view that although the imperial government of Germany had fallen, her elite
culture remained, and it was this culture that was honoured by their awards in
1919. This view however proved both naïve and overly optimistic because
international reaction was swift and damning. Friedman,
34 in Neutrality in
20th Century Europe, sums up the position;
Of all the actions during and immediately following the war, none so clearly
revealed the process of bias as the efforts in 1918 and 1919 of the Nobel
committee for chemistry to award an undivided prize to Haber. Committee
members themselves elevated Haber as a contender for the prize at this
time. They abandoned established principles and routines when evaluating
his worthiness for a prize. They could have waited until information as yet
held secret was made available; they could even have waited for signs of
support from nominators other than themselves for Haber alone, or for
dividing a prize with his collaborators. They acted with clear partial interests. They then insisted in public statements that they acted without bias;
indeed, that they had no choice, that the statutes require that they reward
solely on pure scientific merit. Some may have convinced themselves that
this was indeed the case; others knew full well that in the name of protecting the image of the prize they needed to fabricate a lie.
This searing indictment, based on current and contemporaneous evidence,
34
means that during his lifetime Robert probably knew nothing of the
Machiavellian maneuvers behind the decision to award an undivided prize to
Haber as the deliberations of the Nobel committees are not made public until
50 years has elapsed (Chap. 14). In terms of collaboration in the creation of
the technology of high pressure nitrogen ‘fixation’—for which the award was
given—there was only one contender for recognition; every paper Haber
published on the technical realization of the ammonia synthesis was with Le
Rossignol, every public lecture given by Haber praised his contribution, and
each of the two critical patents (high pressure and circulation) bore Le
Rossignol’s name as well as his own, and if ever we were to fabricate a set of
circumstances that militated against the award of a prize in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, one need look no further than the case of
Robert Le Rossignol for inspiration. Yes there were elements of Robert’s
candidature that may not have helped the committee had they behaved
objectively and seriously considered dividing the prize; the BASF’s ruthless
prosecution of commercial secrecy prevented the two men publishing as
quickly and as widely they wished; Robert’s move to Berlin from Karlsruhe
broke their working relationship allowing Haber alone to dominate the dissemination of their work; the ‘hijacking’ of fixation by the military was an
15 The Post-war Years 1919–1930
337
culture remained, and it was this culture that was honoured by their awards in
1919. This view however proved both naïve and overly optimistic because
international reaction was swift and damning. Friedman,
34 in Neutrality in
20th Century Europe, sums up the position;
Of all the actions during and immediately following the war, none so clearly
revealed the process of bias as the efforts in 1918 and 1919 of the Nobel
committee for chemistry to award an undivided prize to Haber. Committee
members themselves elevated Haber as a contender for the prize at this
time. They abandoned established principles and routines when evaluating
his worthiness for a prize. They could have waited until information as yet
held secret was made available; they could even have waited for signs of
support from nominators other than themselves for Haber alone, or for
dividing a prize with his collaborators. They acted with clear partial interests. They then insisted in public statements that they acted without bias;
indeed, that they had no choice, that the statutes require that they reward
solely on pure scientific merit. Some may have convinced themselves that
this was indeed the case; others knew full well that in the name of protecting the image of the prize they needed to fabricate a lie.
This searing indictment, based on current and contemporaneous evidence,
34
means that during his lifetime Robert probably knew nothing of the
Machiavellian maneuvers behind the decision to award an undivided prize to
Haber as the deliberations of the Nobel committees are not made public until
50 years has elapsed (Chap. 14). In terms of collaboration in the creation of
the technology of high pressure nitrogen ‘fixation’—for which the award was
given—there was only one contender for recognition; every paper Haber
published on the technical realization of the ammonia synthesis was with Le
Rossignol, every public lecture given by Haber praised his contribution, and
each of the two critical patents (high pressure and circulation) bore Le
Rossignol’s name as well as his own, and if ever we were to fabricate a set of
circumstances that militated against the award of a prize in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, one need look no further than the case of
Robert Le Rossignol for inspiration. Yes there were elements of Robert’s
candidature that may not have helped the committee had they behaved
objectively and seriously considered dividing the prize; the BASF’s ruthless
prosecution of commercial secrecy prevented the two men publishing as
quickly and as widely they wished; Robert’s move to Berlin from Karlsruhe
broke their working relationship allowing Haber alone to dominate the dissemination of their work; the ‘hijacking’ of fixation by the military was an
15 The Post-war Years 1919–1930
337