4.3 Equity: Access and Allocation Patterns
77
additional large-scale biomass demand for energy and novel bioproducts add pressure over resources and can aggravate access issues (Hall et al. 2011; German et al.
2011; Bastos Lima 2018).
Meanwhile, as seen, existing biofuel institutions represent only particular groupings of actors working for a limited agenda. Grassroots organizations and other
critical actors have lacked venues to express their views and interests on the bioeconomy, lacking influence over the institutions being crafted. Even at existing multistakeholder roundtables, the presence of South-based NGOs is minimal (Bastos Lima
2009).
Allocation patterns are revealing of the inequities in international biofuel and bioeconomy governance thus far. First, biofuel research, development, and production
have been mostly linked to consolidated agricultural sectors rather than small-scale
agriculture or strategies that target the poor. Vulnerable groups and energy poverty
are regularly evoked to justify bioenergy promotion (Von Braun and Pachauri 2006;
Hunsberger et al. 2017), yet the growing volume of biofuels produced mostly go to
higher-income consumers (automobile users) rather than to the hundreds of millions
still lacking access to modern energy. Second, developing countries have usually
been allocated only the natural resource-intensive stage (feedstock cultivation) of
bio-based production chains, the one of least economic value. Value-added from
biofuel processing and biorefining technologies remains primarily controlled by
governments and companies of developed countries—or, exceptionally, of emerging
countries such as Brazil or China. Thus, international governance does not yet
address either the risks or the much-heralded but largely undelivered potentials for the
bioeconomy to promote socio-economic and technological development in poorer
countries, despite more than a decade of work on biofuels.
As such, the global bioeconomic order starts shaped to prioritize improved access
to land, freshwater, and renewable energy for more affluent consumers in developed
countries. Poorer actors, instead of benefiting, mostly have become exposed to additional risks of ecosystem degradation, food insecurity, and reduced access to land
and water (Smith 2010). By broadly neglecting equity issues, international biofuel
governance risks aggravating rather than addressing existing inequalities.
4.4 Agency in International Biofuel Governance
4.4.1 Agents, Coalitions and Policy-Related Beliefs
The main agents of international biofuel governance have arguably been states.
Except for the multi-stakeholder roundtables, all discussed venues have nearly exclusive state-based membership (e.g., GBEP, IBF, IEA Bioenergy, CBD). Although nonstate actors such as biofuel businesses and the scientific community have de facto
participated in these fora, this is done mostly by appointment, frequently as part of
77
additional large-scale biomass demand for energy and novel bioproducts add pressure over resources and can aggravate access issues (Hall et al. 2011; German et al.
2011; Bastos Lima 2018).
Meanwhile, as seen, existing biofuel institutions represent only particular groupings of actors working for a limited agenda. Grassroots organizations and other
critical actors have lacked venues to express their views and interests on the bioeconomy, lacking influence over the institutions being crafted. Even at existing multistakeholder roundtables, the presence of South-based NGOs is minimal (Bastos Lima
2009).
Allocation patterns are revealing of the inequities in international biofuel and bioeconomy governance thus far. First, biofuel research, development, and production
have been mostly linked to consolidated agricultural sectors rather than small-scale
agriculture or strategies that target the poor. Vulnerable groups and energy poverty
are regularly evoked to justify bioenergy promotion (Von Braun and Pachauri 2006;
Hunsberger et al. 2017), yet the growing volume of biofuels produced mostly go to
higher-income consumers (automobile users) rather than to the hundreds of millions
still lacking access to modern energy. Second, developing countries have usually
been allocated only the natural resource-intensive stage (feedstock cultivation) of
bio-based production chains, the one of least economic value. Value-added from
biofuel processing and biorefining technologies remains primarily controlled by
governments and companies of developed countries—or, exceptionally, of emerging
countries such as Brazil or China. Thus, international governance does not yet
address either the risks or the much-heralded but largely undelivered potentials for the
bioeconomy to promote socio-economic and technological development in poorer
countries, despite more than a decade of work on biofuels.
As such, the global bioeconomic order starts shaped to prioritize improved access
to land, freshwater, and renewable energy for more affluent consumers in developed
countries. Poorer actors, instead of benefiting, mostly have become exposed to additional risks of ecosystem degradation, food insecurity, and reduced access to land
and water (Smith 2010). By broadly neglecting equity issues, international biofuel
governance risks aggravating rather than addressing existing inequalities.
4.4 Agency in International Biofuel Governance
4.4.1 Agents, Coalitions and Policy-Related Beliefs
The main agents of international biofuel governance have arguably been states.
Except for the multi-stakeholder roundtables, all discussed venues have nearly exclusive state-based membership (e.g., GBEP, IBF, IEA Bioenergy, CBD). Although nonstate actors such as biofuel businesses and the scientific community have de facto
participated in these fora, this is done mostly by appointment, frequently as part of