5.2 Allocation and Access: Analyzing Institutional Performance
109
For the small farmer, it is like becoming an employee of the industry, but without job security.
Although the contract ensures him an income for some time, upon any economic downturn
he is the first to be discarded. Then what will he do? He can’t just go back to traditional
farming that easily after having turned his land into a sugarcane monoculture. (Personal
interview)
Finally, although biofuels have much potential to improve access to clean energy
in rural and forest areas using local resources (Cunha et al. 2007; Kuik et al. 2011),
the Brazilian policy all along has been to use them primarily in the mainstream fuel
market, i.e., as an additional offer directed mostly at urban drivers. In other words,
biofuels have been used mainly by those who already had access to modern energy.
Motorists thus benefit from more fuel options, potentially allowing them to spend
less on driving and reducing the costs of goods transported by road. This focus is,
of course, advantageous to the automobile industry, too, as indicated by its record
sales of flex-fuel cars in Brazil (Gomes et al. 2010a). Meanwhile, to improve rural
electrification rates, Brazilian governments of all political hues have systematically
preferred to expand centralized grids, such as through the national program Luz
para Todos (“Light for All”), rather than investing in rural industrialization and local
biofuel use.
5.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in Brazil
5.3.1 Main Coalitions and Their Policy Beliefs
Two main coalitions can be identified in biofuel governance in Brazil: an agribusiness and an agroecology coalition. The former is dominant and comprises most of the
government, in addition to fuel industries, sugarcane, soy and other private agribusinesses, and part of the scientific community. The agroecology coalition includes
mainly civil society organizations (with stronger participation of smallholder and
rural worker organizations than strictly environmental NGOs) and a more critical
segment of the scientific community. Other actors such as urban dwellers and indigenous peoples are not particularly relevant agents in this governance context, even if
they are affected by the biofuels and bioeconomy agenda.
Table 5.6 presents the two main coalitions’ key policy-beliefs. It is useful to note
that, in broad lines, the Brazilian government policy-beliefs regarding biofuels have
not significantly changed despite changes of administration. They have maintained
a clearly optimistic spirit, aligned with ecological modernization and dismissive
of calls for structural change (Lima and Toni 2020). The table shows that there
may be disagreements within a coalition, but usually at the (more superficial) level
of secondary aspects. For example, the sugarcane agroindustry has long lobbied
Brazilian governments to tax gasoline more heavily to make ethanol more competitive (Jank 2011), but generally without success. Similarly, more radical actors in
the agroecology coalition have disagreed with those who believe that smallholders’
109
For the small farmer, it is like becoming an employee of the industry, but without job security.
Although the contract ensures him an income for some time, upon any economic downturn
he is the first to be discarded. Then what will he do? He can’t just go back to traditional
farming that easily after having turned his land into a sugarcane monoculture. (Personal
interview)
Finally, although biofuels have much potential to improve access to clean energy
in rural and forest areas using local resources (Cunha et al. 2007; Kuik et al. 2011),
the Brazilian policy all along has been to use them primarily in the mainstream fuel
market, i.e., as an additional offer directed mostly at urban drivers. In other words,
biofuels have been used mainly by those who already had access to modern energy.
Motorists thus benefit from more fuel options, potentially allowing them to spend
less on driving and reducing the costs of goods transported by road. This focus is,
of course, advantageous to the automobile industry, too, as indicated by its record
sales of flex-fuel cars in Brazil (Gomes et al. 2010a). Meanwhile, to improve rural
electrification rates, Brazilian governments of all political hues have systematically
preferred to expand centralized grids, such as through the national program Luz
para Todos (“Light for All”), rather than investing in rural industrialization and local
biofuel use.
5.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in Brazil
5.3.1 Main Coalitions and Their Policy Beliefs
Two main coalitions can be identified in biofuel governance in Brazil: an agribusiness and an agroecology coalition. The former is dominant and comprises most of the
government, in addition to fuel industries, sugarcane, soy and other private agribusinesses, and part of the scientific community. The agroecology coalition includes
mainly civil society organizations (with stronger participation of smallholder and
rural worker organizations than strictly environmental NGOs) and a more critical
segment of the scientific community. Other actors such as urban dwellers and indigenous peoples are not particularly relevant agents in this governance context, even if
they are affected by the biofuels and bioeconomy agenda.
Table 5.6 presents the two main coalitions’ key policy-beliefs. It is useful to note
that, in broad lines, the Brazilian government policy-beliefs regarding biofuels have
not significantly changed despite changes of administration. They have maintained
a clearly optimistic spirit, aligned with ecological modernization and dismissive
of calls for structural change (Lima and Toni 2020). The table shows that there
may be disagreements within a coalition, but usually at the (more superficial) level
of secondary aspects. For example, the sugarcane agroindustry has long lobbied
Brazilian governments to tax gasoline more heavily to make ethanol more competitive (Jank 2011), but generally without success. Similarly, more radical actors in
the agroecology coalition have disagreed with those who believe that smallholders’