3.4 Agency as the Strategic Use of Power
61
recognizing relationships among actors and their forms of coordination (Sabatier
1988). Later chapters will characterize existing coalitions by identifying their policycore beliefs (i.e., primary normative and prescriptive preferences) and secondary
aspects, comparatively minor beliefs that are, therefore, easier to change (Sabatier
and Weible 2007). These secondary aspects may relate, for instance, to beliefs on how
to best implement a policy or on the effectiveness of particular policy instruments.
A second step is to analyze how agency takes place. It means analyzing the utilization of resources and the strategic uses of power in its various forms (instrumental,
structural, and discursive) to concretize policy beliefs. This task includes examining:
(a) coalition behavior and how coordination among actors takes place; (b) institutional entrepreneurship per se, such as forum shopping and attempts to create, change
or eliminate particular institutions; and (c) action aimed directly at other actors, such
as to destabilize or undermine the capabilities of adversaries.
Finally, an important third step is to provide recommendations on how to pursue
institutional changes found wanting from the analyses on architecture or allocation and access. These recommendations can then accompany any on institutional
redesign, realizing that the latter cannot come about without agency.
3.5 Conclusions: Feedback Loops and Power Spirals
Each of the governance elements discussed in this chapter can be analyzed in isolation, but in reality they are functionally interconnected and very much integrated. It is
therefore useful to acknowledge, unravel, and study the links between them. Doing so
is essential to understanding social equity in any given setting. However, it is particularly crucial for the governance of emerging areas—such as the bioeconomy—where
new sectors are being constituted, and allegedly as a “force for good” to move the
world towards greater sustainability. This aura of the bioeconomy as a set of sectors
that take sustainability at heart arguably makes the equity imperative even stronger.
As seen, the agent-structure debate in governance emphasizes the institutional
milieu when appraising the determinants of actor behavior. Nevertheless, the latter
can also be influenced by material dimensions, i.e., allocation and access patterns.
There is a dialectical relationship not only between agents and institutions, but also
between actors’ material capabilities and the patterns of access and allocation in
governance. As seen most clearly (though not exclusively) in self-serving policy
lobbying, agency often is performed with an eye on the allocation and access patterns
that will arise out of the institutions being put in place. Meanwhile, such distributive
outcomes will profoundly influence the ability of various actors to become effective
governance agents, and thus a feedback loop—and potentially a power spiral—are
created.
Tackling “the inequity of inequality” is historically challenging precisely because
powerful actors systematically retain most benefits. They use their power to allocate
the most advantageous roles to themselves and end up keeping inequitable structures—and thus inequalities—in place even if accruing some minor benefits to their
61
recognizing relationships among actors and their forms of coordination (Sabatier
1988). Later chapters will characterize existing coalitions by identifying their policycore beliefs (i.e., primary normative and prescriptive preferences) and secondary
aspects, comparatively minor beliefs that are, therefore, easier to change (Sabatier
and Weible 2007). These secondary aspects may relate, for instance, to beliefs on how
to best implement a policy or on the effectiveness of particular policy instruments.
A second step is to analyze how agency takes place. It means analyzing the utilization of resources and the strategic uses of power in its various forms (instrumental,
structural, and discursive) to concretize policy beliefs. This task includes examining:
(a) coalition behavior and how coordination among actors takes place; (b) institutional entrepreneurship per se, such as forum shopping and attempts to create, change
or eliminate particular institutions; and (c) action aimed directly at other actors, such
as to destabilize or undermine the capabilities of adversaries.
Finally, an important third step is to provide recommendations on how to pursue
institutional changes found wanting from the analyses on architecture or allocation and access. These recommendations can then accompany any on institutional
redesign, realizing that the latter cannot come about without agency.
3.5 Conclusions: Feedback Loops and Power Spirals
Each of the governance elements discussed in this chapter can be analyzed in isolation, but in reality they are functionally interconnected and very much integrated. It is
therefore useful to acknowledge, unravel, and study the links between them. Doing so
is essential to understanding social equity in any given setting. However, it is particularly crucial for the governance of emerging areas—such as the bioeconomy—where
new sectors are being constituted, and allegedly as a “force for good” to move the
world towards greater sustainability. This aura of the bioeconomy as a set of sectors
that take sustainability at heart arguably makes the equity imperative even stronger.
As seen, the agent-structure debate in governance emphasizes the institutional
milieu when appraising the determinants of actor behavior. Nevertheless, the latter
can also be influenced by material dimensions, i.e., allocation and access patterns.
There is a dialectical relationship not only between agents and institutions, but also
between actors’ material capabilities and the patterns of access and allocation in
governance. As seen most clearly (though not exclusively) in self-serving policy
lobbying, agency often is performed with an eye on the allocation and access patterns
that will arise out of the institutions being put in place. Meanwhile, such distributive
outcomes will profoundly influence the ability of various actors to become effective
governance agents, and thus a feedback loop—and potentially a power spiral—are
created.
Tackling “the inequity of inequality” is historically challenging precisely because
powerful actors systematically retain most benefits. They use their power to allocate
the most advantageous roles to themselves and end up keeping inequitable structures—and thus inequalities—in place even if accruing some minor benefits to their