There are however strong assertions of neglected federal water governance, if
not failed one. Iyer (2002) has argued that there has been a ‘wilful abdication of its
role’ by the Centre. Chokkakula (2020) has argued that the Centre has ‘lost ground’
and is linked to Indian state’s historical transformation trajectory. There are also
equally strong assertions to the contrary that the federalism is undermined by
various interventions of the Centre in water sector (Acharyulu 2019). It is important
to take this debate beyond these assertions and probe for more compelling evidence
—for or against federal governance. This is most critical, not just because the water
security indicators are alarming, but also because of the vital significance of a
strong and robust federal governance structures for pursuing long-term water
security goals.
This is all the more important for at least couple of broad reasons. One is the
limited role and the dominant executive power imply that the outcomes at the
national level are essentially cumulative contributions of individual states—the
‘sum of parts’. These ‘parts’ are often produced in the process of pursuing individual states’ respective territorial visions for water resources development. These
visions do not take into consideration the ‘whole’—the national water security
concerns. This, in a way, suggests a collective action problem producing the
adverse outcomes at the national level—extending Hardin’s (1968) logic, ‘the
tragedy of the commons’. In order to pursue the goals of the ‘whole’ of long-term
water security at the national level, this problem of federal governance must be
addressed.
Two is these conditions akin to ‘federal anarchy’ are also not helpful to pursue
India’s development goals in water sector. Its goals rely on the ambitious projects
and programmes for river rejuvenation, inland navigation, inter-basin transfer and
irrigation development, universal access to safe and secure drinking water—most in
the realm of interstate river waters. The recent slew of legislations—Inland
Waterways Act 2016, National River Ganga (Rejuvenation, Protection and
Management) Bill, the Interstate River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, the River
Basin Management Bill, or the Dam Safety Bill—are some steps in these directions.
Success of these projects depends on close coordination and consensus building
between states (Chokkakula 2019). This requires an active anchoring by Centre
with the support of robust and resilient federal governance ecosystem.
The vacuum or the supposed ‘federal anarchy’ in water sector is obscured by the
larger debates around fiscal federalism. Managing imbalances between states
through the general-purpose IGFTs receives extensive attention in this debate.
4 The
specific-purpose IGFTs are not as significant in comparison, but the Centre uses
these as an effective channel for incentivizing progressive policies and priority
4
IGFTs are of two types. General-purpose IGFTs provide general budgetary support to states:
unconditional and mandated by law to offset the fiscal disadvantages arising from a lower revenue
capacity and a higher unit cost of providing public services. Specific-purpose IGFTSs provide
purpose-specific budgetary support, usually conditional and to incentivize undertaking certain
programmes or projects. They often involve matching contributions from states (see Rao and
Singh 1999).
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S. Chokkakula and P. Prajapati
not failed one. Iyer (2002) has argued that there has been a ‘wilful abdication of its
role’ by the Centre. Chokkakula (2020) has argued that the Centre has ‘lost ground’
and is linked to Indian state’s historical transformation trajectory. There are also
equally strong assertions to the contrary that the federalism is undermined by
various interventions of the Centre in water sector (Acharyulu 2019). It is important
to take this debate beyond these assertions and probe for more compelling evidence
—for or against federal governance. This is most critical, not just because the water
security indicators are alarming, but also because of the vital significance of a
strong and robust federal governance structures for pursuing long-term water
security goals.
This is all the more important for at least couple of broad reasons. One is the
limited role and the dominant executive power imply that the outcomes at the
national level are essentially cumulative contributions of individual states—the
‘sum of parts’. These ‘parts’ are often produced in the process of pursuing individual states’ respective territorial visions for water resources development. These
visions do not take into consideration the ‘whole’—the national water security
concerns. This, in a way, suggests a collective action problem producing the
adverse outcomes at the national level—extending Hardin’s (1968) logic, ‘the
tragedy of the commons’. In order to pursue the goals of the ‘whole’ of long-term
water security at the national level, this problem of federal governance must be
addressed.
Two is these conditions akin to ‘federal anarchy’ are also not helpful to pursue
India’s development goals in water sector. Its goals rely on the ambitious projects
and programmes for river rejuvenation, inland navigation, inter-basin transfer and
irrigation development, universal access to safe and secure drinking water—most in
the realm of interstate river waters. The recent slew of legislations—Inland
Waterways Act 2016, National River Ganga (Rejuvenation, Protection and
Management) Bill, the Interstate River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, the River
Basin Management Bill, or the Dam Safety Bill—are some steps in these directions.
Success of these projects depends on close coordination and consensus building
between states (Chokkakula 2019). This requires an active anchoring by Centre
with the support of robust and resilient federal governance ecosystem.
The vacuum or the supposed ‘federal anarchy’ in water sector is obscured by the
larger debates around fiscal federalism. Managing imbalances between states
through the general-purpose IGFTs receives extensive attention in this debate.
4 The
specific-purpose IGFTs are not as significant in comparison, but the Centre uses
these as an effective channel for incentivizing progressive policies and priority
4
IGFTs are of two types. General-purpose IGFTs provide general budgetary support to states:
unconditional and mandated by law to offset the fiscal disadvantages arising from a lower revenue
capacity and a higher unit cost of providing public services. Specific-purpose IGFTSs provide
purpose-specific budgetary support, usually conditional and to incentivize undertaking certain
programmes or projects. They often involve matching contributions from states (see Rao and
Singh 1999).
172
S. Chokkakula and P. Prajapati