consideration in the plan, hence subsequent German fury with Goschen. But
the plan had already been executed and throughout August 1914, Germany
persisted with her invasion of Belgium. In the meantime, Great Britain sent a
‘small’ ‘Expeditionary Force’ of 75,000 regular army men to France, who in
turn had began the mobilisation of millions of her own recruits. The Belgian
army was only a fraction of the size of the German army, yet it delayed the
Germans for nearly a month.
4 Eventually the Germans destroyed the troublesome Belgian forts in Liège, Namur and Antwerp, and when Antwerp was
occupied, 50,000 tons
5 of Chile saltpetre was secured from its harbour
helping to replace the rapidly dwindling supplies from the import warehouses
at Hamburg. At current consumption levels however, such a tonnage would
last only until early-to-mid 1915.
6 Still, despite stiff Belgian resistance, the
Schlieffen plan was proceeding reasonably well and these reserves should have
been adequate. The Germans however failed to anticipate how the delay in
Belgium would assist the French mobilisation via her railways. The effectiveness of this moblisation meant that by the time the Germans left Belgium
the French and British were waiting for them. The French
commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, placed the BEF on his left flank, where he
believed there would be little fighting. ‘Au contraire’. Due to the rapid
German advance through Belgium, the small British force took a hiding, but
along with the French they provided enough resistance as they fell back
towards the Marne river east of Paris to entice the Germans to modify
‘Schlieffen’. The Germans turned away from Paris, in an attempt to envelop
the retreating allied armies, exposing their right flank and making possible the
‘Miracle of the Marne’.
7
Joffre immediately realised the German armies’ tactical error. On 04
September, he made plans to halt the withdrawal and attack the Germans all
along the front. In preparation for the attack the German First and Second
armies ‘wheeled’ to face the Allies and in doing so opened up a 30-mile gap—
a gap spotted by allied reconnaissance aircraft. The Allies were prompt in
exploiting the break in the German lines, pouring in troops between the two
armies. On 08 September, the French launched a surprise attack against the
German Second Army, serving to further widen the gap. By 09 September, it
looked as though both German armies would be totally encircled and
destroyed. The German General von Moltke suffered a nervous breakdown
upon hearing of the danger and is said to have reported to the Kaiser: ‘Your
Majesty, we have lost the war!’ His subordinates took over and ordered a
general retreat to the Aisne river in northeastern France to regroup. The
Germans were pursued by the French and British but halted their retreat after
40 miles at a point north of the river. The German defeat between the 09 and
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
243
the plan had already been executed and throughout August 1914, Germany
persisted with her invasion of Belgium. In the meantime, Great Britain sent a
‘small’ ‘Expeditionary Force’ of 75,000 regular army men to France, who in
turn had began the mobilisation of millions of her own recruits. The Belgian
army was only a fraction of the size of the German army, yet it delayed the
Germans for nearly a month.
4 Eventually the Germans destroyed the troublesome Belgian forts in Liège, Namur and Antwerp, and when Antwerp was
occupied, 50,000 tons
5 of Chile saltpetre was secured from its harbour
helping to replace the rapidly dwindling supplies from the import warehouses
at Hamburg. At current consumption levels however, such a tonnage would
last only until early-to-mid 1915.
6 Still, despite stiff Belgian resistance, the
Schlieffen plan was proceeding reasonably well and these reserves should have
been adequate. The Germans however failed to anticipate how the delay in
Belgium would assist the French mobilisation via her railways. The effectiveness of this moblisation meant that by the time the Germans left Belgium
the French and British were waiting for them. The French
commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, placed the BEF on his left flank, where he
believed there would be little fighting. ‘Au contraire’. Due to the rapid
German advance through Belgium, the small British force took a hiding, but
along with the French they provided enough resistance as they fell back
towards the Marne river east of Paris to entice the Germans to modify
‘Schlieffen’. The Germans turned away from Paris, in an attempt to envelop
the retreating allied armies, exposing their right flank and making possible the
‘Miracle of the Marne’.
7
Joffre immediately realised the German armies’ tactical error. On 04
September, he made plans to halt the withdrawal and attack the Germans all
along the front. In preparation for the attack the German First and Second
armies ‘wheeled’ to face the Allies and in doing so opened up a 30-mile gap—
a gap spotted by allied reconnaissance aircraft. The Allies were prompt in
exploiting the break in the German lines, pouring in troops between the two
armies. On 08 September, the French launched a surprise attack against the
German Second Army, serving to further widen the gap. By 09 September, it
looked as though both German armies would be totally encircled and
destroyed. The German General von Moltke suffered a nervous breakdown
upon hearing of the danger and is said to have reported to the Kaiser: ‘Your
Majesty, we have lost the war!’ His subordinates took over and ordered a
general retreat to the Aisne river in northeastern France to regroup. The
Germans were pursued by the French and British but halted their retreat after
40 miles at a point north of the river. The German defeat between the 09 and
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
243