account public interest of preservation and
maintenance of this resource. Such behavior
results in early resource depletion.
In this chapter, the experience of the basin
district’s creation in Russia is highlighted. Basin
councils working in the districts are aimed at
developing recommendations in the field of use
and protection of water objects.
8.2 Theoretical Basis
In fundamental economic works, Gordon (1954),
Scott (1955) devoted to the public goods usage on
the example of fishing, it is shown that in situations, when many individuals have unrestricted
access to the scarce resources of fishing stocks, the
factual amount of the fish caught is higher than the
optimal level, which would ensure the maximum
level of fishers’ private benefit. Later Hardin
(1968) called this phenomenon “the tragedy of
commons”. The reasons for this problem may lie
in the absence of strictly defined and reliably
protected property rights. Both nationalization
and privatization of public good seem to be the
obvious solution to this problem (Gordon 1954).
This approach was motivated by the implicit
assumption of the public goods users’ incapability
to self-organization and self-regulation.
The Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom
doubted the latter statement and gave numerous
empirical counter-arguments (Hess and Ostrom
2003; Ostrom 1990). Ostrom showed that collective access resources can be used without
depletion and depreciation and individuals are
able to manage such resources by themselves
(Ostrom 1990, 1992, 2005; Ostrom and Gardner,
1993).
Natural resources management carried out by
groups of people became widely studied; see, for
example, Pretty and Ward (2001), Mostert et al.
(2007). It was shown that self-organized economic institutions can develop and establish
resource access rules, monitor, and regulate its
usage. As a result, they demonstrate higher
effectiveness than government regulation.
Ostrom suggested to expand the traditional
theory of public goods by creating a notion of
common-pool resource (CPR). They are subtractable, orrivalrous, and non-excludable goods,
i.e. people tend to compete for the consumption
of that resource, since one consumer prevents
simultaneous consumption by other consumers,
but it is very hard to exclude those consumers
who have not paid for that resource (Hess and
Ostrom 2003). Both common-pool resource and
public goods have low level of excludability, but,
in contrast to CPR, public goods are nonsubtractable, such as fresh air or national defense.
Due to the non-excludability, both CPR and
public goods face the problem of underinvesting,
because the individuals do not pay for the good,
supposing that the others pay. This is called “free
rider problem” and it was thoroughly investigated in classic economic literature (Grossman
and Hart 1980; Groves and Ledyard 1977;
Hampton 1987). The subtractability of CPR, in
turn, leads to the problem of overuse, or congestion, when the individuals increase the level
of CPR consumption until it is possible.
CPR became the basic concept in water
resources analysis, because rivers, for example,
are exactly such kind of resources; that is why
one of the ways to solve the problem of water
resource usage is to complement the government
regulation by collective action of water resource
consumers. Thus the alliance of two approaches
to natural resources regulation: monocentric,
implying the existence of special natural resources management state institutions, and polycentric, based on the active role of local
communities—seems to be the most effective.
The second approach involves managing water
resource down up and government institutions
are supposed to perform those functions, which
cannot be performed by individuals or small
groups of people.
8.3 Water Basin Councils in Russia
The Water Code of Russian Federation brought
significant changes in the system of state management of water resource usage and protection
(State Duma 2006). The changes affected the
powers and the relationship between the federal
102
A. S. Aladyshkina et al.
maintenance of this resource. Such behavior
results in early resource depletion.
In this chapter, the experience of the basin
district’s creation in Russia is highlighted. Basin
councils working in the districts are aimed at
developing recommendations in the field of use
and protection of water objects.
8.2 Theoretical Basis
In fundamental economic works, Gordon (1954),
Scott (1955) devoted to the public goods usage on
the example of fishing, it is shown that in situations, when many individuals have unrestricted
access to the scarce resources of fishing stocks, the
factual amount of the fish caught is higher than the
optimal level, which would ensure the maximum
level of fishers’ private benefit. Later Hardin
(1968) called this phenomenon “the tragedy of
commons”. The reasons for this problem may lie
in the absence of strictly defined and reliably
protected property rights. Both nationalization
and privatization of public good seem to be the
obvious solution to this problem (Gordon 1954).
This approach was motivated by the implicit
assumption of the public goods users’ incapability
to self-organization and self-regulation.
The Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom
doubted the latter statement and gave numerous
empirical counter-arguments (Hess and Ostrom
2003; Ostrom 1990). Ostrom showed that collective access resources can be used without
depletion and depreciation and individuals are
able to manage such resources by themselves
(Ostrom 1990, 1992, 2005; Ostrom and Gardner,
1993).
Natural resources management carried out by
groups of people became widely studied; see, for
example, Pretty and Ward (2001), Mostert et al.
(2007). It was shown that self-organized economic institutions can develop and establish
resource access rules, monitor, and regulate its
usage. As a result, they demonstrate higher
effectiveness than government regulation.
Ostrom suggested to expand the traditional
theory of public goods by creating a notion of
common-pool resource (CPR). They are subtractable, orrivalrous, and non-excludable goods,
i.e. people tend to compete for the consumption
of that resource, since one consumer prevents
simultaneous consumption by other consumers,
but it is very hard to exclude those consumers
who have not paid for that resource (Hess and
Ostrom 2003). Both common-pool resource and
public goods have low level of excludability, but,
in contrast to CPR, public goods are nonsubtractable, such as fresh air or national defense.
Due to the non-excludability, both CPR and
public goods face the problem of underinvesting,
because the individuals do not pay for the good,
supposing that the others pay. This is called “free
rider problem” and it was thoroughly investigated in classic economic literature (Grossman
and Hart 1980; Groves and Ledyard 1977;
Hampton 1987). The subtractability of CPR, in
turn, leads to the problem of overuse, or congestion, when the individuals increase the level
of CPR consumption until it is possible.
CPR became the basic concept in water
resources analysis, because rivers, for example,
are exactly such kind of resources; that is why
one of the ways to solve the problem of water
resource usage is to complement the government
regulation by collective action of water resource
consumers. Thus the alliance of two approaches
to natural resources regulation: monocentric,
implying the existence of special natural resources management state institutions, and polycentric, based on the active role of local
communities—seems to be the most effective.
The second approach involves managing water
resource down up and government institutions
are supposed to perform those functions, which
cannot be performed by individuals or small
groups of people.
8.3 Water Basin Councils in Russia
The Water Code of Russian Federation brought
significant changes in the system of state management of water resource usage and protection
(State Duma 2006). The changes affected the
powers and the relationship between the federal
102
A. S. Aladyshkina et al.