During the afternoon … I . informed the Secretary of State that unless the
Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o’clock that night that
they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and
stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform
the Imperial Government that His Majesty’s Government would have to take
all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium … Herr von Jagow
[Foreign Minister] replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer
than that which he had given me earlier in the day. I then said that I should like
to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should
have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so….
I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue,
which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His
Majesty’s Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word - ‘neutrality’, a
word which in war time had so often been disregarded … just for a scrap of
paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired
nothing better than to be friends with her…. What we had done was
unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for
his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the
terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement
… it was, so to speak, a matter of ‘life and death’ for the honour of Great
Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to
defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked. The Chancellor said, ‘But at what price
will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
that?’
After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy … At about
9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann [Under-Secretary of State] came to see me
… he asked me … casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a
declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was
known to be must know … what was usual in such cases … Herr
Zimmermann said that it was, in fact, a declaration of war …
13.2 Demise of the Schlieffen Plan … ‘Trench
Warfare’
The instant Great Britain declared war on Germany the ‘suspect’
3 Schlieffen
plan was utterly compromised. The engagement of a third antagonist capable
of committing millions of ‘boots on the ground’ and whose powerful navy
was able to blockade German access to her most vital imports was never a
242
D. Sheppard
Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o’clock that night that
they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and
stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform
the Imperial Government that His Majesty’s Government would have to take
all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium … Herr von Jagow
[Foreign Minister] replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer
than that which he had given me earlier in the day. I then said that I should like
to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should
have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so….
I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue,
which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His
Majesty’s Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word - ‘neutrality’, a
word which in war time had so often been disregarded … just for a scrap of
paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired
nothing better than to be friends with her…. What we had done was
unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for
his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the
terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement
… it was, so to speak, a matter of ‘life and death’ for the honour of Great
Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to
defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked. The Chancellor said, ‘But at what price
will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
that?’
After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy … At about
9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann [Under-Secretary of State] came to see me
… he asked me … casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a
declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was
known to be must know … what was usual in such cases … Herr
Zimmermann said that it was, in fact, a declaration of war …
13.2 Demise of the Schlieffen Plan … ‘Trench
Warfare’
The instant Great Britain declared war on Germany the ‘suspect’
3 Schlieffen
plan was utterly compromised. The engagement of a third antagonist capable
of committing millions of ‘boots on the ground’ and whose powerful navy
was able to blockade German access to her most vital imports was never a
242
D. Sheppard