7.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in Indonesia
163
government. Such resource complementarity leads to even stronger interdependence
and coalition coordination in Indonesia.
However, this mainstream agenda faces the opposition of what can be called
the conservation coalition, which is composed of social and environmental NGOs
(Indonesian and foreign), indigenous peoples, and part of the scientific community. These agents contend that plantation expansion degrades the environment and
frequently leads to land grabbing and social conflict (Wakker 2005; Colchester et al.
2006; Colchester 2011). They have focused much more extensively on criticizing
the plantation coalition than articulating an alternative view. A few have argued
for development based on principles of self-determination and food sovereignty,
emphasizing local communities’ rights to decide how to use their resources and to
prioritize their own needs, thus building resilience from external decisions and food
price volatility (Wakker 2005; Colchester et al. 2006; Colchester 2011). Nevertheless, how such principles would translate into specific biofuel policy choices—if
any—remains mostly unspecified. On a more general level, it is possible to divide
such conservation coalition contenders into two sub-groups. On the one hand, those
who believe that feedstock cultivation can play a role as a cash-crop or for local
energy consumption. On the other hand, the ones who see no place for biofuels on
an alternative development agenda and instead focus on food (Personal interviews).
Lastly, oil palm farmers (who are mostly smallholders) have argued for their views
and beliefs without significant articulation with other actors. Their central policy
belief is that biofuels production—and, more broadly, agriculture—should provide
them with a decent income and improve access to services and modern infrastructure.
Besides, they believe farmers’ access to sufficient land and tenure security should
be ensured (Personal interviews). Despite their participation in the large-scale palmbiodiesel chain, they do not necessarily share the plantation coalition’s policy-core
beliefs. There is also little evidence that their advocacy has any nontrivial coordination (see Sabatier and Weible 2007) with those other biofuel governance actors. They
seem much more concerned about their own needs and have thus performed a form
of isolated advocacy, apart from the two coalitions described above (see Table 7.4).
7.3.2 Strategic Uses of Power
The previous section explained how the plantation coalition strategically combines
financial resources and access to legal authority positions to advance its agenda.
Inside the coalition, it is interesting to observe how the government deftly uses its
structural power to push biofuel policy goals ahead within the broader plantationoriented vision of development. Not only does it set a captive market, siphoning off
CPO and helping drive its prices up. It also compels palm oil producers to contribute
to the biofuel agenda via a revolving door: the levies collected from CPO exports
return primarily to the same palm oil companies as subsidies, so long as they comply
with the biodiesel production agenda (see ICCT 2017). Still, the state shows its
limited trust in private companies (which are largely of foreign capital) when public
163
government. Such resource complementarity leads to even stronger interdependence
and coalition coordination in Indonesia.
However, this mainstream agenda faces the opposition of what can be called
the conservation coalition, which is composed of social and environmental NGOs
(Indonesian and foreign), indigenous peoples, and part of the scientific community. These agents contend that plantation expansion degrades the environment and
frequently leads to land grabbing and social conflict (Wakker 2005; Colchester et al.
2006; Colchester 2011). They have focused much more extensively on criticizing
the plantation coalition than articulating an alternative view. A few have argued
for development based on principles of self-determination and food sovereignty,
emphasizing local communities’ rights to decide how to use their resources and to
prioritize their own needs, thus building resilience from external decisions and food
price volatility (Wakker 2005; Colchester et al. 2006; Colchester 2011). Nevertheless, how such principles would translate into specific biofuel policy choices—if
any—remains mostly unspecified. On a more general level, it is possible to divide
such conservation coalition contenders into two sub-groups. On the one hand, those
who believe that feedstock cultivation can play a role as a cash-crop or for local
energy consumption. On the other hand, the ones who see no place for biofuels on
an alternative development agenda and instead focus on food (Personal interviews).
Lastly, oil palm farmers (who are mostly smallholders) have argued for their views
and beliefs without significant articulation with other actors. Their central policy
belief is that biofuels production—and, more broadly, agriculture—should provide
them with a decent income and improve access to services and modern infrastructure.
Besides, they believe farmers’ access to sufficient land and tenure security should
be ensured (Personal interviews). Despite their participation in the large-scale palmbiodiesel chain, they do not necessarily share the plantation coalition’s policy-core
beliefs. There is also little evidence that their advocacy has any nontrivial coordination (see Sabatier and Weible 2007) with those other biofuel governance actors. They
seem much more concerned about their own needs and have thus performed a form
of isolated advocacy, apart from the two coalitions described above (see Table 7.4).
7.3.2 Strategic Uses of Power
The previous section explained how the plantation coalition strategically combines
financial resources and access to legal authority positions to advance its agenda.
Inside the coalition, it is interesting to observe how the government deftly uses its
structural power to push biofuel policy goals ahead within the broader plantationoriented vision of development. Not only does it set a captive market, siphoning off
CPO and helping drive its prices up. It also compels palm oil producers to contribute
to the biofuel agenda via a revolving door: the levies collected from CPO exports
return primarily to the same palm oil companies as subsidies, so long as they comply
with the biodiesel production agenda (see ICCT 2017). Still, the state shows its
limited trust in private companies (which are largely of foreign capital) when public