space: (i) the assumptions and presumptions that water is an exclusively state
subject and the associated extant and dominant executive powers with the states and
(ii) the history of negligence of constitutional provisions under the Union List,
especially the poor application of a credible role under the Entry 56 provisions.
There are earlier works that made similar arguments extending support to this
plausible ‘anarchy’. Iyer (1994, 2002) blamed the Centre for ‘abdication of its role’
(Chokkakula 2019) and argued that the Centre ‘lost its ground’ due to the particular
political history of Indian state’s historical transformation. For others, the Centre
relied on non-statutory bodies such as the Planning Commission and the attached
‘fiscal power’ to engage with states (Swenden and Saxena 2017). While a great deal
needs to be done, the lone intervention under the Entry 56 provisions, the RBA
1956, has also turned out a ‘dead letter’. Further, since its inception, the RBA 1956
has not been modified or amended to address even its immediate concerns of
interstate river water regulation and development.
The neglect of federal governance space appears to have gradually eroded the
Centre’s role, allowing the states’ dominant executive powers reinforcing notions
that water is an exclusively state subject. In order to assess the extent of erosion,
and for an evidence-based argument, the chapter makes an initial assessment of the
‘fiscal power’ of the Centre in engaging with states for improved water governance
or in support of the broader course-shift needed for pursuing the long-term security
and sustainability goals, besides the immediate development goals that India has set
itself. The analysis of budgetary allocations of the Centre, select states and their
historical trends leads to the following findings.
First, the Centre’s allocations have declined over years, and relatively the states’
allocations have risen to a point that the former cannot claim significant influence
over the latter’s preferences and choices regarding water resources management.
Even if we see a sharp rise of Centre’s contributions in recent years, these are
neither adequate, nor effective. Yet, we cannot make a sweeping statement to this
effect across the board though, for these contributions appear to be significant
₹₹2,00,000
₹4,00,000
₹6,00,000
₹8,00,000
₹ 10,00,000
₹ 12,00,000
₹ 14,00,000
₹ 16,00,000
₹ 18,00,000
Andhra
Pradesh
Assam
Karnataka
Kerala
Maharashtra
Punjab
Tamil Nadu
Development
Use Efficiency
Sustainability
Fig. 10 State’s expenditure preferences—disaggregated analysis. Source State Governments’
detailed demands for grants (department-wise) (2017a, b, c, d, e, f, g)
182
S. Chokkakula and P. Prajapati
subject and the associated extant and dominant executive powers with the states and
(ii) the history of negligence of constitutional provisions under the Union List,
especially the poor application of a credible role under the Entry 56 provisions.
There are earlier works that made similar arguments extending support to this
plausible ‘anarchy’. Iyer (1994, 2002) blamed the Centre for ‘abdication of its role’
(Chokkakula 2019) and argued that the Centre ‘lost its ground’ due to the particular
political history of Indian state’s historical transformation. For others, the Centre
relied on non-statutory bodies such as the Planning Commission and the attached
‘fiscal power’ to engage with states (Swenden and Saxena 2017). While a great deal
needs to be done, the lone intervention under the Entry 56 provisions, the RBA
1956, has also turned out a ‘dead letter’. Further, since its inception, the RBA 1956
has not been modified or amended to address even its immediate concerns of
interstate river water regulation and development.
The neglect of federal governance space appears to have gradually eroded the
Centre’s role, allowing the states’ dominant executive powers reinforcing notions
that water is an exclusively state subject. In order to assess the extent of erosion,
and for an evidence-based argument, the chapter makes an initial assessment of the
‘fiscal power’ of the Centre in engaging with states for improved water governance
or in support of the broader course-shift needed for pursuing the long-term security
and sustainability goals, besides the immediate development goals that India has set
itself. The analysis of budgetary allocations of the Centre, select states and their
historical trends leads to the following findings.
First, the Centre’s allocations have declined over years, and relatively the states’
allocations have risen to a point that the former cannot claim significant influence
over the latter’s preferences and choices regarding water resources management.
Even if we see a sharp rise of Centre’s contributions in recent years, these are
neither adequate, nor effective. Yet, we cannot make a sweeping statement to this
effect across the board though, for these contributions appear to be significant
₹₹2,00,000
₹4,00,000
₹6,00,000
₹8,00,000
₹ 10,00,000
₹ 12,00,000
₹ 14,00,000
₹ 16,00,000
₹ 18,00,000
Andhra
Pradesh
Assam
Karnataka
Kerala
Maharashtra
Punjab
Tamil Nadu
Development
Use Efficiency
Sustainability
Fig. 10 State’s expenditure preferences—disaggregated analysis. Source State Governments’
detailed demands for grants (department-wise) (2017a, b, c, d, e, f, g)
182
S. Chokkakula and P. Prajapati