institution he claimed. He called for vigorous protest from within Sweden
and asked whether a comparable British or French chemist who had worked
directly for the war effort would have been awarded a prize ‘while sores are
still dripping of blood … but because Haber is a Prussian professor we find it
acceptable!’, hinting in turn at an uncomfortable collusion between Sweden
and Germany. British newspapers hardly covered the story of the awards in
terms of a leading article, possibly out of contempt for the whole affair.
Branting’s criticism however—‘pure politics’ according to the RSAS—was
reported briefly in The Times ‘Imperial and Foreign News Items’ on Thursday
30 November 1919, where it was claimed that he ‘deplored that an international distinction should fall to one who during the war devoted all his
powers to inventing new means of destruction …’. But British disinterest
belies the outcry amongst the various international communities which
spilled over into the ‘quality’ press on both sides of the Atlantic.
The next few weeks saw displeasure with the Swedish Academy grow and
grow, and it made the front page of the New York Times on 26 January 1920
where severe criticisms—attributed to ‘French sources’—prompted an
immediate defence from the First Secretary of the Swedish Legation in
Washington D.C.—published in the same newspaper on 28 January.
Secretary Hammarskjöld was ‘by order of the Minister from Sweden, to set
forth the following facts’, viz, that the award of the Prize was for the synthesis
of ammonia from its elements, that the invention was of the greatest value to
the world at large leading to the production of cheap nitric fertilisers, that the
detail of the invention was made available [equally] to all before the ‘Great
War’ by Bernthsen (in ‘Philadelphia’) in 1912, that the ‘Haber plants’ in
Germany were erected with a view to the production of agricultural fertilizer
alone, and that in order to generate explosives, ammonia has to be converted
to nitric acid which was not part of the process described by the Award.
Secretary Hammarskjöld finally made it clear that during the war Sweden had
a strict export ban on ‘all sorts of war materials’, a point made to deflect a
growing feeling against Sweden because it was felt she had accommodated
German requests for certain material(s) during the war.
Hammarskjöld’s ‘clinical’ justification of the award was entirely in keeping
with the fabrication the Academy wished to propagate, but now the Swedish
Government was also implicated in the ruse. His intervention however, drew
a skeptical response. In this example—once again from the New York Times
39
and written by the eminent American colloid chemist Jerome Alexander
40
—
the author takes the First Secretary to task (Plate 15.3).
Alexander accepted Hammarskjöld’s view that the perfection of the commercial synthesis of ammonia from hydrogen and atmospheric nitrogen
15 The Post-war Years 1919–1930
339
and asked whether a comparable British or French chemist who had worked
directly for the war effort would have been awarded a prize ‘while sores are
still dripping of blood … but because Haber is a Prussian professor we find it
acceptable!’, hinting in turn at an uncomfortable collusion between Sweden
and Germany. British newspapers hardly covered the story of the awards in
terms of a leading article, possibly out of contempt for the whole affair.
Branting’s criticism however—‘pure politics’ according to the RSAS—was
reported briefly in The Times ‘Imperial and Foreign News Items’ on Thursday
30 November 1919, where it was claimed that he ‘deplored that an international distinction should fall to one who during the war devoted all his
powers to inventing new means of destruction …’. But British disinterest
belies the outcry amongst the various international communities which
spilled over into the ‘quality’ press on both sides of the Atlantic.
The next few weeks saw displeasure with the Swedish Academy grow and
grow, and it made the front page of the New York Times on 26 January 1920
where severe criticisms—attributed to ‘French sources’—prompted an
immediate defence from the First Secretary of the Swedish Legation in
Washington D.C.—published in the same newspaper on 28 January.
Secretary Hammarskjöld was ‘by order of the Minister from Sweden, to set
forth the following facts’, viz, that the award of the Prize was for the synthesis
of ammonia from its elements, that the invention was of the greatest value to
the world at large leading to the production of cheap nitric fertilisers, that the
detail of the invention was made available [equally] to all before the ‘Great
War’ by Bernthsen (in ‘Philadelphia’) in 1912, that the ‘Haber plants’ in
Germany were erected with a view to the production of agricultural fertilizer
alone, and that in order to generate explosives, ammonia has to be converted
to nitric acid which was not part of the process described by the Award.
Secretary Hammarskjöld finally made it clear that during the war Sweden had
a strict export ban on ‘all sorts of war materials’, a point made to deflect a
growing feeling against Sweden because it was felt she had accommodated
German requests for certain material(s) during the war.
Hammarskjöld’s ‘clinical’ justification of the award was entirely in keeping
with the fabrication the Academy wished to propagate, but now the Swedish
Government was also implicated in the ruse. His intervention however, drew
a skeptical response. In this example—once again from the New York Times
39
and written by the eminent American colloid chemist Jerome Alexander
40
—
the author takes the First Secretary to task (Plate 15.3).
Alexander accepted Hammarskjöld’s view that the perfection of the commercial synthesis of ammonia from hydrogen and atmospheric nitrogen
15 The Post-war Years 1919–1930
339