Supreme Court—are often defied, and these lead to conditions of constitutional
crises (Iyer 1994, 2002; Chokkakula 2014). The literature on these conditions is
often listless and helpless. Nariman (2009) called these escalations ‘a nightmare’.
Others advised against interference by the Supreme Court, calling it as undermining
federalism (D’Souza 2009).
The much-mentioned Entry 56 under the Union List is the central element in this
role of the Centre in interstate river water governance. There exists a River Boards
Act, 1956, essentially to facilitate cooperation and collaboration between states over
interstate rivers. Here too, the Centre’s role is a detached one. The act attaches the
Centre with an advisory role in the act (Nariman 2009). Yet, interestingly, the act
has never been put to use to create any river board since its inception. None of the
existing river boards draw the force of the act (Doabia 2012). Several government
reports termed the River Boards Act, 1956, as ‘dead letter’ (Sarkaria 1988,
NCRWC 2002).
Further, the existing body of work and understanding has a major ‘blind spot’.
Despite the RBA 1956s ‘disuse’, the record of interstate cooperation over river
waters is a compelling one (Chokkakula 2019). In contrast to nine river water
disputes since independence, there are 139 interstate river water agreements—as
compiled by CWC (2015). Most of these agreements are bilateral though, and there
is no assessment available about how actively the Centre contributed to the
materialization of these agreements or their endurance later. However, a quick
perusal of these instances suggests there are instances of both: the agreements
endured with or without the Centre’s participation.
3
This state of affairs raises doubts about the Centre’s ability to pursue the larger
national water security goals. Can the apparent minimalist role of the Centre be
linked to the adverse trajectory indicated by the national-level indicators of water
security? Does it suggest failed federal water governance?
2.3 ‘Federal Anarchy’ in Water Governance?
This link between federal governance and deteriorating water security indicators
has to be substantiated, though it is intuitively convincing. To rely entirely on the
experiences of interstate river water disputes may not be sufficient. The element of
politicization and territorialization of interstate river water disputes can make them
an exception to assessments of federalism (see Chokkakula 2014; Iyer 2002).
3
There are also instances where bilateral agreements needed Centre’s intervention later. The
instance of Vamsadhara dispute between the states of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha began with a
bilateral agreement between the two in 1956 for construction and cost sharing of multiple projects
on the river. In the later years, this arrangement drew on the Centre for technical support (via the
CWC), as well as resolution of a dispute. In 2006, Odisha demanded setting up a tribunal to
resolve a dispute arising out of a Andhra Pradesh’s construction of a flood flow canal. The
Vamsadhara tribunal set-up in 2010 gave its award 2017.
Whither India’s Federal Governance for Long-Term Water Security?
171
crises (Iyer 1994, 2002; Chokkakula 2014). The literature on these conditions is
often listless and helpless. Nariman (2009) called these escalations ‘a nightmare’.
Others advised against interference by the Supreme Court, calling it as undermining
federalism (D’Souza 2009).
The much-mentioned Entry 56 under the Union List is the central element in this
role of the Centre in interstate river water governance. There exists a River Boards
Act, 1956, essentially to facilitate cooperation and collaboration between states over
interstate rivers. Here too, the Centre’s role is a detached one. The act attaches the
Centre with an advisory role in the act (Nariman 2009). Yet, interestingly, the act
has never been put to use to create any river board since its inception. None of the
existing river boards draw the force of the act (Doabia 2012). Several government
reports termed the River Boards Act, 1956, as ‘dead letter’ (Sarkaria 1988,
NCRWC 2002).
Further, the existing body of work and understanding has a major ‘blind spot’.
Despite the RBA 1956s ‘disuse’, the record of interstate cooperation over river
waters is a compelling one (Chokkakula 2019). In contrast to nine river water
disputes since independence, there are 139 interstate river water agreements—as
compiled by CWC (2015). Most of these agreements are bilateral though, and there
is no assessment available about how actively the Centre contributed to the
materialization of these agreements or their endurance later. However, a quick
perusal of these instances suggests there are instances of both: the agreements
endured with or without the Centre’s participation.
3
This state of affairs raises doubts about the Centre’s ability to pursue the larger
national water security goals. Can the apparent minimalist role of the Centre be
linked to the adverse trajectory indicated by the national-level indicators of water
security? Does it suggest failed federal water governance?
2.3 ‘Federal Anarchy’ in Water Governance?
This link between federal governance and deteriorating water security indicators
has to be substantiated, though it is intuitively convincing. To rely entirely on the
experiences of interstate river water disputes may not be sufficient. The element of
politicization and territorialization of interstate river water disputes can make them
an exception to assessments of federalism (see Chokkakula 2014; Iyer 2002).
3
There are also instances where bilateral agreements needed Centre’s intervention later. The
instance of Vamsadhara dispute between the states of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha began with a
bilateral agreement between the two in 1956 for construction and cost sharing of multiple projects
on the river. In the later years, this arrangement drew on the Centre for technical support (via the
CWC), as well as resolution of a dispute. In 2006, Odisha demanded setting up a tribunal to
resolve a dispute arising out of a Andhra Pradesh’s construction of a flood flow canal. The
Vamsadhara tribunal set-up in 2010 gave its award 2017.
Whither India’s Federal Governance for Long-Term Water Security?
171