive effort of a systematic and transparent moral evaluation of a relatively straightforward legal rule system. Considerable efforts are involved in the evaluation of
rules and regulations. In order to be able to obtain reasoned evaluation statements,
the results of social, natural and legal research must be taken into account when
determining the degree to which the criteria have been fulfilled. The hurdles that
arise when answering the questions relating to the criteria or checking their fulfilment are enormous. If we take seriously the idea that policy-making is above all a
choice of rules within rules, we have to consider also the rules which guide our
evaluations, arguments and uses of evidence. When we talk about evidence in the
context of policy-making we have to achieve a better understanding of rules and rule
uses—for example to predict the possible side effects of certain policies. And
because the use of evidence is imbedded in the use of evaluations and arguments
we have to consider theories of evaluation. And we should argue about the criteria
A Framework for Evaluation of Normative Solutions to Environmental Problems
125