Chapter 4
An Account of the ISO/IEC
Standardization of the Simon and Speck
Block Cipher Families
Tomer Ashur and Atul Luykx
Abstract Simon and Speck are two block cipher families published in 2013
by the US National Security Agency (NSA). These block ciphers, targeting
lightweight applications, were suggested in 2015 to be included in ISO/IEC 29192-2
Information technology—Security techniques—Lightweight cryptography—Part 2:
Block ciphers. Following 3.5 years of deliberations within ISO/IEC JTC 1 they
were rejected in April 2018. This chapter provides an account of the ISO/IEC
standardization process for Simon and Speck.
4.1 Introduction
By their very nature, cryptographic algorithms require large-scale agreement to
enable secure communication. Standardization by bodies such as ANSI, IEEE,
and ISO/IEC is important means by which industries and governments achieve
such agreement. The standardization process can be effective for agreeing upon
trustworthy, secure, and efficient cryptographic algorithms when conducted in the
open, as was the case with AES [444]. Yet opaque standardization processes lend
themselves to subversion, as exemplified by Dual-EC [472].
In recent years, standardization bodies have initiated projects to understand
the need for lightweight cryptographic algorithms. We shed light on the ISO/IEC
standardization process, one not well understood by the general public, by delving
into how cryptographic algorithms are scrutinized and determined to be fit for
standardization. To this end, we present a chronological description of the events
that led to removal of the NSA block ciphers Simon and Speck [64] from
T. Ashur ()
imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
TU Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
e-mail: tomer.ashur@esat.kuleuven.be
A. Luykx
imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
© The Author(s) 2021
G. Avoine, J. Hernandez-Castro (eds.), Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10591-4_4
63
An Account of the ISO/IEC
Standardization of the Simon and Speck
Block Cipher Families
Tomer Ashur and Atul Luykx
Abstract Simon and Speck are two block cipher families published in 2013
by the US National Security Agency (NSA). These block ciphers, targeting
lightweight applications, were suggested in 2015 to be included in ISO/IEC 29192-2
Information technology—Security techniques—Lightweight cryptography—Part 2:
Block ciphers. Following 3.5 years of deliberations within ISO/IEC JTC 1 they
were rejected in April 2018. This chapter provides an account of the ISO/IEC
standardization process for Simon and Speck.
4.1 Introduction
By their very nature, cryptographic algorithms require large-scale agreement to
enable secure communication. Standardization by bodies such as ANSI, IEEE,
and ISO/IEC is important means by which industries and governments achieve
such agreement. The standardization process can be effective for agreeing upon
trustworthy, secure, and efficient cryptographic algorithms when conducted in the
open, as was the case with AES [444]. Yet opaque standardization processes lend
themselves to subversion, as exemplified by Dual-EC [472].
In recent years, standardization bodies have initiated projects to understand
the need for lightweight cryptographic algorithms. We shed light on the ISO/IEC
standardization process, one not well understood by the general public, by delving
into how cryptographic algorithms are scrutinized and determined to be fit for
standardization. To this end, we present a chronological description of the events
that led to removal of the NSA block ciphers Simon and Speck [64] from
T. Ashur ()
imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
TU Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
e-mail: tomer.ashur@esat.kuleuven.be
A. Luykx
imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
© The Author(s) 2021
G. Avoine, J. Hernandez-Castro (eds.), Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10591-4_4
63