20 Does the Use of Local Knowledge in Complex Systems …
471
2009:7). This reported lack of organizational, financial, and institutional capacity
(Tchouplaou et al. 2009; NBA 2010; Edl 2017) indicates potential vulnerability of
NUCs to decisions that reflect the interests of other, more powerful stakeholders
(CRU-BN 2017; Edl 2017). This was confirmed at the NBA regional workshop on
“integration of the water-energy-food Nexus in the NBA Operational Plan 2016–
2024” in June 2018, where NUC representatives evaluated alongside representatives
of the water, energy, agriculture, and environment ministries their respective and
combined capacities to influence and implement decisions on uses of the basin’s
resources in each country’s portion and the basin as a whole. The NBA study even
notes ongoing debate about the identity of users, some of whom felt misrepresented
by the term “civil society.” The definition ultimately agreed upon is, “rural and urban
populations whose livelihoods depend on the exploitation of the natural resources of
the Niger basin” (Tchouplaou et al. 2009:4).
To improve the situation, the following interventions were proposed: “The setting
up of a technical assistance mission that provides technical and organizational
support/advice to the NUCs; the capacity building of the members of the NUCs
on accompaniment through adequate logistical means; organization of an information and awareness campaign for users and civil society organizations on NBA,
Shared Vision and investment plans; support for capacity building; implementation
of income-generating activities” (Tchouplaou et al. 2009:19). These interventions
reflect the NBA’s drive and interest for users to support implementation of certain
projects, and also serves as motivation, at least indirectly, for some state entities
of the NBA member states. These interventions are however reported to have the
unintended and undesirable effects of making participation more passive (KPMG
2016).
Representatives of the NUCs, particularly those who participated in the creation of
the agreement following protests over the construction of dams, expressed in interviews their perception that, once users are seen as recipients of capacity building
and financial support, the nature of their relationship to public authority changes.
Involvement would be characterized by Arnstein’s levels 1–3, manipulation, to
therapy to informing, which are all highly passive. In addition, the definition of
“user” is limited to the identified representatives, who are allocated offices and a
budget, distancing them from their stakeholder base (interviews with members of
NUCs networks in Mali and Niger). Finally, the system focus remains on high-level,
basin-wide processes, mainly representing the view of NBA, failing to connect effectively with lower level processes and system understanding (interviews with NUC
representatives in Chad, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria).
In 2014, new protocol agreements were signed among NUCs, the ministries
responsible for the NBA in each country and the NBA itself. The revised protocols refine expectations for the involvement of users in the management of the Niger
Basin, to promote greater local involvement as advocated by scholars (e.g., Thomas
et al. 2005; Armitage 2005; Lebel 2013); formal institutions tend to welcome voices
of local interests (Agrawal 2010). But NUCs are effectively under the control of
the national focal structure of the relevant ministry, and made dependent on NBA
supervision and oversight. The objective of the new agreements of the NUCs are
471
2009:7). This reported lack of organizational, financial, and institutional capacity
(Tchouplaou et al. 2009; NBA 2010; Edl 2017) indicates potential vulnerability of
NUCs to decisions that reflect the interests of other, more powerful stakeholders
(CRU-BN 2017; Edl 2017). This was confirmed at the NBA regional workshop on
“integration of the water-energy-food Nexus in the NBA Operational Plan 2016–
2024” in June 2018, where NUC representatives evaluated alongside representatives
of the water, energy, agriculture, and environment ministries their respective and
combined capacities to influence and implement decisions on uses of the basin’s
resources in each country’s portion and the basin as a whole. The NBA study even
notes ongoing debate about the identity of users, some of whom felt misrepresented
by the term “civil society.” The definition ultimately agreed upon is, “rural and urban
populations whose livelihoods depend on the exploitation of the natural resources of
the Niger basin” (Tchouplaou et al. 2009:4).
To improve the situation, the following interventions were proposed: “The setting
up of a technical assistance mission that provides technical and organizational
support/advice to the NUCs; the capacity building of the members of the NUCs
on accompaniment through adequate logistical means; organization of an information and awareness campaign for users and civil society organizations on NBA,
Shared Vision and investment plans; support for capacity building; implementation
of income-generating activities” (Tchouplaou et al. 2009:19). These interventions
reflect the NBA’s drive and interest for users to support implementation of certain
projects, and also serves as motivation, at least indirectly, for some state entities
of the NBA member states. These interventions are however reported to have the
unintended and undesirable effects of making participation more passive (KPMG
2016).
Representatives of the NUCs, particularly those who participated in the creation of
the agreement following protests over the construction of dams, expressed in interviews their perception that, once users are seen as recipients of capacity building
and financial support, the nature of their relationship to public authority changes.
Involvement would be characterized by Arnstein’s levels 1–3, manipulation, to
therapy to informing, which are all highly passive. In addition, the definition of
“user” is limited to the identified representatives, who are allocated offices and a
budget, distancing them from their stakeholder base (interviews with members of
NUCs networks in Mali and Niger). Finally, the system focus remains on high-level,
basin-wide processes, mainly representing the view of NBA, failing to connect effectively with lower level processes and system understanding (interviews with NUC
representatives in Chad, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria).
In 2014, new protocol agreements were signed among NUCs, the ministries
responsible for the NBA in each country and the NBA itself. The revised protocols refine expectations for the involvement of users in the management of the Niger
Basin, to promote greater local involvement as advocated by scholars (e.g., Thomas
et al. 2005; Armitage 2005; Lebel 2013); formal institutions tend to welcome voices
of local interests (Agrawal 2010). But NUCs are effectively under the control of
the national focal structure of the relevant ministry, and made dependent on NBA
supervision and oversight. The objective of the new agreements of the NUCs are