scientist received a thorough ‘dressing down’. However, as the cylinders were
once again being removed to Langemarck, an Allied shell—purely by chance
—scored a direct hit, releasing the gas and killing and injuring around fifty
soldiers.
44 Presented with first hand evidence of the effectiveness of the new
weapon Deimling had a change of heart, and by mid April all the cylinders
had been removed and were in position awaiting a northerly wind. On 22
April 1915, late in the afternoon (about 6 pm), the wind arrived from the
northeast and the valves were opened releasing an estimated four hundred
tons of chlorine gas. As the chlorine drifted slowly towards the French and
Canadian lines, another component of the ‘chemist’s war’ came into being.
The world subsequently placed the responsibility for chemical warfare
squarely on Fitz Haber’s shoulders, and despite his justification for its use and
the limited casualties it caused, over the passage of time, even down to today,
his burden has never been lifted.
The attack however was not as successful as Haber had hoped. Certainly,
his poisonous cloud cleared out many of the trenches—especially those
occupied by the French/Algerian troops—at the same time opening up a
four-mile-wide gap in the Allied lines. The German troops advanced about
fifteen minutes after the gas release picking their way between the trenches,
through the barbed wire, machine gun nests and over the distorted, still warm
bodies of those unable to flee. But the cloud soon dissipated, sufficient
support troops to reinforce the breakthrough were unavailable, night was
falling and the advance guard had to dig into consolidate the day’s work. In
later years, Haber became rather bitter regarding the gas release at Ypres. He
felt that the German high command should have had more faith in his ‘shock
of the new’. They should have been more patient and waited for more
favourable weather conditions releasing the gas in the morning, and taking
full advantage of its novelty by committing enough reserves to sustain the
breakthrough. As it was, the battles around Ypres continued for another two
weeks and the Germans released chlorine gas four more times. Casualties at
Ypres due to gas alone were difficult to quantify but it was estimated that
there were around 7000 injured and 350 dead—enough it was felt to effect a
tactical advantage, but not enough to provide the strategic advantage that
would have re-instated a mobile war.
45 Despite some initial enthusiasm for
the gas cloud, this remained the opinion of the German high command over
the next two years, the Allies however were galvanized and, as Germany had
anticipated, they immediately made preparations for both retaliation and
protection against gas.
260
D. Sheppard
once again being removed to Langemarck, an Allied shell—purely by chance
—scored a direct hit, releasing the gas and killing and injuring around fifty
soldiers.
44 Presented with first hand evidence of the effectiveness of the new
weapon Deimling had a change of heart, and by mid April all the cylinders
had been removed and were in position awaiting a northerly wind. On 22
April 1915, late in the afternoon (about 6 pm), the wind arrived from the
northeast and the valves were opened releasing an estimated four hundred
tons of chlorine gas. As the chlorine drifted slowly towards the French and
Canadian lines, another component of the ‘chemist’s war’ came into being.
The world subsequently placed the responsibility for chemical warfare
squarely on Fitz Haber’s shoulders, and despite his justification for its use and
the limited casualties it caused, over the passage of time, even down to today,
his burden has never been lifted.
The attack however was not as successful as Haber had hoped. Certainly,
his poisonous cloud cleared out many of the trenches—especially those
occupied by the French/Algerian troops—at the same time opening up a
four-mile-wide gap in the Allied lines. The German troops advanced about
fifteen minutes after the gas release picking their way between the trenches,
through the barbed wire, machine gun nests and over the distorted, still warm
bodies of those unable to flee. But the cloud soon dissipated, sufficient
support troops to reinforce the breakthrough were unavailable, night was
falling and the advance guard had to dig into consolidate the day’s work. In
later years, Haber became rather bitter regarding the gas release at Ypres. He
felt that the German high command should have had more faith in his ‘shock
of the new’. They should have been more patient and waited for more
favourable weather conditions releasing the gas in the morning, and taking
full advantage of its novelty by committing enough reserves to sustain the
breakthrough. As it was, the battles around Ypres continued for another two
weeks and the Germans released chlorine gas four more times. Casualties at
Ypres due to gas alone were difficult to quantify but it was estimated that
there were around 7000 injured and 350 dead—enough it was felt to effect a
tactical advantage, but not enough to provide the strategic advantage that
would have re-instated a mobile war.
45 Despite some initial enthusiasm for
the gas cloud, this remained the opinion of the German high command over
the next two years, the Allies however were galvanized and, as Germany had
anticipated, they immediately made preparations for both retaliation and
protection against gas.
260
D. Sheppard