212
9 The Politics for a Fairer Bioeconomy
seem closer to such a consensus and have long called for changes in those domestic
policies.
2
International regimes that put reins on domestic policies, although hard to negotiate, are not nonexistent, as the Kyoto Protocol and its emissions caps showed—
among various other examples. However, while global ecological impacts are more
easily seen as “negative,” transnational economic impacts such as those of domestic
biofuel policies on agricultural commodity prices are much more nuanced despite
the clamor made about “starving the poor to fuel cars.” While there is a fairly broad
consensus about the desirability of, say, mitigating climate change and avoiding
biodiversity loss, the idea of keeping agricultural commodity prices low is not nearly
as consensual. Furthermore, restrictions on crop or land diversion to biofuels would
mean, in practice, compelling major agricultural countries to stick to producing and
exporting food. They would have to forgo the development of other crop-based industries and a bioeconomy “just” to keep international agricultural commodity prices
at a certain level because other countries have become dependent on (cheap) food
imports. It can certainly be asked why the latter have become so vulnerable to international price volatility and dependent on food imports (see Clapp 2009). If anything,
the COVID-19 pandemic has brutally exposed the need for addressing structural
vulnerabilities of access to food in the neoliberal food security order (Clapp and
Moseley 2021). However, requesting producer countries to refrain from a broader
utilization of their crops, multipurpose agriculture, and bioeconomy development
would affect their national sovereignty to a degree they are generally unwilling to
accept.
To what extent are these factors specific to biofuels, and to what extent can they
be generalized to regime formation in other areas? Issue-area specificity is a crucial
debate in non-regime theory (Dimitrov et al. 2007). Still, some generalization may
be possible. Arguably, national interest and sovereignty concerns are relevant to any
issue-area considered to be strategic. In strategic areas, the country’s economic status
or geopolitical power is at stake, as seen in global energy governance, international
climate change negotiations, or discussions about the liberalization of agriculture. For
instance, despite the crucial importance of energy production, trade and consumption
for economies or to the environment on a planetary scale, global energy governance
remains weak, scattered and, for most practical purposes, nonexistent (Florini and
Sovacool 2009; Gupta and Ivanova 2009; Lesage et al. 2010). Even rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) generally exempt oil and gas sectors (Abdallah
2006; Cottier et al. 2010). As such energy resources are strategic both for economic
and geopolitical interests, countries are hardly willing to compromise in this area—
except when international institutions are perceived to be non-intrusive and to work
in the best interest of all participants, as in the case of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (see Kaufmann et al. 2004; Carey 2009;
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010). For instance, in international climate negotiations, US
2 See FAO et al. (2011) for a joint statement by several multilateral organizations against large-scale
biofuel production based on food crops, and HLPE (2013b) for the call of a high-level panel of
experts gathered by the FAO for further sustainability policy-making on biofuels.
9 The Politics for a Fairer Bioeconomy
seem closer to such a consensus and have long called for changes in those domestic
policies.
2
International regimes that put reins on domestic policies, although hard to negotiate, are not nonexistent, as the Kyoto Protocol and its emissions caps showed—
among various other examples. However, while global ecological impacts are more
easily seen as “negative,” transnational economic impacts such as those of domestic
biofuel policies on agricultural commodity prices are much more nuanced despite
the clamor made about “starving the poor to fuel cars.” While there is a fairly broad
consensus about the desirability of, say, mitigating climate change and avoiding
biodiversity loss, the idea of keeping agricultural commodity prices low is not nearly
as consensual. Furthermore, restrictions on crop or land diversion to biofuels would
mean, in practice, compelling major agricultural countries to stick to producing and
exporting food. They would have to forgo the development of other crop-based industries and a bioeconomy “just” to keep international agricultural commodity prices
at a certain level because other countries have become dependent on (cheap) food
imports. It can certainly be asked why the latter have become so vulnerable to international price volatility and dependent on food imports (see Clapp 2009). If anything,
the COVID-19 pandemic has brutally exposed the need for addressing structural
vulnerabilities of access to food in the neoliberal food security order (Clapp and
Moseley 2021). However, requesting producer countries to refrain from a broader
utilization of their crops, multipurpose agriculture, and bioeconomy development
would affect their national sovereignty to a degree they are generally unwilling to
accept.
To what extent are these factors specific to biofuels, and to what extent can they
be generalized to regime formation in other areas? Issue-area specificity is a crucial
debate in non-regime theory (Dimitrov et al. 2007). Still, some generalization may
be possible. Arguably, national interest and sovereignty concerns are relevant to any
issue-area considered to be strategic. In strategic areas, the country’s economic status
or geopolitical power is at stake, as seen in global energy governance, international
climate change negotiations, or discussions about the liberalization of agriculture. For
instance, despite the crucial importance of energy production, trade and consumption
for economies or to the environment on a planetary scale, global energy governance
remains weak, scattered and, for most practical purposes, nonexistent (Florini and
Sovacool 2009; Gupta and Ivanova 2009; Lesage et al. 2010). Even rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) generally exempt oil and gas sectors (Abdallah
2006; Cottier et al. 2010). As such energy resources are strategic both for economic
and geopolitical interests, countries are hardly willing to compromise in this area—
except when international institutions are perceived to be non-intrusive and to work
in the best interest of all participants, as in the case of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (see Kaufmann et al. 2004; Carey 2009;
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010). For instance, in international climate negotiations, US
2 See FAO et al. (2011) for a joint statement by several multilateral organizations against large-scale
biofuel production based on food crops, and HLPE (2013b) for the call of a high-level panel of
experts gathered by the FAO for further sustainability policy-making on biofuels.