under an armed guard. But on the morning they left Oppau they found the
notes had gone and there was a rather suspicious hole in the floor of the
wagon.
1 On their return home, the official report of the inspectors had to be
made from memory only. The Times on 09 February 1920, published it on
page 9 under the title ‘Secretive German Chemists’. Undoubtedly, this article
was also read by Robert and later he too was to experience just how secretive
they still were (in this chapter, Sect. 15.5).
During the French occupation Bosch kept his workers on the payroll even
though the loss of production
25 meant huge financial penalties each month
but that, he decided, was better than losing the technology. Equally, Bosch
knew that he couldn’t protect his plants indefinitely. By shutting down
Oppau he was simply stalling for time until some decision could be reached
regarding her fate. He hoped that the new German government would soon
become strong enough to lobby on his behalf and he argued that
Ludwigshafen, Oppau and Leuna needed to remain viable in order to help
stabilize Germany by providing employment, by feeding the people, and by
generating wealth. All his hopes were centred on the peace negotiation at
Versailles in the summer of 1919 which he attended as a representative of
German industry, but when he arrived at the talks, he soon realised that these
were not ‘negotiations’ but rather a device by means of which a peace settlement would be imposed on Germany.
At Versailles Bosch presented his argument to the Allies. He was listened to
politely, but ignored. It was clear that the French wanted to shut down the
German ammonia plants completely, but what was of more concern to him
was the unexpected talk of ‘reparations’. The figures put forward were of
‘stellar’ proportions and ensured that Germany would remain economically
crippled for decades. It became clear to Bosch that in order to ensure the
protection of his plants he had only one thing to offer. Everyone in the
Western world wanted an ammonia plant. The French alone were ‘hell bent’
on destroying Oppau and Leuna and so Bosch made them an offer they could
not refuse, viz, to build a Haber-Bosch plant on French territory.
26
Unsurprisingly, from that point onwards the French attitude towards the
German ammonia plants became more relaxed. The deal was signed on the
first anniversary of the Armistice and in early 1920 French forces pulled out
of the occupied territories. After they left, the reactors were re-started and
Oppau began a slow march back to some sort of normality, although on 21
September 1921 Oppau was all but destroyed by a huge explosion when a silo
containing 4,500 tonnes of a mixture of ammonium sulfate and ammonium
nitrate fertilisers detonated.
1 Even so, Bosch had kept his plants but at what
price? From a personal perspective he was rewarded for his negotiating skills
15 The Post-war Years 1919–1930
331
notes had gone and there was a rather suspicious hole in the floor of the
wagon.
1 On their return home, the official report of the inspectors had to be
made from memory only. The Times on 09 February 1920, published it on
page 9 under the title ‘Secretive German Chemists’. Undoubtedly, this article
was also read by Robert and later he too was to experience just how secretive
they still were (in this chapter, Sect. 15.5).
During the French occupation Bosch kept his workers on the payroll even
though the loss of production
25 meant huge financial penalties each month
but that, he decided, was better than losing the technology. Equally, Bosch
knew that he couldn’t protect his plants indefinitely. By shutting down
Oppau he was simply stalling for time until some decision could be reached
regarding her fate. He hoped that the new German government would soon
become strong enough to lobby on his behalf and he argued that
Ludwigshafen, Oppau and Leuna needed to remain viable in order to help
stabilize Germany by providing employment, by feeding the people, and by
generating wealth. All his hopes were centred on the peace negotiation at
Versailles in the summer of 1919 which he attended as a representative of
German industry, but when he arrived at the talks, he soon realised that these
were not ‘negotiations’ but rather a device by means of which a peace settlement would be imposed on Germany.
At Versailles Bosch presented his argument to the Allies. He was listened to
politely, but ignored. It was clear that the French wanted to shut down the
German ammonia plants completely, but what was of more concern to him
was the unexpected talk of ‘reparations’. The figures put forward were of
‘stellar’ proportions and ensured that Germany would remain economically
crippled for decades. It became clear to Bosch that in order to ensure the
protection of his plants he had only one thing to offer. Everyone in the
Western world wanted an ammonia plant. The French alone were ‘hell bent’
on destroying Oppau and Leuna and so Bosch made them an offer they could
not refuse, viz, to build a Haber-Bosch plant on French territory.
26
Unsurprisingly, from that point onwards the French attitude towards the
German ammonia plants became more relaxed. The deal was signed on the
first anniversary of the Armistice and in early 1920 French forces pulled out
of the occupied territories. After they left, the reactors were re-started and
Oppau began a slow march back to some sort of normality, although on 21
September 1921 Oppau was all but destroyed by a huge explosion when a silo
containing 4,500 tonnes of a mixture of ammonium sulfate and ammonium
nitrate fertilisers detonated.
1 Even so, Bosch had kept his plants but at what
price? From a personal perspective he was rewarded for his negotiating skills
15 The Post-war Years 1919–1930
331