9.2 Unraveling the Politics of Bioeconomy Governance
209
as scholarly emphasis on “agency beyond the state” may suggest (see Cashore 2002;
Pattberg 2007; Biermann et al. 2009; Biermann and Pattberg 2012), states have shown
to be the principal agents of bioeconomy promotion, particularly in emerging countries (see also Schmalz and Ebenau 2012; Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). In these countries, the private sector has worked mostly through the state rather than independently.
Instead of advocating for deregulation or focusing on private governance mechanisms, agribusiness in bioeconomy matters has devoted most resources to influencing public policy. For instance, palm oil producers walking out of the Europe-led
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in Indonesia did not launch their certification mechanism. Instead, they have supported government-made certification: the
Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO).
Strong coordination between states and agribusiness around the bioeconomy
stems from at least two reasons. For one, both sets of actors have shared some common
norms (e.g., urban-centered development, sustainability understood as ecological
modernization, economic but not political inclusion of weaker actors) and policycore beliefs. In the case of emerging economies, both agribusiness and states have
also been keener on pursuing economic growth, technological innovation, increased
geopolitical influence, and catching up with developed countries—in short, “equalizing development” (see Chap. 8)—than on fixing domestic inequities or protecting
the environment. Moreover, resource complementarity between state and agribusiness has made them interdependent. While agribusiness has depended on public regulations and economic incentives for producing biofuels and bioproducts, emerging
economy states have not been able to fulfill their aspirations without resorting to
the private sector’s material capabilities such as technologies, investment capital,
and—notably in Brazil’s case—farmland.
Still, states are not monolithic entities. Democratic governments, in particular,
must respond to multiple pressures and may accommodate the interests of different
social groups (Poulantzas 1978; Jessop 1990; Gallas et al. 2011). Nevertheless, bioeconomy governance has largely excluded more critical views and actors from the
agenda-setting processes. The interests of weaker stakeholders (e.g., rural communities, indigenous peoples) have been regularly underrepresented. Agribusiness’ superior material capabilities explain that imbalance to an extent, but not entirely. Such a
lack of government responsiveness and democratic representativeness, which illustrates the limited political strength of more critical actors, arguably also owes to their
limited connection with the ruling political parties and civil society.
States are not machines—people and political groups with particular views and
policy beliefs staff public apparatuses. Various non-state actors may influence policymaking, but policies still depend mostly on what the political parties in power want
and decide (Hibbs 1977; Allern and Saglie 2012; Pedersen 2012; Nelson 2013).
Among the analyzed cases, only in Brazil have critical actors been able to play a meaningful (albeit limited) role in bioeconomy governance. That resulted from the close
links between smallholder movements and the Workers’ Party, which ruled from 2003
to 2016 and introduced inclusion-oriented policies, giving Brazil’s biodiesel program
its social hues. It was representative of Latin America’s broader left-wing turn—or
“Pink Tide”—with social policy improvements and achievements in reducing poverty
209
as scholarly emphasis on “agency beyond the state” may suggest (see Cashore 2002;
Pattberg 2007; Biermann et al. 2009; Biermann and Pattberg 2012), states have shown
to be the principal agents of bioeconomy promotion, particularly in emerging countries (see also Schmalz and Ebenau 2012; Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). In these countries, the private sector has worked mostly through the state rather than independently.
Instead of advocating for deregulation or focusing on private governance mechanisms, agribusiness in bioeconomy matters has devoted most resources to influencing public policy. For instance, palm oil producers walking out of the Europe-led
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in Indonesia did not launch their certification mechanism. Instead, they have supported government-made certification: the
Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO).
Strong coordination between states and agribusiness around the bioeconomy
stems from at least two reasons. For one, both sets of actors have shared some common
norms (e.g., urban-centered development, sustainability understood as ecological
modernization, economic but not political inclusion of weaker actors) and policycore beliefs. In the case of emerging economies, both agribusiness and states have
also been keener on pursuing economic growth, technological innovation, increased
geopolitical influence, and catching up with developed countries—in short, “equalizing development” (see Chap. 8)—than on fixing domestic inequities or protecting
the environment. Moreover, resource complementarity between state and agribusiness has made them interdependent. While agribusiness has depended on public regulations and economic incentives for producing biofuels and bioproducts, emerging
economy states have not been able to fulfill their aspirations without resorting to
the private sector’s material capabilities such as technologies, investment capital,
and—notably in Brazil’s case—farmland.
Still, states are not monolithic entities. Democratic governments, in particular,
must respond to multiple pressures and may accommodate the interests of different
social groups (Poulantzas 1978; Jessop 1990; Gallas et al. 2011). Nevertheless, bioeconomy governance has largely excluded more critical views and actors from the
agenda-setting processes. The interests of weaker stakeholders (e.g., rural communities, indigenous peoples) have been regularly underrepresented. Agribusiness’ superior material capabilities explain that imbalance to an extent, but not entirely. Such a
lack of government responsiveness and democratic representativeness, which illustrates the limited political strength of more critical actors, arguably also owes to their
limited connection with the ruling political parties and civil society.
States are not machines—people and political groups with particular views and
policy beliefs staff public apparatuses. Various non-state actors may influence policymaking, but policies still depend mostly on what the political parties in power want
and decide (Hibbs 1977; Allern and Saglie 2012; Pedersen 2012; Nelson 2013).
Among the analyzed cases, only in Brazil have critical actors been able to play a meaningful (albeit limited) role in bioeconomy governance. That resulted from the close
links between smallholder movements and the Workers’ Party, which ruled from 2003
to 2016 and introduced inclusion-oriented policies, giving Brazil’s biodiesel program
its social hues. It was representative of Latin America’s broader left-wing turn—or
“Pink Tide”—with social policy improvements and achievements in reducing poverty