210
9 The Politics for a Fairer Bioeconomy
and inequality in the 2000s (see Castañeda 2006; Schmalz and Ebenau 2012; Hogenboom and Jilberto 2014). As that lost steam by the mid-2010s and many governments
of more pro-business inclinations came to power in the region, it remains to be seen
how that state-agribusiness nexus will evolve.
Concerning civil society support, one must regard the prevailing discourses that
state-agribusiness coalitions have put forth and used to secure their dominance in
democratic systems (see Falkner 2009; Williams 2009; McMichael and Schneider
2011). While highlighting employment creation and the macroeconomic benefits of
the bioeconomy, private agroindustries also depict themselves as national champions
in a competitive international market, in a nationalistic appeal for public support. In
practice, they adapt the (self-serving) claim that “what is good for General Motors
is good for the United States”, offering contemporary bio-based versions of it in
emerging economies. That nationalistic emphasis continuously underscores their
discourses and, if anything, it has become even stronger as national-populist governments came to power in countries such as Brazil and India. Also elsewhere, governments and agribusiness have mostly framed large-scale biofuel production in terms of
public interests such as job creation, energy security, and climate change mitigation.
In contrast, critical discourses have lacked sufficient penetration within civil society
at large. Critiques or alternative formulations for the bioeconomy have remained
relatively marginal. During government elections, they usually hardly constitute a
challenge to dominant discourses.
That said, the case studies have shown how failure from the part of private industries to meet government expectations (e.g., smallholder inclusion) has occasionally
led to counter-movements from the state. In Brazil, the state increasingly used its
prerogatives as a major financier to set additional rules on biofuel value chains.
In both Brazil and India, it also started engaging directly in biofuel production,
taking market share from the private sector, while in Indonesia it has increasingly
attempted to do so. This pattern shows an expansion of the typical state dominance
in emerging economies’ energy markets (see De Graaff 2012), from oil to renewable
fuels and now also in the agribusiness sector. Such an expanded role is in tune with
the perceived prominence of a “neo-developmentalist”—as opposed to neoliberal—
state in those countries (Morais and Saad-Filho 2012; Schmalz and Ebenau 2012;
Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012), and with its similar strides in other strategic areas such as
mining. However, this in itself has not (yet) meant a challenge to the neoliberal global
order (Schmalz and Ebenau 2012; Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). On the contrary, the
recent past shows that, in times of increasing protectionism, emerging economies
may sometimes be strong advocates of free trade at the international level.
9 The Politics for a Fairer Bioeconomy
and inequality in the 2000s (see Castañeda 2006; Schmalz and Ebenau 2012; Hogenboom and Jilberto 2014). As that lost steam by the mid-2010s and many governments
of more pro-business inclinations came to power in the region, it remains to be seen
how that state-agribusiness nexus will evolve.
Concerning civil society support, one must regard the prevailing discourses that
state-agribusiness coalitions have put forth and used to secure their dominance in
democratic systems (see Falkner 2009; Williams 2009; McMichael and Schneider
2011). While highlighting employment creation and the macroeconomic benefits of
the bioeconomy, private agroindustries also depict themselves as national champions
in a competitive international market, in a nationalistic appeal for public support. In
practice, they adapt the (self-serving) claim that “what is good for General Motors
is good for the United States”, offering contemporary bio-based versions of it in
emerging economies. That nationalistic emphasis continuously underscores their
discourses and, if anything, it has become even stronger as national-populist governments came to power in countries such as Brazil and India. Also elsewhere, governments and agribusiness have mostly framed large-scale biofuel production in terms of
public interests such as job creation, energy security, and climate change mitigation.
In contrast, critical discourses have lacked sufficient penetration within civil society
at large. Critiques or alternative formulations for the bioeconomy have remained
relatively marginal. During government elections, they usually hardly constitute a
challenge to dominant discourses.
That said, the case studies have shown how failure from the part of private industries to meet government expectations (e.g., smallholder inclusion) has occasionally
led to counter-movements from the state. In Brazil, the state increasingly used its
prerogatives as a major financier to set additional rules on biofuel value chains.
In both Brazil and India, it also started engaging directly in biofuel production,
taking market share from the private sector, while in Indonesia it has increasingly
attempted to do so. This pattern shows an expansion of the typical state dominance
in emerging economies’ energy markets (see De Graaff 2012), from oil to renewable
fuels and now also in the agribusiness sector. Such an expanded role is in tune with
the perceived prominence of a “neo-developmentalist”—as opposed to neoliberal—
state in those countries (Morais and Saad-Filho 2012; Schmalz and Ebenau 2012;
Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012), and with its similar strides in other strategic areas such as
mining. However, this in itself has not (yet) meant a challenge to the neoliberal global
order (Schmalz and Ebenau 2012; Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). On the contrary, the
recent past shows that, in times of increasing protectionism, emerging economies
may sometimes be strong advocates of free trade at the international level.