9.2 Unraveling the Politics of Bioeconomy Governance
213
unwillingness to compromise has been credited partly to its decreasing status as a
world power and fears of being overtaken by emerging economies, notably China
(Gupta 2010; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012; Roberts 2011). Finally, agriculture, too, is
perceived by many countries as a strategic sector for employment creation, foreign
exchange earnings, or cultural and landscape conservation (see Potter 2006; Piketty
et al. 2009). Unsurprisingly, it has hindered advances in the Doha Round of negotiations under the WTO, which is ongoing since 2001 (Clapp 2006). Therefore, even
though environmental changes and an increasingly interdependent economy have
turned energy and agricultural sectors into global concerns, their strategic nature has
curtailed international regime formation attempts.
This analysis thus suggests that, even in the presence of ample scientific evidence,
of domestic policy externalities perceived as negative, and of possibly mutual benefits
from multilateral agreements, regime formation on strategic sectors still depends on:
• Reaching a minimum level of consensus about transnational impacts and on
whether and how to avoid them;
• A willingness to compromise on national sovereignty proportional to the desirability of avoiding those impacts and to the opportunity costs this would
create;
• Accommodating for the economic or geopolitical interests associated with the
strategic resource sectors being regulated (e.g., finding a substitute strategy).
As biofuels policy meets none of the requirements above, one may ask why there
is any biofuel governance at all (see Chap. 4). Arguably, in contrast to regimes,
governance requires just like-minded actors to share a common purpose and agree
on mutually advantageous strategies (e.g., the US and Brazil seeking to establish a
global ethanol market; see Afionis and Stringer 2020). Unlike regime formation, it
does not necessarily require agreement on behavior rules, the balancing-out of tradeoffs and compromises, or sacrifices of any sort (see Chap. 3). Therefore, non-regimes
and non-governance are not determined by the same factors.
9.2.5 Consequences of Inequity: The Relevance of Allocation
and Access to Governance
This book has argued that social equity is a normative goal as well as an essential determinant of vulnerability, agency, and a range of other elements relevant to
governance. Thus far, the experience with actual bioeconomy development makes a
compelling case for taking allocation and access issues more seriously into account.
First, biofuels have shown that lack of attention to allocation and access issues can
easily lead to widespread human rights violations. Such violations include not only
compromised access to essential resources such as water and food but also to exercising human rights to housing and decent work (see CESCR 1991; International
213
unwillingness to compromise has been credited partly to its decreasing status as a
world power and fears of being overtaken by emerging economies, notably China
(Gupta 2010; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012; Roberts 2011). Finally, agriculture, too, is
perceived by many countries as a strategic sector for employment creation, foreign
exchange earnings, or cultural and landscape conservation (see Potter 2006; Piketty
et al. 2009). Unsurprisingly, it has hindered advances in the Doha Round of negotiations under the WTO, which is ongoing since 2001 (Clapp 2006). Therefore, even
though environmental changes and an increasingly interdependent economy have
turned energy and agricultural sectors into global concerns, their strategic nature has
curtailed international regime formation attempts.
This analysis thus suggests that, even in the presence of ample scientific evidence,
of domestic policy externalities perceived as negative, and of possibly mutual benefits
from multilateral agreements, regime formation on strategic sectors still depends on:
• Reaching a minimum level of consensus about transnational impacts and on
whether and how to avoid them;
• A willingness to compromise on national sovereignty proportional to the desirability of avoiding those impacts and to the opportunity costs this would
create;
• Accommodating for the economic or geopolitical interests associated with the
strategic resource sectors being regulated (e.g., finding a substitute strategy).
As biofuels policy meets none of the requirements above, one may ask why there
is any biofuel governance at all (see Chap. 4). Arguably, in contrast to regimes,
governance requires just like-minded actors to share a common purpose and agree
on mutually advantageous strategies (e.g., the US and Brazil seeking to establish a
global ethanol market; see Afionis and Stringer 2020). Unlike regime formation, it
does not necessarily require agreement on behavior rules, the balancing-out of tradeoffs and compromises, or sacrifices of any sort (see Chap. 3). Therefore, non-regimes
and non-governance are not determined by the same factors.
9.2.5 Consequences of Inequity: The Relevance of Allocation
and Access to Governance
This book has argued that social equity is a normative goal as well as an essential determinant of vulnerability, agency, and a range of other elements relevant to
governance. Thus far, the experience with actual bioeconomy development makes a
compelling case for taking allocation and access issues more seriously into account.
First, biofuels have shown that lack of attention to allocation and access issues can
easily lead to widespread human rights violations. Such violations include not only
compromised access to essential resources such as water and food but also to exercising human rights to housing and decent work (see CESCR 1991; International