and made head of the BASF—a position he both coveted and dreaded
because he was happier with a spanner in his hand than a balance sheet or an
agenda. From a technical perspective, the French were not to be ‘privy’ to
BASF’s commercial secrets and the ‘letter’ of the Treaty of Versailles made no
demand upon Germany to reveal her technology in areas unrelated to war—
which the ammonia plants now were. However, it was inevitable that the
technology would soon be duplicated in other countries and BASF’s domination of the post-war nitrogen fixation market ended. The same applied to
dyes. The French flooded the market with confiscated materials and German
patents were often stolen or disregarded leading to rising dye production and
depressed markets in the Allied countries. All of this was later compounded
by German hyper-inflation which meant that even after the settlement with
the French, the BASF was still in trouble as a business. In the early 1920s
then, Bosch began the process of finding another ‘blockbuster’ technology. By
1929 he had succeeded, predicated on the belief that the world was running
out of oil and the age of the automobile was about to arrive. The BASF’s
synthetic gasoline (‘petrol’) process—developed alongside the fundamental
research work of Friedrich Bergius—produced high octane fuels via the
hydrogenation of ‘fluidised’ coal which generated something resembling
crude oil. Coal was plentiful in Germany but oil was not and the successful
development of the process meant that Germany—along with the later
development of ‘Fischer-Tropsch’ (Chap. 13)—eventually became
self-sufficient in fuel oils in the same way ‘Haber-Bosch’ had made her
self-sufficient in nitrates. Because of his role before, during and after the war
Bosch became a major player on the European chemistry scene, and
Germany’s additional self-sufficiency at the time naturally ‘fueled’ fears of
another world war. For historians, such momentous events tended to leave
little room for Le Rossignol.
15.4.2 Events in the United Kingdom
However, by the 1920s, anyone involved with the fixation of nitrogen in
Europe must have been aware of the original fundamental contribution of
Robert Le Rossignol, but by then the terms ‘Haber’ and ‘Haber-Bosch’
process had become ubiquitous—although in Germany Robert’s name did
become famous amongst chemists but only because of the ‘Le Rossignol’ valve
(Chap. 18). But, this period probably represents the last time the 20th
century ever recorded Robert’s contribution to fixation, certainly until the
Haber biographies began appearing from the late 1980s onwards. Only then
332
D. Sheppard
because he was happier with a spanner in his hand than a balance sheet or an
agenda. From a technical perspective, the French were not to be ‘privy’ to
BASF’s commercial secrets and the ‘letter’ of the Treaty of Versailles made no
demand upon Germany to reveal her technology in areas unrelated to war—
which the ammonia plants now were. However, it was inevitable that the
technology would soon be duplicated in other countries and BASF’s domination of the post-war nitrogen fixation market ended. The same applied to
dyes. The French flooded the market with confiscated materials and German
patents were often stolen or disregarded leading to rising dye production and
depressed markets in the Allied countries. All of this was later compounded
by German hyper-inflation which meant that even after the settlement with
the French, the BASF was still in trouble as a business. In the early 1920s
then, Bosch began the process of finding another ‘blockbuster’ technology. By
1929 he had succeeded, predicated on the belief that the world was running
out of oil and the age of the automobile was about to arrive. The BASF’s
synthetic gasoline (‘petrol’) process—developed alongside the fundamental
research work of Friedrich Bergius—produced high octane fuels via the
hydrogenation of ‘fluidised’ coal which generated something resembling
crude oil. Coal was plentiful in Germany but oil was not and the successful
development of the process meant that Germany—along with the later
development of ‘Fischer-Tropsch’ (Chap. 13)—eventually became
self-sufficient in fuel oils in the same way ‘Haber-Bosch’ had made her
self-sufficient in nitrates. Because of his role before, during and after the war
Bosch became a major player on the European chemistry scene, and
Germany’s additional self-sufficiency at the time naturally ‘fueled’ fears of
another world war. For historians, such momentous events tended to leave
little room for Le Rossignol.
15.4.2 Events in the United Kingdom
However, by the 1920s, anyone involved with the fixation of nitrogen in
Europe must have been aware of the original fundamental contribution of
Robert Le Rossignol, but by then the terms ‘Haber’ and ‘Haber-Bosch’
process had become ubiquitous—although in Germany Robert’s name did
become famous amongst chemists but only because of the ‘Le Rossignol’ valve
(Chap. 18). But, this period probably represents the last time the 20th
century ever recorded Robert’s contribution to fixation, certainly until the
Haber biographies began appearing from the late 1980s onwards. Only then
332
D. Sheppard