the English’, broke with his previous position, gave voice to his German
sympathies, and actively helped overcome the problems that had previously
hindered Haber’s candidature. In short, with absolutely no mandate from
international nominators, the committee shamefully set out to unilaterally
engineer support for Haber alone. The committee, for example, did not
object to members evaluating those whom they proposed, the claim that
nominators are partial whilst committee members are objective seems to have
been ignored or conveniently forgotten. Had they waited a year or two things
would have been clearer. The Americans had failed to build nitrogen factories,
the process did not benefit both sides, what was the full extent of Le
Rossignol’s or Bosch’s involvement in the creation of this technology, were
others worthy of a share in the prize? Committee members agreed to a
collective ‘tunnel vision’, their ‘fixation’ on Haber was overwhelming. At the
preliminary meeting in May 1919 all members agreed to support Haber.
Some small reservations were raised but his candidacy sailed through the
committee. In October the Academy supported the committee’s decision but
50 members—anticipating the furore—subsequently sent a petition to academies and journals abroad pleading that German science not be ostracized
because of their decision, and on November 13th 1919 three Germans,
including Haber, were honoured. Friedman
34 describes it perfectly. He says,
Committee members did not simply assess the scientific merits impartially
and then turn the matter over to the Academy to decide whether such an
award entailed moral and ethical issues. They played the role of partial
advocates; they produced flawed evaluations. The Academy too seem to
have desired to ‘cut loose’ in an atmosphere of utter pessimism and
dejection; to cast caution to the wind and embrace those with whom its
members wanted to stand in solidarity.
This remarkable ‘cutting loose’ by the Academy appears to have been driven
by a belief that in the confusion that embraced Germany at the time, no
political party there offered any hope for culture and learning. On the contrary, ‘a gaudy, materialistic, commercial middle class sprang up amongst
wartime profiteering’ and Swedish scientists therefore turned to comfort their
German colleagues. ‘Surrounded by economic ruin, shamed by humiliating
defeat, buffeted by revolution and cast as international pariahs’, German
academics needed encouragement to heal the wounds of war, and by deliberately ignoring the principles of the Academy, Sweden could ‘stand in solidarity’ with them to help them do so. Sweden it seemed, had no intention of
turning her back on Germany.
34 In this sense the Academy stood behind the
336
D. Sheppard
sympathies, and actively helped overcome the problems that had previously
hindered Haber’s candidature. In short, with absolutely no mandate from
international nominators, the committee shamefully set out to unilaterally
engineer support for Haber alone. The committee, for example, did not
object to members evaluating those whom they proposed, the claim that
nominators are partial whilst committee members are objective seems to have
been ignored or conveniently forgotten. Had they waited a year or two things
would have been clearer. The Americans had failed to build nitrogen factories,
the process did not benefit both sides, what was the full extent of Le
Rossignol’s or Bosch’s involvement in the creation of this technology, were
others worthy of a share in the prize? Committee members agreed to a
collective ‘tunnel vision’, their ‘fixation’ on Haber was overwhelming. At the
preliminary meeting in May 1919 all members agreed to support Haber.
Some small reservations were raised but his candidacy sailed through the
committee. In October the Academy supported the committee’s decision but
50 members—anticipating the furore—subsequently sent a petition to academies and journals abroad pleading that German science not be ostracized
because of their decision, and on November 13th 1919 three Germans,
including Haber, were honoured. Friedman
34 describes it perfectly. He says,
Committee members did not simply assess the scientific merits impartially
and then turn the matter over to the Academy to decide whether such an
award entailed moral and ethical issues. They played the role of partial
advocates; they produced flawed evaluations. The Academy too seem to
have desired to ‘cut loose’ in an atmosphere of utter pessimism and
dejection; to cast caution to the wind and embrace those with whom its
members wanted to stand in solidarity.
This remarkable ‘cutting loose’ by the Academy appears to have been driven
by a belief that in the confusion that embraced Germany at the time, no
political party there offered any hope for culture and learning. On the contrary, ‘a gaudy, materialistic, commercial middle class sprang up amongst
wartime profiteering’ and Swedish scientists therefore turned to comfort their
German colleagues. ‘Surrounded by economic ruin, shamed by humiliating
defeat, buffeted by revolution and cast as international pariahs’, German
academics needed encouragement to heal the wounds of war, and by deliberately ignoring the principles of the Academy, Sweden could ‘stand in solidarity’ with them to help them do so. Sweden it seemed, had no intention of
turning her back on Germany.
34 In this sense the Academy stood behind the
336
D. Sheppard