results. Such confidence should certainly be avoided when working with models of
political practice.
The first approach is a probabilistic form of indifference analysis that supposes
that trade-offs can be defined by subjective probabilities, worked out from the
planner’s judgment. Techniques for allocating such probabilities generally provide
a method for explicit and reliable quantifications of personal judgment. The technique can also be applied to decision making problems concerning small or big
policy-making groups.
The second approach is known as policy simulation, arising from a simulation
technique for assessing political feasibility developed by Buckley and McLaughlin
(1966), who concentrated on the organisations which impress or guide the
policymaking process rather than on the policy makers themselves. The simulation
of the organisations’ reactions to a potential multi-objective infrastructure plan,
enable the identification of
(1) conflicts among groups
(2) possible coalitions supporting and/or opposing the plan being formed, and
(3) plan acceptance or rejection depending on the lobbying capacities or political
power levels mustered by both coalitions.
This simulation procedure has been used to compare the political feasibility of
several real projects by different authors (Haith and Loucks 1976).
14.8 Summary
While planners make recommendations and managers are expected to take decisions, some overlap might not only be necessary but essential. However, sometimes
decision makers abdicate their responsibilities to planners or modellers, or conversely planners try their hand at the decision-making process, and this creates the
difference between successful and unsuccessful development (Biswas 1976).
A decision maker – if he has perfect knowledge of exact probabilities of each of
the possible outcomes and their values (Biswas 1975) – should or can make the right
decisions. However, as it is impossible to have perfect knowledge, it will not be
possible to always make the best decisions (i.e., the decisions will be imperfect). The
next possible approach, within the time schedule available to take the decisions, is to
make the decisions (hopefully, the right ones) on the basis of available information.
In principle, the planners/advisers/consultants suggest a set of possible alternatives and outcomes with their justified recommendations to the decision maker who
then adopts or selects one of the possible course of action, either after a careful
scrutiny of the documents presented and accompanied by pertinent queries or just
acting as a rubber stamp.
The foregoing describes a technocratic approach whereby the problem is first
identified and analysed, then all feasible alternatives and their possible consequences
or impacts are investigated using a series of sequential and progressive steps.
14.8 Summary
407
political practice.
The first approach is a probabilistic form of indifference analysis that supposes
that trade-offs can be defined by subjective probabilities, worked out from the
planner’s judgment. Techniques for allocating such probabilities generally provide
a method for explicit and reliable quantifications of personal judgment. The technique can also be applied to decision making problems concerning small or big
policy-making groups.
The second approach is known as policy simulation, arising from a simulation
technique for assessing political feasibility developed by Buckley and McLaughlin
(1966), who concentrated on the organisations which impress or guide the
policymaking process rather than on the policy makers themselves. The simulation
of the organisations’ reactions to a potential multi-objective infrastructure plan,
enable the identification of
(1) conflicts among groups
(2) possible coalitions supporting and/or opposing the plan being formed, and
(3) plan acceptance or rejection depending on the lobbying capacities or political
power levels mustered by both coalitions.
This simulation procedure has been used to compare the political feasibility of
several real projects by different authors (Haith and Loucks 1976).
14.8 Summary
While planners make recommendations and managers are expected to take decisions, some overlap might not only be necessary but essential. However, sometimes
decision makers abdicate their responsibilities to planners or modellers, or conversely planners try their hand at the decision-making process, and this creates the
difference between successful and unsuccessful development (Biswas 1976).
A decision maker – if he has perfect knowledge of exact probabilities of each of
the possible outcomes and their values (Biswas 1975) – should or can make the right
decisions. However, as it is impossible to have perfect knowledge, it will not be
possible to always make the best decisions (i.e., the decisions will be imperfect). The
next possible approach, within the time schedule available to take the decisions, is to
make the decisions (hopefully, the right ones) on the basis of available information.
In principle, the planners/advisers/consultants suggest a set of possible alternatives and outcomes with their justified recommendations to the decision maker who
then adopts or selects one of the possible course of action, either after a careful
scrutiny of the documents presented and accompanied by pertinent queries or just
acting as a rubber stamp.
The foregoing describes a technocratic approach whereby the problem is first
identified and analysed, then all feasible alternatives and their possible consequences
or impacts are investigated using a series of sequential and progressive steps.
14.8 Summary
407