16 Integration of Detectors into a Large Experiment: Examples from ATLAS. . .
711
improving the efficiency of the various strands of these collaborations, an admittedly
weak point of such organisations. There are two major weaknesses intrinsic to
collaborations structured as ATLAS and CMS with distributed funding resources:
• one is that it is not simple to converge on the minimum required number of
technologies once the research and development phase is over. One example of
perhaps unnecessary multiplication of technologies are the precision chambers
in the ATLAS muon spectrometer, where the highest-η part of the measurements
are covered by cathode strip chambers rather than the monitored drift tube
technology used everywhere else. A similar example can be found in the
CMS muon spectrometer, which is also equipped with two different chamber
technologies in the barrel and end-cap regions (see Sect. 16.5).
• the decision-making process is sometimes skewed by the difficulty of conveying
a global vision of the best interests of the project, which should be weighed
against the more localised and focussed interests of particular funding agencies,
some of which operate within a rather inflexible legal framework.
The strengths of this international and distributed approach far outweigh however
its deficiencies over a much more centralised one, such as that adopted for the
Super-Conducting Super Collider with a centralised funding and management in
Waxahachie (Texas) about 15 years ago:
• the flexibility achieved has often provided solutions to the inevitable problems,
which have shown up during the design and construction phase. Whenever a link
in the chain was shown to falter or even to be totally missing, the collaboration
has often been able to find alternate solutions. If a large laboratory had difficulties
in meeting a complex technological challenge alone because of limitations in
funding and human resources, other laboratories with similar expertise could
be sought out and integrated into the effort with minimal disruption. If the
production line for certain detectors did not churn out the required number of
modules per unit time because of yield issues or of an underestimate of the
human resources required, other production lines, often on different continents
with cheaper labour costs, were launched and operated successfully.
• many concrete examples have shown that motivation and dedication to the
project go together with the corresponding responsibilities, both technical and
managerial. It is worthwhile also to note here that it surely would have been
beneficial for the overall LHC project if the management of the ATLAS and
CMS experiments would have been integrated as a real partner into the CERN
management structure at the highest level right from the beginning. Both
experiments were severely handicapped by a cost ceiling without contingency
defined top-down more than 10 years ago.
It is fair to say that, without the motivation and dedication of many of our
colleagues all over the world, who fought and won their own battles at all required
levels (technical, funding, human resources, organisational), and of their funding
agencies, the construction of ATLAS and CMS would not have reached its
astounding and successful completion with only small parts of each experiment
711
improving the efficiency of the various strands of these collaborations, an admittedly
weak point of such organisations. There are two major weaknesses intrinsic to
collaborations structured as ATLAS and CMS with distributed funding resources:
• one is that it is not simple to converge on the minimum required number of
technologies once the research and development phase is over. One example of
perhaps unnecessary multiplication of technologies are the precision chambers
in the ATLAS muon spectrometer, where the highest-η part of the measurements
are covered by cathode strip chambers rather than the monitored drift tube
technology used everywhere else. A similar example can be found in the
CMS muon spectrometer, which is also equipped with two different chamber
technologies in the barrel and end-cap regions (see Sect. 16.5).
• the decision-making process is sometimes skewed by the difficulty of conveying
a global vision of the best interests of the project, which should be weighed
against the more localised and focussed interests of particular funding agencies,
some of which operate within a rather inflexible legal framework.
The strengths of this international and distributed approach far outweigh however
its deficiencies over a much more centralised one, such as that adopted for the
Super-Conducting Super Collider with a centralised funding and management in
Waxahachie (Texas) about 15 years ago:
• the flexibility achieved has often provided solutions to the inevitable problems,
which have shown up during the design and construction phase. Whenever a link
in the chain was shown to falter or even to be totally missing, the collaboration
has often been able to find alternate solutions. If a large laboratory had difficulties
in meeting a complex technological challenge alone because of limitations in
funding and human resources, other laboratories with similar expertise could
be sought out and integrated into the effort with minimal disruption. If the
production line for certain detectors did not churn out the required number of
modules per unit time because of yield issues or of an underestimate of the
human resources required, other production lines, often on different continents
with cheaper labour costs, were launched and operated successfully.
• many concrete examples have shown that motivation and dedication to the
project go together with the corresponding responsibilities, both technical and
managerial. It is worthwhile also to note here that it surely would have been
beneficial for the overall LHC project if the management of the ATLAS and
CMS experiments would have been integrated as a real partner into the CERN
management structure at the highest level right from the beginning. Both
experiments were severely handicapped by a cost ceiling without contingency
defined top-down more than 10 years ago.
It is fair to say that, without the motivation and dedication of many of our
colleagues all over the world, who fought and won their own battles at all required
levels (technical, funding, human resources, organisational), and of their funding
agencies, the construction of ATLAS and CMS would not have reached its
astounding and successful completion with only small parts of each experiment