the reaction occurred in the gas phase at just a few atmospheres pressure so
there were huge volumes to deal with in the ‘contact chambers’. The product
too—an aqueous solution of nitric acid—was highly corrosive so all the
piping, valves, coolers and pumps etc. would have to be fashioned from the
relatively new chromium-nickel stainless steel, but both men felt that even
without the benefit of a pilot plant, and faced with yet another huge engineering challenge, it would still be possible to switch Oppau’s production
from ammonium sulphate to nitric acid and hence sodium nitrate.
13.5.2 The ‘Masters of War’
In September 1914, Bosch visited the War Ministry who were keen to add
the BASF’s new ammonia synthesis to the more established processes.
Although Bosch found the Ministry utterly ignorant of the chemical
requirements of a modern war, he also detected a natural partnership here, a
kind of symbiosis; a nation at war desperately needing a product, and a group
of companies equally desperately seeking new markets for a product whose
old markets had disappeared. This partnership was to herald the rise of the
German military-industrial complex
19
—the ‘Masters of War’—who were to
have such an influence on subsequent European history. Bosch however had
already learned to be bold where ammonia was concerned, and emphasing the
essential bond between the nation and her industries, by the beginning of
October 1914 he made what was to become known as the ‘saltpetre promise’,
where the BASF—in an audacious attempt to grab the fixed nitrogen business
for itself—offered not only to convert and expand the Oppau plant but also to
build a new plant which, after a just few months, could provide 5,000 tonnes
of sodium nitrate per month from synthetic ammonia. 60,0000t y
−1
,
equivalent to 9,900t fixed N, or 12,000t NH 3 .
20
Under ‘normal’ circumstances, the funding for the expansion of Germany’s
nitrate industry would have been expected to borne by the industry itself as
an investment. After all it was a commercial venture. By December 1914 as
the military’s need for munitions became ‘ravenous’, the BASF initially took
the conventional route and agreed to fund the quadrupling of its ammonia
production at Oppau to 37,500 tonnes per year,
21 and by May 1915 the first
deliveries for military use began. But in early 1915 when Haber on behalf of
the nitrate commission pleaded with Ludwigshafen to double that again to
80,000 tonnes per year, the BASF ‘froze’, for this was commercial madness.
Even as the flower of Europe was being slaughtered on the fields of France, at
some point the war would be over, leaving the BASF with a chemical
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
249
there were huge volumes to deal with in the ‘contact chambers’. The product
too—an aqueous solution of nitric acid—was highly corrosive so all the
piping, valves, coolers and pumps etc. would have to be fashioned from the
relatively new chromium-nickel stainless steel, but both men felt that even
without the benefit of a pilot plant, and faced with yet another huge engineering challenge, it would still be possible to switch Oppau’s production
from ammonium sulphate to nitric acid and hence sodium nitrate.
13.5.2 The ‘Masters of War’
In September 1914, Bosch visited the War Ministry who were keen to add
the BASF’s new ammonia synthesis to the more established processes.
Although Bosch found the Ministry utterly ignorant of the chemical
requirements of a modern war, he also detected a natural partnership here, a
kind of symbiosis; a nation at war desperately needing a product, and a group
of companies equally desperately seeking new markets for a product whose
old markets had disappeared. This partnership was to herald the rise of the
German military-industrial complex
19
—the ‘Masters of War’—who were to
have such an influence on subsequent European history. Bosch however had
already learned to be bold where ammonia was concerned, and emphasing the
essential bond between the nation and her industries, by the beginning of
October 1914 he made what was to become known as the ‘saltpetre promise’,
where the BASF—in an audacious attempt to grab the fixed nitrogen business
for itself—offered not only to convert and expand the Oppau plant but also to
build a new plant which, after a just few months, could provide 5,000 tonnes
of sodium nitrate per month from synthetic ammonia. 60,0000t y
−1
,
equivalent to 9,900t fixed N, or 12,000t NH 3 .
20
Under ‘normal’ circumstances, the funding for the expansion of Germany’s
nitrate industry would have been expected to borne by the industry itself as
an investment. After all it was a commercial venture. By December 1914 as
the military’s need for munitions became ‘ravenous’, the BASF initially took
the conventional route and agreed to fund the quadrupling of its ammonia
production at Oppau to 37,500 tonnes per year,
21 and by May 1915 the first
deliveries for military use began. But in early 1915 when Haber on behalf of
the nitrate commission pleaded with Ludwigshafen to double that again to
80,000 tonnes per year, the BASF ‘froze’, for this was commercial madness.
Even as the flower of Europe was being slaughtered on the fields of France, at
some point the war would be over, leaving the BASF with a chemical
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
249